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introduction             
Introduction
Aristotle’s political philosophy determines much of the political thinking in the 
history of Western philosophy and politics. however, precisely how his theory 
on the nature of politics has mattered over the ages has varied a great deal. even 
today, approaches to political theory by means of an Aristotelian perspective can 
differ from one another enormously. for obvious reasons, then, the present vol-
ume cannot pretend to offer an overall view of the whole fortune of Aristotle’s 
political philosophy. instead, we concentrate on two segments of this rich his-
tory of reflections, reconstructions and interpretations: the ancient beginnings 
and the modern developments.
Again, the essays dealing with the ancient beginnings cannot attempt to cover 
every aspects of this theory. They pick up certain moments which seem to be 
important for later interpretations as well. As is well known, on Aristotle’s ac-
count ethics and politics constitute what is called practical philosophy. Among 
others, it implies that ethics provides certain basic theses and starting points for 
political theory.
one of the most important Aristotelian ethical theses is the so-called function 
argument (Nicomachean Ethics i 7). its aim is to show that human good is tied to 
the excellent exercise of the proper function of man, and the function of a hu-
man being is an activity of the human soul in accordance with reason. Jakub Jirsa 
shows that the argument can be used to settle an important question about the 
relation between theoretical and practical life, which intrigued so many inter-
preters of Aristotle’s ethical theory. he thinks that the argument offers a good 
ground for interpreting human happiness as theória and that the argumentation 
is coherent with the rest of the Nicomachean Ethics as well. if we think with 
Aristotle that excellence is a fine activity of human soul according to reason, 
then we also have to admit that excellent human praxis also involves the activity 
of a kind of reason, which Aristotle calls phronesis, practical insight.
As a specifically human activity, politics also has to make room for the exercise 
of practical insight. is there any difference between ethical and political phrone-
6 inTroducTion
sis? Péter lautner argues that in the account of phronesis in the Politics Aristotle is 
willing to distinguish between the two cognitive states; statesmen possess prac-
tical insight in the full sense because they know not only the facts but also the 
reasons (a distinction taken from Posterior Analytics), whereas ordinary citizens 
are familiar with the facts only. Thus statesmen are endowed with a cognitive 
element which explains and justifies their leading position in the state.
The aftermath of Aristotle’s theory in hellenistic times has been a subject 
of highly diverse approaches. To take but one sample, from Petrarch’s times 
onwards it was a kind of common opinion that cicero deviated from Aristotle’s 
political philosophy a great deal. Walter nicgorski shows that this claim should 
not be taken for granted. on careful examination, he shows that the tension 
between cicero and Aristotle in matters of politics is much less than has been 
assumed hitherto. cicero can be usefully read as an illuminating commentator 
on and extender of the practical philosophy of Aristotle and his school. Theo-
phrastus offers a nice example of his reading of the practical philosophy of the 
Peripatetics. in his distinctive way and in the context of the late roman repub-
lic, cicero has appropriated and represented the Aristotelian tradition of practi-
cal philosophy in a number of respects.
certainly, ways to make use of the legacy of Aristotelian political theory – it-
self a mixed package – may vary depending on context, political biases, philo-
sophical presuppositions and many other accidentals. This selection of the re-
ception tries to show the relevance of similarities as well as dissimilarities within 
the broad Aristotelian tradition, mainly in the context of 20th century philosophy 
and politics.
But the first author in this section, iwona Barwicka-Tylek needs a deeper 
historical excavation when she tries to show the basic elements of a continuous 
Aristotelian line within the Polish tradition of political thought. her argument is 
interesting both methodologically – as she relies on richard dawkins’s concept 
of memes when describing the nature of receiving Aristotelian ideas by later gen-
erations in different political cultures – and substantially, when she claims that 
the Polish tradition on the whole takes for granted Aristotelian ideas, like zo-on 
politikon, politea and virtue.
next, we have three papers that are closely linked together by common in-
terests of the thinkers discussed in them, concerning themes, authors and tradi-
tions. They have returning heroes of a neo-Aristotelian inclination like Maritain 
or Macintyre, religiously minded thinkers who still use Aristotle for their reflec-
tions, and secular Aristotelian thinkers, who – sometimes surprisingly – use their 
reading of Aristotle for their own purposes – including Yves simon and Martha 
nussbaum, respectively.
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Kelvin Knight is interested in the differences between his cherished author, 
Alasdair Macintyre’s Aristotelian vein and Maritain’s earlier and rather differ-
ently motivated appropriation of Aristotle – as far as their views on human rights 
are concerned. The approach used by Knight is contextually informed, and most 
surprisingly compares the early Macintyre with such analytical thinkers, as the 
young rawls and searle. Knight finishes his paper with considerations of the 
new phenomenon of the institutionalisation of human rights, as it relates to the 
Aristotelian legacy.
Balázs Mezei also uses Maritain as his reference point in an introduction of 
some Aristotelian remnants in Yves simon’s philosophy. While Mezei’s analysis 
is already thought provoking when he gives a revisionist re-evaluation of simon, 
it is the more interesting as he shows the relevance of the different layers of re-
ception within the Aristotelian tradition: simon read his Aristotle both directly 
and indirectly, through – and in dialogue with – the Aristotle interpretation by 
Maritain. While Knight focuses on the issue of human rights, Mezei discusses 
the problem of democracy, as it was laid out by simon in his philosophy deeply 
touched by neo-Aristotelianism.
Another author who takes account of rather diverging interpretations of 
Aristotle in her paper is catherine Zuckert, who looks at contemporary political 
interpreters’ views of how to foster Aristotelian virtue politics in a modern lib-
eral democracy. she does not find some of the answers provided by such diverse 
thinkers, as those of nussbaum, Macintyre, den uyl and rasmussen satisfac-
tory. she points out that the common mistake of these different authors is a 
disregard of the educational activity “in which they, like Aristotle, are engaged.”
finally, ferenc hörcher aims at rethinking some of the basic components of 
an oakeshott-like conservative political theory – while reflecting on the inner 
tension within the heart of this very effort – through a reliance on some Aristo-
telian concepts. he recovers a close conceptual connection between phronesis 
(practical wisdom) and kairos (the right time for action) in connection with the 
political agent. he claims that the time constraint inherent in political activity 
makes virtues (excellences that can be mobilised in crisis situations without 
a time-consuming process of deliberation) and practices (common practical 
knowledge within a political community) seem necessary within a conservative 
political horizon.
Taken together, these essays represent an effort to recapture Aristotelian po-
litical thought in a contemporary philosophical context by a group of authors, 
coming from rather different backgrounds (classical studies, philosophy, politi-
cal theory), but sharing an interest in Aristotle’s ideas; thus, they prove both 
the wide horizon and continuing relevance of the legacy of Aristotelian political 
theory.
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The editors would like to say thanks to hungarian Philosophical review, par-
ticularly the chief editor, dániel schmal for an interest in the topic, and Anikó 
sohár for polishing the non-native speakers’ texts.  This publication was sup-
ported by the TÁMoP 4.2.1. B-11/2/KMr-2011-0002 grant of the european 
union and the hungarian Government. 
Budapest, november, 2013.
Ferenc Hörcher and Péter Lautner
guest editors
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JakuB JIrsa
To ergon tou anthropou1
“Ἕκαστόν ἐστιν, ὧν ἐστιν ἔργον, ἕνεκα τοῦ ἔργου.” 
Aristotle, De caelo ii.3, 286a8–9
ABSTRACT: The article offers an interpretation of the so-called ergon argument in 
Aristotle’s nicomachean ethics I.7. I argue that the argument offers a good ground 
for interpreting human happiness as theória and that the argumentation is coherent with 
the rest of the nicomachean ethics as well. The article provides answers to three wide-
spread critiques of the ergon argument. I claim that the ergon argument covers both the 
moral and intellectual virtues, further I offer a possible interpretation of the difference 
between theória of human beings and theória belonging to gods. Finally, I try to explain 
in what sense a good of human being is good for a human being at the same time.
KEYWORDS: ergon argument, Aristotle, ethics, nicomachean ethics, gods, 
happiness, theória 
1. ArisToTle on The ERGON of MAn
Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics introduces a more substantial account of hap-
piness by an argument concerning to ergon tou anthropou, i.e., the work or func-
tion of man.2 Many scholars dislike this argument and consider it either falla-
1  The research for this paper was supported by GAcr P401/11/0568. i am thankful to 
audiences in Budapest, Vienna and Prague for their comments upon the draft versions of this 
paper.
2  from the numerous literature on this argument i found the following texts relevant to my 
project: clark (1972), Wilkes (1980), Korsgaard (1986), hutchinson (1986), Whiting (1988), 
Kraut (1989): chap. 6, Broadie (1991): chap. 1, Brüllmann (2011): chap. 3, and Brüllmann 
(2012).
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cious or useless.3 My aim in the following paper is to examine the argument and 
defend it from three possible objections found in modern commentaries.
After going through the possible endoxa concerning eudaimonia as the high-
est good (NE i.3–4), Aristotle provides us with several formal characteristics of 
eudaimonia. We do not know yet what eudaimonia consists in or what kind of 
life one ought to live in order to be happy and good, but whatever it could be, 
eudaimonia as the final goal of every doing and deliberation (praxei kai proairesei 
to telos, 1097a21, cf. a23) will have the following characteristics: it will be com-
plete (teleion, 1097a25) in the sense of being a final good that is not demanded 
for anything else but for itself (auta kai di’ auto airetón, 1097a32–4). further, 
it will be self-sufficient (autarkes, 1097b6–11), so that one does not need any-
thing else but this end. Therefore, “happiness is clearly something complete 
and self-sufficient, being the end of our practical undertakings” (1097b21–22, 
transl. rowe).4
According to Aristotle this is a plain truth and he wants to provide a clearer 
or more distinct (energesteron) account of eudaimonia. What is energesteron is bet-
ter known and somewhat more easily recognisable for us than its counterpart 
(cf. Anal. Prior. 68b36, Magna Mor. 1187a30). Therefore, the following account 
should make more lucid what eudaimonia is and what it consists in. The best 
way to clarify the concept of eudaimonia is to consider the ergon of human beings 
(1098a24–25).
The term ergon is usually translated as “function” (irwin, rowe, ross/Brown) 
or “characteristic activity” (crisp).5 none of these alternatives is completely ap-
pealing to me, for – as will be clear from what follows – ergon does not have to 
be an activity and it is not a function in the most common meaning of the term. 
Another possible translation might be “product,”6 however, this term is not fully 
adequate either since it suggests certain separation between the product and 
producer (e.g. between us as individual human beings and our own ergon). The 
human ergon is much closer or even intimate to us than any product we other-
wise produce. The Greek-English Lexicon by h. G. liddell and r. scott offers 
translations like “work,” “deed,” or “matter.” on the other hand, Aristotle’s us-
age of the term corresponds to the third meaning of “function” in Oxford English 
Dictionary: “the special kind of activity proper to anything; the mode of action 
by which it fulfills its purpose.” This meaning seems so Aristotelian that i will 
3  for the list of complaints see Achtenberg (1989. 37).
4  see curzer (1990) on the criteria for happiness.
5  Kenny (1992. 144–5) leaves the term untranslated throughout his translation of this chap-
ter. The most common translation as “function” is sometimes unfortunate since it may mis-
lead the reader into thinking that ergon is merely a predominant activity (cf. Barney 2008. 
314–315); ergon can be understood as “task” or “deed” as well, since it sometimes refers to the 
object done and not the activity of doing, cf. the argument in the Eudemian Ethics ii.1.
6  suggested to me by Gábor Betegh.
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use “function” when it is inappropriate to keep the transliteration of the Greek 
term.7
in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle leaves the term without closer specifica-
tion or definition, but his following reasoning tells us enough to determine what 
he has in mind. Ergon comes complementing praxis (doing), and according to Ar-
istotle, ergon rather than praxis is the seat of the good. Aristotle reasons further:
is it the case that there are some doings and functions for a carpenter or a shoe-
maker, but not for a human being, who is born without anything to do (ἀργός)? 
or just as an eye, hand and foot or any of the bodily parts seem to have a function, 
similarly there could be given some function for a human being alongside with 
these? What would it be? (1097b30–33)
Aristotle does not present the argument that a human being has an ergon in a 
logical form; the above quoted passage is not a case of valid induction nor it is 
an argument from analogy. The examples are too few to make a valid induction, 
and they are clearly picked only from two categories (technai or occupations, and 
merei, bodily parts), further, there is no clear analogy between the examples and 
a human being.8
The text is quite persuasive despite the lack of rigid argumentation. its force 
lies exactly in the nature of the two categories of examples indicated as entities 
having their products. There are two uncontroversial truths in the text: different 
occupations have their erga and bodily parts have their erga as well. Therefore, 
a human being is composed of parts, each part having its ergon in relation to the 
complex whole, i.e., to the human being.9 Moreover, any occupation, or social 
and family status one holds has its ergon as well. i am composed of functional 
elements, and since i am, for example, a son, a father, and a lecturer, i always 
partake in family and social positions having their erga (cf. 1097b11). Aristotle 
thus suggests that it would be extremely unlikely if a being that is virtually sur-
rounded by erga, products, would not have a product on its own.
7  Aristotle, PA 639b19–21 might be a place where the term “function” works smoothly.
8  cf. Broadie (1991. 34) for this criticism. nevertheless, the analogies with bodily parts and 
crafts might play a certain role. none of them is a perfectly fitting analogy, but each of them 
has different reasons for not working entirely, which might be important in understanding 
the concept of ergon. An important aspect that would deserve an entire study on its own is the 
fact that both technai and merei have their erga in relation to a broader, complex entity: the polis 
and the living body. The same seems to hold in the case of human beings as well, namely, 
ergon of a man makes sense in relation to a broader complex entity of the polis, cf. Aristotle, 
Pol. i.2, 1253a33–35.
9  clark (1972. 272) points out that according to Aristotle the organs have functions (erga) only 
in relation to a given whole or as parts of this whole, cf. Aristotle, Metaph. Vii.10, 1035b23.
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At this point Aristotle seems to suppose that the case for a human ergon has 
been made sufficiently. The only specification of ergon within this passage is 
that it is something “own” or “peculiar” (idion) to the entity whose ergon it is 
(1097b34). We learn more from the Eudemian Ethics ii.1 where Aristotle dis-
cusses ergon in the same context,10 and a brief look into this text might help in 
understanding why Aristotle thinks it is not necessary to argue for the existence 
of human ergon:
let this be assumed; and about excellence (ἀρετῆς), that it is the best disposition, 
state or capacity of anything that has some employment or function (τις χρῆσις 
ἢ ἔργον). This is evident from induction (ἐπαγωγῆς): in all case this is what we 
suppose. for example, a cloak has an excellence – and a certain function and em-
ployment also; and the best state of the cloak is its excellence. similarly too with 
a boat, a house, and other things. so the same is true also of the soul; for there is 
something which is its function. (ee ii.1, 1218b37–1219a5, transl. Woods).11
Ergon is described in two ways (dichós). it is either distinct from the employment 
(chrésis) as a house is a product of house-building, or in some cases the employ-
ment itself is the product (hé chrésis ergon) as it is in the case of sight or math-
ematical knowledge (EE ii.1, 1219a13–17).12 The text of EE continues:
for example, a shoe is the product of the art of shoe-making and the activity of 
shoe-making. so if there is some excellence which is the excellence (ἀρετὴ) of 
shoe-making and of a good (σπουδαίου) shoe-maker, their product is a good shoe. 
(ee ii.1, 1219a20–23; transl. Woods, slightly adapted)
from the usage of ergon in NE and EE it can be safely assumed that Aristo-
tle employs the same concept of relation between areté and ergon which Plato 
introduces in the end of the first book of the Republic. There Thrasymachus 
refuses to participate in the discussion and leaves the reasoning solely to socra-
tes himself. his first attempt to investigate “whether just people also live better 
and are happier than unjust ones” (Resp. i, 352d2–4, transl. Grube, rev. reeve) 
soon turns to the discussion of ergon. The ergon of an entity is described as “that 
which one can do only with it or best with it” (352e3) and a bit later in the text 
as what the given entity “alone can do or what it does better than anything else” 
10  see hutchinson (1986) for a detailed interpretation of the ergon argument in the Eudemian 
Ethics ii.1 as well as for the justification of interpreting it together with NE.
11  compare the closing chapter of the Meteorology iV.12, 390a10–13: “What a thing is 
is always determined by its function (ergon): a thing really is itself when it can perform its 
function; an eye, for instance, when it can see.” (transl. Webster)
12  This is one of the passages which questions the translation of ergon as “function” since a 
house is hardly a function in any sense of the word.
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(353a10–11). According to socrates a virtue (areté) is a quality by which one per-
forms one’s ergon well (353c6–7).13 Aristotle shares the basic scheme that ergon 
is something own or peculiar (idion) to an entity and we correctly talk about an 
excellence or virtue of this entity if it performs its ergon well. Therefore, in the 
Nicomachean Ethics i.7 Aristotle can suppose that the listeners (or readers) are 
familiar with this concept of ergon within the ethical discussions and does not 
need to argue for it in the first place.
When asked about the ergon of a human being as such (not a man qua shoe-
maker or father), one could answer that this ergon must be one’s life. Aristotle 
proceeds in this way, but narrows the possible answers down to a practical life of 
an entity possessing reason (praktiké tis tou logon echontos, 1098a3-4) since neither 
vegetative life nor life based on perception is idion to a human being, but they 
are shared with plants and animals (1097b33–1098a3).14 Possession of reason is 
expressed in two ways: as obedience to reason (epipeithes logói), and as actually 
having reason and thinking (echon kai dianooumenon, 1098a4–5). Therefore in 
defining human ergon, one has to consider the activity (energeia) since it is more 
valuable than passive obedience.
This focus on energeia manifests itself in the wordings of human ergon by Ar-
istotle. The first version is the conclusion of the reflections on different forms 
of life sketched above: “the product of human being is activity (energeia) of the 
soul according to reason or not without reason.”15 The soul is the subject since 
it is what makes one alive (EE ii.1, 1219a23–25; cf. DA ii.1, 412a27–29) and it 
is the eidos of a living being (DA ii.1, 412b10 ff.), therefore it can be said that 
human ergon is an activity of one’s soul, since the soul is the eidos of man. The 
second wording of human ergon employs the notion of praxis which reflects the 
discussion about the particular doings of a kitharist. The kind of life Aristotle 
looks for can be summarised as “an activity of soul and doings accompanied with 
reason.”16 A virtuous man is the one who does this well, in accordance with the 
concept of ergon sketched above, and thus leads a good life.17 Aristotle supports 
this conclusion by an analogy: the ergon of a kitharist is to play, the virtuous kith-
arist plays well, similarly, if the ergon of human being is the life described above, 
the virtuous man lives this live in a good and beautiful manner 1729864278 (eu 
13  for the usage of ergon later in the Republic see santas (2006). several interpreters confirm 
Aristotle’s inspiration in Plato’s Republic as well, e.g. Barney (2008. 315 ff.), hutchinson (1986. 
46–48).
14  in the Politics i.2 1253a8–1253a18 Aristotle lists further characteristics which are idion to 
man: articulated speech (logos) and sense of good and bad which allows him to live in societies 
or communities. These characteristics do not threaten the coherence of ergon argument in NE 
i.7 since they are both derived from the fact that man is endowed with reason.
15  NE i.7, 1098a7–8: ἐστὶν ἔργον ἀνθρώπου ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατὰ λόγον ἢ μὴ ἄνευ 
λόγου.
16  NE i.7, 1098a13–14: ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν καὶ πράξεις μετὰ λόγου.
17  cf. Plato, Gorgias 507b-c for a similarly shaped argument in favor of a just life.
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kai kalós, 1098a14–15). The description of this human good then uses the term 
areté already: “human good is an activity of soul in accordance with virtue.”18 
This is the case since Aristotle accepts Plato’s concept from the Republic i that 
we do well by the virtue or because of the virtue.19
human good was defined (perigraphó) but it is still only sketched (hupotupoó), 
so that we have a clearer conception of what Aristotle talks about, and he pro-
ceeds to describe it (anagrafó) in more details (1098a20–22). This description 
then fills the rest of the Nicomachean Ethics and climaxes in book ten, where Ar-
istotle mentions again that human good, eudaimonia, is “an activity in accordance 
with virtue” (kat’ aretén energeia, 1177a12 ). The best activity we are capable of 
is contemplation (theória, 1177a18). so Aristotle returns to the activity of reason 
which he mentioned in book one during the argumentation about ergon (1098a4–
5 compare with 1177a13–17), and declares that eudaimonia is theória (1178b32). 
This conclusion should not surprise us since theória as the highest form of activi-
ty of a wise man (or of a reason of a wise man) satisfies all the conditions Aristotle 
sets for human good in book one. A wise person is the most self-sufficient one 
(autarkestatos, 1177b1, cf. 1097b6-11 ), contemplation is demanded for its own 
sake and does not have any other goal (1177b4 ff, 1177b19–21, cf. 1097a32–4), 
and therefore can be considered more complete (teleion) than life consisting in 
other doings (1178b1 ff.).20 finally, it is the activity of reason that satisfies the 
condition of being peculiar or one’s own at the highest level:
And each of us would seem actually to be this (sc. reason),21 given that each is his 
authoritative and better element; it would be strange thing, then if one chose not 
one’s own life but that of something else. Again, what was said before will fit with the 
present case too: what belongs to each kind of creature is best and most pleasant for 
each;22 for man, then, the life in accordance with intelligence is so too, given that man 
is this most of all. This life, then, will be happiest. (1178a2–8; transl. rowe)
The life of contemplation thus satisfies all the conditions of eudaimonia which 
Aristotle mentions earlier in the Nicomachean Ethics.23
18  NE i.7, 1098a16–17: τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια γίνεται κατ’ ἀρετήν.
19  see the dative ἀρετῇ in Plato, Resp. i, 353c6 which suggests that we accomplish 
something by means of the virtue.
20  curzer (1990) argues that the criteria for happiness in NE i.7 differ from NE X.6–8. his 
text clarifies several important points, but overall it rests on too elaborate and not absolutely 
convincing interpretations.
21  The term nous has to be supplied from 1177b30. Meanwhile it is referred to as “the 
strongest among the things in us” (1177b34).
22  This important part of the argument was mentioned earlier in book nine (1169b33) and 
it comes from Plato’s Republic iX, 585d–e and 586d; Adam (1963), vol. ii, p. 358 points out 
this dependence.
23  What remains an open question is the relation between the life based on moral (and 
social) virtues on the one hand, and contemplative life based on intellectual virtues on the 
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2. oBJecTions
i tried to present Aristotle’s notion of to ergon tou anthropou as convincingly as 
possible. now i will turn to three objections against this conception of construct-
ing human eudaimonia as a final goal of life based on human ergon. The cho-
sen objections occur repeatedly in modern interpretations and their proponents 
consider them so crucial as to undermine Aristotle’s position. According to the 
first objection, the ergon argument is useless within the overall argumentative 
structure of the NE since Aristotle actually depicts not one but two morally sat-
isfying lives: the life of moral virtues described in the central books of NE and 
the contemplative life sketched in book ten. since in NE X.7–8 Aristotle clearly 
argues for the superiority of contemplative life, the ergon argument plays only 
a minor role in introducing the moral virtues and Aristotle leaves it aside in the 
crucial and concluding book X.24
The second objection runs as follows: even if one admits that the ergon ar-
gument is coherent with conclusions in NE X.7–8, the ergon Aristotle states as 
fitting for man does not satisfy his own conditions for being ergon since (a) it is 
not unique (idion) – not only men, but also and foremost the gods contemplate 
and enjoy the activity of reason.25 Moreover, (b) there are many other activities 
or doings peculiar to human beings which Aristotle does not suggest and does 
not discuss.26
finally, the third objection claims that the good of a human being does not 
have to be a good for a human being.27 namely, if justice is an excellence or vir-
tue of human character, it characterises a good life of a human being. however, 
a just man might suffer because of his own justice. in the same way, sharpness is 
a good or virtue of a knife, but it is hard to see how it is good for a knife.
3. The firsT rePlY
is it indeed the case that Aristotle uses the ergon argument solely in order to ar-
rive at describing moral life based on the so-called moral virtues (éthiké areté)28 
and leaves it behind in book ten? or to put it another way, is Aristotle guilty of 
introducing theória as eudaimonia in book ten despite and against the methodol-
ogy and argument in the rest of the Nicomachean Ethics? The possible answer 
other hand. however, this question demands another substantial investigation, for the current 
state of debate, see the summary in dahl (2011).
24  roche (1988. 183). This objection is entertained in Korsgaard (1986. 260) as well.
25  Kraut (1979).
26  Broadie (1991. 36); Whiting (1988. 36–38); Williams (1972. 59).
27  Wilkes (1980).
28  on éthiké areté cf. ΝE ΙΙ.1 1103a14, ii.9 1109a20, Vi.2 1139a22; Vi.12 1144a7.
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has two parts. first, i will show that Aristotle does not leave the ergon argument 
behind and the conclusion within book ten corresponds to the principles laid 
out within the ergon argument in book one. second, it can be demonstrated that 
Aristotle reflects on the relation between contemplative and practical life in the 
middle books of the Nicomachean Ethics in a way which helps us in understand-
ing the relation between moral virtues and contemplative virtues.
indeed, it is the case that the term ergon is missing from the crucial chapters 
on the contemplative life (X.7–8), however, it plays an important role in Aristo-
tle’s discussion of pleasure in chapter five of book ten. Aristotle uses an example 
of different erga in order to support his thesis that “activity’s own pleasure (oikeia 
hedoné) contributes to increasing the activity” (1175a30–31). each man takes 
pleasure doing his own ergon rather than the ergon of anyone else; each one gets 
better in his own activity due to pleasure he finds in it, and this pleasure is said 
to “increase” (sunauxanó) this activity as something which is own to it (1175a31–
b1). This argument then leads Aristotle to a general conclusion that: “each kind 
of creature seems to have its own kind of pleasure, just as it has its own ergon, for 
the pleasure corresponding to its activity will be its own” (1176a3–5).
Moreover, Aristotle refers to this thesis that each one gets most pleasure from 
doing what is his or her own in the conclusion concerning the contemplative life 
as the happiest life. once again, let me quote:
Again, what was said before will fit with the present case too: what belongs to each 
kind of creature is best and most pleasant for each; for man, then, the life in accord-
ance with intelligence is so too, given that man is this most of all. This life, then, 
will be happiest. (1178a4–8).
The reference is to chapter five interpreted above. The quoted passage suggests 
that contemplative life is the ergon of a human being.29 This is the answer to the 
question of what sort of life satisfies the description of “an activity of soul in ac-
cordance with virtue (and if there are more virtue than one, in accordance with 
the best and the most complete)” (1098a16–18).
second, this interpretation is supported by Aristotle’s own reflection on the 
relation between the contemplative life on the one hand, and the so-called life 
of moral virtues on the other hand. Within the discussion of intellectual virtues 
in book six, Aristotle compares phronésis (reasonableness) and sophia (wisdom) 
on two occasions (1141a18–22, 1143b33–35). These comparisons have the same 
results: wisdom is above reasonableness since its objects belong to the greatest 
and most valuable ones within the cosmos (tón timiótatón, 1141a19–20), and wise 
people (sophoi) have knowledge concerning archai (1141a18). Moreover, wisdom 
29  of course much depends on the understanding of life (bios), see Keyt (1989) for one 
possible interpretation.
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is said to rule over and command reasonableness since it either creates reasona-
bleness itself or supplies it with material to work on.30
Aristotle claims that despite this comparison, both virtues, phronésis and 
sophia, are desirable by themselves since they each belong to a different part 
of the soul (1144a1–3). This means that both satisfy an important condition for 
making up eudaimonia (cf.1097a32–4), and they cannot be substituted. Aristotle 
then describes what these virtues do (poiein). he proceeds through all four parts 
of the soul which he distinguished earlier in NE i.12 and Vi.2,31 and lists what 
they do (except the fourth, vegetative part since it cannot be said doing or not 
doing anything at all). Aristotle explicitly states that wisdom produces eudaimo-
nia in the soul (1144a4–5).32 Phronésis and moral virtues contribute to fulfilling 
the ergon of man: virtue is responsible for having the right goal (skopos) and rea-
sonableness for the right means leading to it (1144a7–9). Therefore, contempla-
tive life seems unquestionably higher than life of moral virtues; however, these 
virtues and reasonableness are necessary though not sufficient components of 
eudaimonia since without them one could not fulfil one’s own ergon.33
30  The sentence runs as follows: πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἄτοπον ἂν εἶναι δόξειεν, εἰ χείρων 
τῆς σοφίας οὖσα κυριωτέρα αὐτῆς ἔσται· ἡ γὰρ ποιοῦσα ἄρχει καὶ ἐπιτάττει περὶ 
ἕκαστον (1143b33–35). The explicative gar clause is puzzling and translators to do not agree 
on its meaning. crisp translates it as “in addition, given that a productive science does gov-
ern each product and issue commands about it, it will seem odd if practical wisdom, which 
is inferior to wisdom, is to be put in control of it.” This is the only occurrence of the term 
“productive science” in crisp’s translation. he uses “productive” for poiétiké (e.g. 1139a28, 
b1, 1140a4) and “science” for epistémé (e.g. 1094a26, b4–5). Therefore the phrase “productive 
science” should stand for something like poiétiké epistémé which does not occur anywhere in 
ne (moreover, none of the terms occurs in proximity to this passage; for poiétiké epistémé see 
EE 1216b11ff., Met. 1025b25ff., 1064a17ff.). Brown ross renders it as “Besides this, it would 
be thought strange if practical wisdom, being inferior to philosophic wisdom, is to be put in 
authority over it, as seems to be implied by the fact that the art which produces anything rules 
and issues commands about that thing.” This translation seems much better, yet it is unclear 
why it includes “the art” in the translation of the second clause. rowe’s translation: “in ad-
dition to these problems, it would be strange if wisdom (phronésis) turned out to be inferior to 
intellectual accomplishment (sophia), yet be more authoritative – as it apparently will be, for 
the one that brings the other about will be in control and prescribe on everything.” stewart 
(1892) vol 2. 97 reads the clause so that sophia supplies material for phronésis.
31  The contextual division of the soul in NE seems to be based on three bipartitions; first, 
two parts are distinguished in the soul: reasonless one (alogon) and reason-having one (logon 
echon) at 1102a28. The former one is further divided into the vegetative part and a part that 
shares in reason or at least it can obey it (1102b11 ff.). The reason-having one is then separated 
again into two parts; once at i.13, 1103a1 ff. and this division is confirmed and elaborated at 
Vi.2 1139a4 ff. one subsection of the reason-having part deals with necessary objects and 
connections, the other with all the entities that undergo change, generation and corruption.
32  it is said that sophia produces eudaimonia not as a physician produces health but as health 
produces good state in the body; stewart (1894) vol. 2, p. 98 comments extensively on the 
analogy with health and its implications.
33  compare NE X.7 1177a27ff. on autarkeia in relation to intellectual and moral virtues.
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4. The second rePlY
The second objection had two parts. According to the latter, Aristotle neglects 
various specific doings of man. This can be answered with some help from his 
explicitly stated methodology.34 When Williams criticises Aristotle’s interpreta-
tion since it arbitrarily chooses one peculiar doing of man without discussing 
other options, he writes:
if one approached without preconceptions the question of finding characteristics 
which differentiate men from other animals, one could as well, on these principles, 
end up with a morality which exhorted men to spend as much time as possible 
in making fire; or developing peculiarly human physical characteristics; or having 
sexual intercourse without regard to season; or despoiling the environment and 
upsetting the balance of nature; or killing things for fun. (Williams 1972. 59)35
let us accept that these characteristics are peculiar to man and they do not de-
pend upon the fact of our rationality. nonetheless, Aristotle has a fairly reason-
able reply: all these suggestions are absurd and unconvincing as an ethical ideal. 
This is enough to reject them from a serious inquiry. When Aristotle reflects 
upon his methodology in the Nicomachean Ethics, he makes it clear that he is 
not obliged to go through all logically possible options. first, the study of eth-
ics does not allow the same degree of precision as, for example, mathematics or 
metaphysics (1094b19–27). second, and more importantly, it only takes most 
of the credible opinions (endoxa), and the most important ones (ta pleista kai 
kuriótata, 1145b2–7) into consideration.36 Therefore, Aristotle is not obliged in 
examining all peculiarities of a human being. Anyone suggesting, for example, 
making fire as a human ergon to ground human eudaimonia should first sincerely 
experience a life based on such an ergon before making this claim.
The variety of different peculiarities of a human being does not threaten Ar-
istotle’s argument. But what about the fact that on the one hand, he claims that 
ergon must be something idion (1097b34) and then identifies eudaimonia with 
theória (1178b32) which is rather a life for gods than humans (1178b25 ff.)?37 Ar-
istotle uses the term idion in order to reject the plain fact of living (zén) as human 
ergon since it is common to everything alive including plants, further, he also 
excludes the life based on sensation since it is common to all animals (1097b33–
1098a3). Therefore, when looking for human ergon that is idion, he ends up with 
a complex form of “practical life of an entity that possesses reason” (praktiké tis 
34  extremely useful article is Barnes (1980).
35  Broadie (1991. 36) lists different characteristics but her argument is the same one.
36  compare Aristotle’s position in EE, i,3 1214b28–1215a3.
37  see Kraut (1979) and (1989), chap. 6.1. on the term theória see extremely useful 
roochnik (2009).
JAKuB JirsA: To erGon Tou AnThroPou 19
tou logon echontos, 1098a3–4). This complex form of life is indeed idion to a hu-
man being since gods relate to contemplation (theória) in a different way and 
their form of life cannot be called practical (praktiké) because it is not based on 
any doing (praxis). Aristotle considers contemplation as one possible kind of 
human doing38 and nothing human can last in its activity without interruption 
(1175a4–5). on the other hand, gods do not do anything since no doing (praxis) 
can be worthy of them (1178b17–18). The gods are active in the sense of energeia 
not praxis and their activity is contemplation.39 indeed, the god is this energeia 
and therefore he is constantly happy.40
Therefore, the ergon that is idion to human beings demands phronésis, reasona-
bleness, in order to be achieved (1144a7–9) since it includes doings (praxeis); 
it is, after all “an activity of soul and doings accompanied with reason”.41 if we 
remain satisfied with moral virtues, Aristotle says, we live the second best life 
(1178a9–14) since eudaimonia consists in theória (1178b32). But whereas the god’s 
life is blessed in its entirety, our life only in so far as there is some similarity with 
the god’s activity (energeia). To put it into a nutshell, while for us contemplation 
is something we do (time to time), for the god it is what it actually is.42 human 
beings can only be similar to god since in the moments of theória they share in 
the same energeia that constitutes the essence of god. Within these (perhaps rare) 
moments we, humans, are god-like but our life nevertheless essentially differs 
from god’s mode of existence.
38  cf. Aristotle, Politics, Vii.3 1325b16–21: “Yet it is not necessary, as some suppose, for a 
life of action to involve relations with other people, nor are those thoughts alone active which 
we engage in for the sake of action’s consequences; the study and thought that are their own 
ends and are engaged in for their own sake are much more so. for to do or act well is the end, 
so that action of a sort is the end too” (transl. reeve).
39  NE X.8 1178b21–22: ὥστε ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνέργεια, μακαριότητι διαφέρουσα, θεωρητικὴ 
ἂν εἴη· Aristotle never mentions praxis in relation to the god or gods; he consistently uses 
energeia. cf. Grant (1885), vol. 1, p. 236. 
40  on god as energeia see Met. Xii.7, 1072b26–28: καὶ ζωὴ δέ γε ὑπάρχει· ἡ γὰρ νοῦ 
ἐνέργεια ζωή, ἐκεῖνος δὲ ἡ ἐνέργεια· ἐνέργεια δὲ ἡ καθ’ αὑτὴν ἐκείνου ζωὴ ἀρίστη 
καὶ ἀΐδιος. few lines earlier it says that god’s energeia is his hédoné as well (ἡδονὴ ἡ ἐνέργεια 
τούτου, Met. Xii.7 1072b16) and in NE iX.4 1166a21–23 Aristotle says that god has the 
good solely in virtue of what god is (ἔχει γὰρ καὶ νῦν ὁ θεὸς τἀγαθόν ἀλλ’ ὢν ὅ τι ποτ’ 
ἐστίν).
41  NE i.7, 1098a13–14: ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν καὶ πράξεις μετὰ λόγου.
42  Wilkes (1980. 345) writes “the gods do nothing else,” this is not correct, the gods do not 
do anything, they are the energeia of contemplation.
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5. The Third rePlY
i have suggested possible answers to two objections, according to the third one, 
the good of a human being that is determined by the ergon argument does not 
have to be a good for a human being.43 The ergon argument established that the 
good of a human being consists in “human good is an activity of soul in accord-
ance with virtue” (1098a16–17). now we ask whether it is the case that these 
virtues are good for this human being. it is a crucial question since it exposes 
Aristotle’s ethical theory to an amoralist challenge.44 The question is not only 
whether a corrupt society can threaten eudaimonia of a just and moral person 
since it is unclear whether one can gain any moral virtues while living in a cor-
rupt society in the first place (1179b31 ff.). This question aims at justification of 
Aristotle’s morality to someone who does not accept its basic premises. When 
talking about the human good (anthrópinos agathos, NE 1094b7, 1098a7, 1102a14, 
1140b5 atd.), Aristotle presupposes that the good of man is at the same time 
good for man since nothing that is not his own can be good for him. Yet, what 
can Aristotle answer if someone questions this very assumption?
Aristotle could proceed in two steps. The first attempt might be to appeal to 
a naturally hedonistic point of view since no one would disprove that pleasure 
coming from one’s own doing is good for a human being (not the highest good, 
of course, but simple good since we enjoy it). Aristotle might introduce his basic 
principle that what is one’s own is enjoyable in itself (1169b33). And pleasure is 
essentially connected with activity (energeia) it makes complete:
for the activity’s own pleasure contributes to increasing the activity. it is those 
who are active and take pleasure in it that are more discriminating and precise in 
relation to a given subject, e.g. those who delight in geometry are the ones that be-
come expert in geometry, and are always more able to see things, and similarly the 
lover of music, or of buildings, or whatever it may be – each gets better at his own 
task through taking pleasure in it; but what contributes to increasing something 
belongs to it as its own. (1175a29–36; transl. rowe)
When applied to a human being that is foremost nous, reason (1169a2–3, 1178a2, 
1178a7), the result is that human being not only reaches eudaimonia when con-
templating, but it brings him the highest pleasure as well.45
43  This challenge actually mirrors Glaucon’s problem with justice in the second book of 
Plato’s Republic, 360d-361d.
44  on the amoralist, see Williams (1972. 3–13); Williams (1985. 22–29) and raz (2002), 
chap. 12.
45  cf. NE 1175a19–21: “As for whether we choose living because we want pleasure or 
pleasure because we want to be alive, this is something that may be set aside for the present; 
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What if this answer to an amoralist fails since either he rejects the relation 
between pleasure and activity or he disapproves of Aristotle’s principle linking 
what is one’s own with pleasure and eudaimonia? Aristotle considers both the 
relation between pleasure and activity on the one hand, and the principle that 
what is one’s own is highly pleasurable on the other hand, as basic principles de-
rived from experience (cf. his argumentation at 1104b3ff., 1169b30ff., and X.4-5 
from which i quoted above). The only possible answer to someone who denies 
so basic principles seems to be: go and try. That is why in the Nicomachean Eth-
ics Aristotle says that sufficient experience in doings of life  (tón kata ton bion 
praxeón) is a necessary precondition for a reasonable discourse on moral philoso-
phy (1095a1–13). And he is even more explicit in the Eudemian Ethics: “only 
the opinions of reasonable men should be examined; it would be strange to 
present argument to those who need not argument, but experience (pathous)” 
(EE, 1215a2–3; transl. Woods).46
6. conclusion
i offered a defense of Aristotle’s ergon argument in the first book of Nicomachean 
Ethics from three objections to its coherence and integrity within the overall 
argumentative structure of the NE. in my reading the ergon argument plays a 
crucial role in Aristotle’s moral theory since it allows him to model his theory of 
virtue upon a much broader (and common-sense) notion of excellence as being 
good within one’s own ergon. The result might be frustrating for many inter-
preters since Aristotle argues for a life of contemplation as providing eudaimo-
nia. however, i argued that the moral virtues and reasonableness constitute a 
necessary part of a fully human life; it is this complexity of human life (with 
contemplation as its climax) that best satisfies human ergon. Aristotle’s approach 
is humanistic in the sense that his moral theory rests upon what it means to live 
a human life. nevertheless, it is not humanistic in the sense that human beings 
are not the most (or even the only) valuable entities in the universe. According 
to Aristotle: “in fact there are other things that have a far diviner nature than a 
human being” (1141a34–b1). This seems to be the reason why Aristotle cannot 
be satisfied with a merely mortal, human way of life as an ethical goal.
further, if we take the ergon argument seriously (both in Plato and Aristotle), 
it shows how different this kind of ethics is compared to its modern counterparts 
influenced by hume and Kant. The move from describing human life based on 
for the two things appear to be yoked together, and not to allow themselves to be separated” 
(transl. rowe).
46  Aristotle in the Politics uses the same approach towards those who are mistaken concerning 
the importance of virtue: “We, however, will say to them that it is easy to reach a reliable 
conclusion on these matters even from the facts themselves.” (Polit. Vii.1, 1323a38–40).
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human eidos leads us to the excellence and notion of good human life in a way 
that shows the humean distinction between descriptive and normative to be 
completely anachronistic in this respect.47 surely, it is the case that the term 
eidos is “already normative” in certain contexts (especially in ethics). Moreover, 
one might have problems with accepting that human nature shares in divine or, 
to put it differently, that there is a bit of divine in us. however, these aspects of 
Aristotle’s moral theory do not threaten the main aim of the argument that is still 
interesting and important: to achieve an account of human virtue and good life 
based on what it means to be a human being.
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PÉTer lauTner
Political φρόνησις
ABSTRACT: The paper discusses the relation of φρόνησις to excellences of character 
in matters of politics. The so-called civic excellences play a key role in that connection. The 
various kinds of practical insight shed light to the different positions occupied by ordinary 
citizens and rulers in the state. Their difference is established also by the cognitive states 
they are endowed with; excellent rulers have knowledge, whereas excellent ordinary citi-
zens have right opinion. The distinction will be discussed within the context of Aristotle’s 
treatment of knowledge and opinion in An. Post. II.
KEYWORDS: φρόνησις, civic excellences, expertise, knowledge and right opinion.
near the beginning of Nicomachean Ethics (i 2, 1094a26–28) Aristotle tells us that 
it is the task of political expertise to study the ultimate end of human beings, 
which is happiness, or well-being (εὐδαιμονία). it is the most sovereign, the 
most ‘architectonic’ expertise for it sets out which of the other expertises there 
needs to be in cities, and what sort of expertise people should acquire, and up 
to what point. other expertise such as generalship, household management and 
rhetoric falls under its direction. it makes use of the other practical expertises, 
and legislates about what one should do and what things one must abstain from 
doing. hence its end will comprise the particular ends of the rest. To mention 
but one sample, in a well-governed state, military experts are placed under the 
control of statesmen who have learnt the proper uses to which war should be 
put. There is a priority concerning the end since even if the good is the same 
for the individual and the city, the good of the city is greater and more complete 
thing both to achieve and to preserve. excellences (ἀρεταί), both in character 
and thinking, are necessary for a happy life, which is the final good, and for this 
reason it is a small surprise that they have manifestations in civic life.
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As the intellectual virtue concerned with practical matters, φρόνησις, practi-
cal insight, is central for the unity of excellences of character.1 it is not possible 
to possess excellence in the primary sense without practical insight, nor is it pos-
sible to have practical insight without excellence of character (ne 1144b32–3). 
its role is linked to the problem of how to follow the rules in the city. The just 
person is not a automatic follower of rules. it is fairly easy to follow the rules of a 
given community, and practically any adult can perform it without much think-
ing. People believe that to have recognised what is just and what is unjust in-
volves no special accomplishment; they assume that it is not hard to understand 
the issues the laws address (ne 1137a10 ff.). To show it, he takes the example of 
medicine. in general, we all know what makes for health; it is a matter of honey, 
wine, hellebore, cautery and surgery. But we have to be a doctor to know how to 
administer them with a view to producing health, and to whom, and when. To 
have excellences of character in full we need φρόνησις and vice versa, to have 
φρόνησις we need excellences of character (ne 1144b32). The excellence of 
lawfulness is not just a matter of being law-abiding. As Aristotle puts it, due to 
his intellectualistic position socrates might have thought that the excellences 
were prescriptions, although we can only say that they are accompanied with 
prescriptions. Practical insight is one, and if it is present, all the excellences will 
be present with it. it has a certain kind of generality since if every excellence 
of character had a kind of practical insight of its own, we would not be capable 
of deciding what to do in each situations. concrete situations may call for the 
exercise of several excellences of character, but it is one decision that has to 
be made. furthermore, if practical insight is a stable state of the soul, like all 
the excellences of character (ne 1105a33), it has to have all the excellences of 
character since the lack of a single one would weaken its performance.2 conse-
quently, strictly speaking excellences of character imply one another indirectly 
because each requires practical insight, which connects them. The uniting fac-
tor is φρόνησις.3 excellences of character do not involve one another in the way 
we read it in Plato’s Protagoras. There is no logical dependency between these 
excellences because unity is provided by an external factor, the practical insight 
which is an intellectual virtue. here we can also see that as an intellectual vir-
tue φρόνησις connects the two definitions of human being. As an intellectual 
virtue it provides the ground for the definition according to which humans are 
rational animals, and as a virtue guaranteeing the unity of virtues it justifies the 
1  for an overview of the scholarly discussion of the topic, with a particular emphasis on 
political issues, see Bodéüs (1993. 27–30).
2  see Broadie-rowe (2002. 383).
3  it is important to have in mind, as has been shown by engberg-Pedersen (1983. 56 with 
reference also to Politics 1253a7–18), that as a uniting factor φρόνησις plays a crucial role in 
connecting the “altruistic” reasoning and the so-called prudential reasoning which concerns 
the agent and his personal long-term good.
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definition that humans are political animals. on this account practical insight is 
the virtue which enables us to recognise what is good and useful for us.4 There 
are two questions to be raised. What is the role of practical insight in action 
and how to understand the relation between practical insight and excellences of 
character in politics?
As for the first, i do not argue for a thesis of my own. for present purposes, 
i simply accept –because i find it persuasive – the claim that the role of practi-
cal insight is not only to find the most appropriate means to reach the goal set 
by emotional dispositions. its main constituents, deliberation (βούλευσις) and 
decision (προαίρεσις), are not just about finding the best means towards certain 
goals. rather, they concern goals and means alike. Although the final goal, hap-
piness or well-being, is not something to be deliberated since it is encoded in us 
– we have a certain natural drive towards it – the particular goals can be subject 
to deliberation and thus fall within the authority of practical insight.5
The question to be settled now is whether the scheme we have found in 
Nicomachean Ethics Book 6 applies to politics as well. To see it, first i shall dis-
cuss the so-called civic excellences (πολιτικὴ ἀρετή), which might modify the 
scheme we have learnt in the ethics, and then i suggest a possible way of relat-
ing them to practical insight. The second point involves some general claim 
about the role of practical insight in politics. Among others, one has to clarify the 
difference between the practical insight of the ruler and the practical insight of 
the ordinary citizen.
excellence has a formative role in the life of a city. Aristotle insists in Politics 
that rulers must have complete excellence in character (1260b17–18). later on 
(1277a14–15) he adds that the good ruler has not only a fine character but also 
practical insight. As a matter of fact, φρόνησις is the only excellence peculiar to 
the ruler (1277b25–26).6 At least, the ruler must possess it in the full sense. in 
Books 3 and 8 Aristotle claims that civic excellence must be taken into account 
by those who respect the laws (1280b5–6). however, the law does not make us 
good and lover of justice; it is nothing but a certain contract.7 excellence must 
4  see Kamp (1985. 86–87).
5  see, e.g., Wiggins (19983) and ebert (1995). The former also emphasises (235–236) that 
the decisive property of the man of practical insight is the ability to select those features that 
are related to the notion of living well – whose accomplishment is his constant aim – from 
an infinite number of features of a situation. The latter draws attention to the problem of 
interpreting practical insight as a moral notion. With reference to ne 1141a27–28, he stresses 
that Aristotle considered certain non-rational animals as possessing practical insight, but that 
hardly means that they are considered as capable of acting morally. 
6  it follows that the good citizen who is not a ruler cannot possess excellence in character in 
the full sense, the point has been developed in Kraut (2002. 370–71). however, that does not 
mean that the excellences of the rulers could be opposed to the excellences of the subjects, 
see 1277b18–20 and Kamp (1985. 204–205).
7  συνθήκη (1280b10). Aristotle refers to lycophron the sophist as someone thinking that 
laws are a result of contract. he criticises lycophron’s theory by saying that laws conceived of 
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be cared for in a city worthy of its name. if it were not the case, the city would 
only be a community for reaching certain goals by fight (συμμαχία). it would 
be nothing but an ad hoc gathering. furthermore, there would be no difference 
between this city and a loose alliance of settlements located far away from one 
another. nature endows us with the latent capacity for civic excellence and an 
impulse to live in a community (1253a29–30).8 it does not mean that civic excel-
lences are of the same kind. different citizens have different capacities, just as 
sailors differ in capacity since one is a rower, one a pilot, one a lookout. for this 
reason, the most accurate account of the excellence of each citizen will be pecu-
liar to each (1276b20–25).9 it is clear that justice is an important excellence here 
for it qualifies interpersonal relations. The main concern in a true city is that 
citizens should abstain from being unjust to another fellow-citizen (1280b4–5), 
which contributes to unity. due to its interpersonal nature, justice is the most 
important excellence from the point of view of the city. in ideal circumstances, 
equality in excellence matters more than noble birth, and those who excel in 
justice have a greater share in the advantages of the city (1281a7). We might 
expect that just as excellences in general, civic excellences are acquired through 
habituation. on criticising the craft-model of excellences, Aristotle asserts that 
they cannot be taught in the way we learn a craft, as a collection of general rules. 
As he famously claims, excellence is not a matter of rule-following.10 on de-
scribing the acquisition of civic excellence, however, Aristotle offers a modified 
version of the thesis. interestingly enough, a way of acquiring civic excellence 
leads through the learning of rhythm and harmony (1341a1). Music is capable 
as contracts lack the power of making the citizens good and just, see 1280a1–b12. for further 
consequences of the critique, see Bien (1973/1985. 222–223). 
8  see Keyt (1991. 125). he argues that Aristotle’s theory does not imply that humans 
live in political community by nature. instead, political community is an artefact of practical 
insight. on this interpretation Aristotle’s theory comes very close to hobbes’s view who fa-
mously claims that the polis is a product of art. one might say that it does not rule out that the 
polis as a certain artefact exists for good. There was no such period in the history of mankind 
in which political community did not exist. By contrast, hobbes seems to have accepted a 
pre-political phase in the history of mankind. This is not to say that there is no change in the 
history of different forms of political community, since deformations of practical reason may 
lead to bad political communities such as tyranny. on this, see Kullmann (1991. 99–101) who 
argues that Aristotle did not accept such a phase.
9  see roberts (2009. 557). she also emphasises that civic excellence is connected to par-
ticular political circumstances.
10  As it is clear in the discussion about practical insight in NE Vi (e.g., 1142a12–16) where 
Aristotle points to the significance of experience in acquiring it, which has been thoroughly 
discussed by hursthouse (2006) who emphasises the skill-like character of φρόνησις. see 
also Mulgan (1987. 10) and surprenant (2012. 223–225). Although it is certainly true that 
practical insight combines intellectual strength with experience in order to facilitate right 
decisions, one also has to pay attention to Politics 1277b28–29 where we are told that the 
ruler who has practical insight has knowledge as well, and the two properties are tied to one 
another. Thus the intellectual side of practical insight is contrasted to the cognitive state of 
ordinary citizens.
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of reforming the character of the soul (1340b10–13). The modification recalls 
Plato’s description of the educational process of the youth in the Republic. dif-
ferent kinds of music give rise to different dispositions of the soul. it also makes 
a big difference as to which instrument the young is supposed to play; flute and 
cithera are not advised, the former being all too frivolous anyway (οὐκ ήϑικὸν 
ἀλλά ὀργιαστικόν, 1341a21–22). The primary aim of musical education is not 
to produce professionals. rather, it aims at cultivating taste and establishing 
proper dispositions in the soul. despite the divergence from the thesis on ha-
bituation in Nicomachean Ethics i, Aristotle insists that civic excellence is not 
something to be taught by way of direct indoctrination, even if the way of its 
acquisition is somewhat different from what he suggests in the ethical work. it 
seems, therefore, that civic excellences do not differ in kind from those excel-
lences which Aristotle discusses in the ethics. hence their internal relations may 
not differ from those mentioned in the ethical treatises either. We might get a 
more complex picture, however, if we examine the context in which practical 
insight is introduced in the Politics.
it seems that excellence can be attributed, not only to individuals, but to 
cities as well. courage, justice, practical insight and, perhaps, temperance of 
the city have the same power and form as the one we find in each person hav-
ing those characteristics (1323b34 ff.).11 Without them the city cannot function 
properly. i suppose that the moral qualities of a city are derivative of those in 
the individual. derivation may take two forms: we say either, for example, that 
the city is courageous because the citizens are courageous, or courage is a kind of 
supervenient quality which comes from good arrangement and proper distribu-
tion of tasks. nothing seems to support the second option. it implies, however, 
that the analysis in the ethical works applies to communal life as well. This may 
be the reason why Aristotle does not examine them in detail in the Politics. nev-
ertheless, the common root allows for certain variations which are due to the ar-
gumentative context. it is a matter of practical insight to recognise the best laws 
and those which fit the polities (1289a12). it is not just a technical skill which 
can be used for various purposes, good or bad alike.12 here Aristotle maintains 
the difference he made in the Nicomachean Ethics between practical insight and 
cunningness (ἀγχινοία/δεινοτής) which is a neutral strength of thinking on 
practical matters.13 furthermore, it is linked to age which leads to a distribu-
tion of work in the city. Youth is naturally more vigorous and powerful, whereas 
11  in line b34 σωφροσύνη was added by the Greek humanist scholar Adamantios Korais.
12  in 1253a34 he says that men are born with weapons for excellence in character and prac-
tical insight but such weapons can be used for evil purposes lacking excellence in character. 
one might allow the possibility that excellence in character alone may cause such a situation. 
for an explanation, see schütrumpf (1) (1991), ad loc.
13  or, practical insight can be deformed into cleverness in tyranny (Pol. iii 7), as has been 
emphasised by Kamp (1985. 282).
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older people are more likely endowed with practical insight (1329a9–15). Ac-
cording to this division, the citizen body is divided into fighting and counselling 
part.14 rulers emerge from this social ambience of the city for they must pos-
sess practical insight. Thus the additional information we gain by reading the 
Politics may be twofold. first, as for its cognitive nature, practical insight must 
be knowledge, not just right opinion. The difference between the two cognitive 
states will be discussed later. furthermore, as a consequence, practical insight 
enables us to see which law is the best and which fits the polity – for laws must 
be adjusted to polity, not vice versa. second, it can contribute to the distribution 
of social roles as well, since its possession qualifies people to take part in the life 
of the city in a specific way.
now it seems that the function of practical insight is very much tied to the 
exercise of civic (πολιτική) expertise, and as a result, to the exercise of political 
power.15 ruling requires practical insight for excellent performance. The inti-
mate link between them has been described in Nicomachean Ethics Book 6. in a 
typically Aristotelian manner we are told (1141b23–24) that practical insight and 
civic expertise are the same state (ἕξις), although their being is different, which 
may mean that they are different manifestations of the same capacity.16 At this 
point, it has not been settled yet whether they are partly or entirely different 
from one another. in so far as the disposition concerns the city, the architectonic 
form of practical insight is legislative expertise with the task of discovering and 
establishing the best laws in the society in question (ne 1141b25), whereas at 
the level of individuals it has the common name ‘civic expertise’ and is con-
cerned with action and deliberation.17 later he adds that it also has a kind called 
judicial (δικαστική) expertise (1141b34) which must have something to do with 
practice in the courts.18 Architectonic and civic forms of practical insight must be 
connected for the following reason. The decree by which the city is managed, 
is something to be acted upon, as what comes last in the process which includes 
both deliberation and legislation. The decree is issued by way of a legislative 
procedure which involves practical insight. We can observe that Aristotle starts 
his argument from the observation of common conceptions. in everyday usage, 
14  1329a31: ὁπλητικόν… βουλευτικόν.
15  i think πολιτική must be supplemented with τέχνη (expertise), not with ἀρετή (excel-
lence), see Broadie-rowe (2002. 183, 373).
16  This is controversial, ebert thinks (1995. 169) that they are the same state, and their 
difference is nominal only. difference in being might involve difference in definition, see 
Broadie-rowe (2002. 373–4).
17  This is related to concrete political action which differs from legislation, as has been 
emphasized by Bien (1973/1985. 138).
18  in 1141b30–34 Aristotle enumerates the different kinds of practical insight conceived of 
as “caring about one’s own interest” (contrasted with the involvement in political matters), 
which are household management, legislative and civic expertise, the latter being divided 
into deliberative and legislative expertises. The classification interlocks with the division 
of architectonic form of practical insight in an interesting way, an issue i cannot discuss here.
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practical insight is the ability of the person to take care of himself as an individ-
ual (1141b30). By way of expansion, which Aristotle thinks advisable, it relates 
to household management as well. The relation between the two main forms of 
practical insight is not quite clear, but so much may be said that civic expertise 
is not an implementation of rules laid down by the architectonic form.19 We can-
not rule out that even if the architectonic form is superior, it is originated in the 
person’s care for himself.20 The comparison between judicial and deliberative 
oratory in the Rhetoric may also support the claim.21 There Aristotle says that 
speaking in the assembly is prior to legal debates because in political debates 
it is useless to speak outside the subject. for this reason deliberative oratory 
leaves less scope for manipulation than judicial speech. on his view, political 
argumentation is linked to public deliberation in the course of which each mem-
ber of the audience has to decide about something familiar to him. This is not 
the case in the courts where the jury decides about issues concerning other peo-
ple. Thus political debates may provide a better condition for rational persua-
sion since they concern issues that are important to each citizen as citizen. As a 
consequence, citizens consider the problems discussed as their own and they try 
to get as much and thorough information about it as possible.
We have seen that political expertise and practical insight arise from the same 
state of the soul, although practical insight has manifestations that do not belong 
to the sphere of polity. Among the political manifestations of practical insight 
the most important are the recognition of the best law and the one which fits 
best the ideal polity, and the involvement in the legislative process. it does not 
mean that some manifestations remain within the confines of private life. We 
have also seen that it is knowledge which can be contrasted with right opinion; 
rulers have knowledge. By contrast, the good citizen does not need practical 
insight, but only right opinion (1277b28–29).22 As he occupies a lower office, his 
decisions are of a limited range and weight, and can be overseen by the ruler 
having practical insight. Aristotle does not claim, and we do not have to assume, 
that φρόνησις amounts to an abstract, theoretical knowledge.23
19  see Broadie-rowe (2002. 373).
20  This is a well-known method of Aristotle, see his discussion of friendship in NE Book 9. 
famously, he derives friendship from self-love.
21  Rhetoric 1354b22–1355a1. i owe this point to Miklós Könczöl.
22  schütrumpf (2) (1991. 433–434) discusses the Platonic origin of the distinction but does 
not examine the question of the content of these cognitive states within the context of the 
Aristotelian distinction in An. Post. ii. i will not deny, of course, that Aristotle was aware of 
Plato’s distinctions. i shall only try to put it into an Aristotelian context. surprenant (2012. 
224) explains the passage by saying that “a citizen is able to display phronesis at the point 
when he becomes a ruler. if and when he ceases to be a ruler, his judgment, which was for-
merly considered to be phronesis, is no longer knowledge but opinion.” he thus seems to link 
the possession of practical insight to social status. it is not clear whether difference in status 
implies difference in content as well.
23  As has been emphasised convincingly by Bodéüs (1993. 34–37).
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There remains to examine the character of the difference between the two 
cognitive states. how to distinguish between knowledge and true opinion in 
this context? The thesis sounds almost like a Platonic distinction. it may be 
clear that, as an excellence of the thinking faculty of the soul, practical insight 
must not only be a fine exercise of thinking on practical matters, but also has to 
possess (or has to have access to) a specific content.24 in order to be knowledge, 
then, practical insight must have propositional content. We have to bear in mind 
also that practical insight is knowledge about particulars as well (1142a15). it 
implies that the content may not be made up of universal statements, or, to 
put it with more reservation, it may not be made up of universal statements 
exclusively. Thus the distinction between knowledge and true opinion is not 
to be equated with the distinction between universal and particular statements. 
What is the rationale for setting apart the two cognitive states?  My sugges-
tion is that the difference might not amount to the difference between a true 
statement of fact and a true statement of fact accompanied with a right causal 
explanation. it is a much discussed difference between a hoti- and a dia ti-type 
of propositions. Aristotle discusses it at length in Posterior Analytics.25 There, in 
Book ii, he compares opinion with knowledge. first, knowledge is universal 
and acquired by necessary premises. opinion is a consequence from premises 
that express contingency (88b30–89a2). if the difference mentioned in the Poli-
tics were of this kind, however, then we run into a serious difficulty. how can the 
rulers have necessary knowledge about matters concerning the polis? The rul-
ers’ knowledge must be practical knowledge which is about contingent things.26 
The crucial component of practical insight, deliberation, rests on the very pos-
sibility of things’ being otherwise. The second option for distinguishing opinion 
and knowledge is that right opinion is about the fact only (89a22–23). Aristotle 
claims that if someone thinks that the propositions are true but his thought does 
not follow from the nature of the subject-matter, he will have opinion and not 
knowledge.27 in this way, opinion is both of the fact and of the reason. opinion 
24  The distinction between possessing and having access to certain content may suggest 
that the exact status of the intellectual excellences might be vague. We may say either that 
practical insight is a sub-faculty on its own, and has its own content, or the thinking faculty 
works differently in different situations (which fit the threefold division of sciences) and has 
a unitary content of different kinds propositions. At this point i do not see clear evidence for 
any of the options.
25  see 78a22, 79a23, 88b30–89b6.
26  The primary example of someone having practical insight is Pericles (ne 1140b10) 
whose excellence was manifest, not in possessing universal knowledge, but in administering 
the affairs of the state. Aubenque (1963. 54–56) also draws attention to the fact that Aristotle 
chose a politician as an example, which may be due to his insistence on the supreme position 
of political knowledge as well.
27  if opinion rests on the immediate premises, on premises that are not derived by correct 
reasoning from necessary premises, it can be both about fact and about reason. for an analysis 
of the passage (89a3–18), see ross (1949/1965. 607).
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can be of fact only if it follows from immediate premises. Thus we have two pos-
sibilities to separate the cognitive state of the rulers from that of the subjects. 
first, unlike good rulers, then, good citizens know the fact but cannot provide 
causal explanation for that. on the other hand, subjects can opine on reasons 
but in doing so they do not exploit the nature of the subject-matter.28 The latter 
option may involve that they do not rely on the necessary, definitional proper-
ties of the subject-matter. Thus the knowledge of the rulers can be based on 
necessary premises but they do not express the necessity of events since events 
are not necessitated in the practical world. rather, the premises express the 
necessary presence of certain properties.29 it is important to realise that such a 
distinction is missing from the analysis of practical insight in the Nicomachean 
Ethics. The reason for the omission is not quite clear and i cannot pretend to 
have a persuasive answer at this point.30
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Cicero on Aristotle and Aristotelians
ABSTRACT: Set against tendencies in the Renaissance and later political theory to 
see Cicero in tension with Aristotle, this research essay reports the results of a close study 
of all of Cicero’s texts that bear on his reading, understanding and assessment of Aristotle 
and the Peripatetic school. The essay necessarily attends to Cicero’s sources for his encoun-
ter with Aristotle and affirms, with some qualifications, Cicero’s overall continuity with 
the moral and political thought of Aristotle.
KEYWORDS: Aristotle, cicero, socrates, Theophrastus, Peripatetic, new 
Academy, rhetoric, stoic, dialogues, Virtue, equality, Petrarch.
[M]y philosophical writings differing very little from Peri-
patetic teachings, for both i and those men wish to follow 
in the socratic and Platonic tradition… (cicero, De Officiis 
i. 2)
cicero was rome’s “best Aristotelian”. (dante)1
The authority of the American declaration of independen-
ce rests in part on its drawing from “elementary books of 
public right as Aristotle, cicero, locke, sidney, etc.” (Tho-
mas Jefferson, 1824/1973. 12)
This research essay provides the basis, in cicero’s own writings, to see his moral 
and political thinking as a significant roman manifestation of political Aristo-
telianism. it examines closely his assessment of Aristotle’s political legacy and 
the necessary preliminary topic of cicero’s sources for understanding Aristotle 
1  This was dante’s judgement according to A. e. douglas (1965, 162) and Paul renucci 
(1954, 331). A seemingly different claim made by the 20th century scholar ernest fortin (1996, 
33) was that cicero and Varro are “Plato’s roman disciples.”
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and the teachings of the Peripatetic school founded by Aristotle. The essay thus 
lays important groundwork for more focused comparative examinations of such 
topics as equality, democracy, mixed government, human rights and natural law. 
since cicero’s selective but substantial appropriation of Aristotle’s practical phi-
losophy to his thinking entails a commentary on it, his own moral and political 
philosophy illuminates not only some of the possible features but also some of 
the difficulties and challenges for a modern Aristotelian public philosophy.
The TrAdiTion of oPPosinG ArisToTle And cicero
following dante and indeed cicero himself and thus seeing cicero largely in 
continuity with Aristotle, requires, at the very least, some notice of those who 
have thought otherwise. There is a “modern” tradition that emphasizes the op-
position and tension between cicero and Aristotle. Manifestations of this appear 
at least as far back as the early renaissance. here it is possible only to give a 
sketch and small sampling of the arguments and concerns of this tradition. it 
is well to have such arguments and concerns in mind as this essay proceeds to 
examine the texts of cicero. 
The more recent manifestation of this tradition and the form of it that has 
had a direct impact on the study of political theory in the past century is that 
most often traced to the carlyles’ opening chapter on cicero in their six-volume 
work entitled A History of Mediaeval Political Theory in the West.2 They argue that 
“the dividing-line between the ancient and the modern political theory” occurs 
in the period between Aristotle and cicero and is signaled by the “change … 
startling in its completeness” between Aristotle’s “view of the natural inequal-
ity of human nature” and cicero’s opposing view. in cicero’s and later roman 
thought they see “the beginnings of a theory of human nature and society of 
which the `liberty, equality, and fraternity’ of the french revolution is only 
the present-day expression.”3 cicero is seen as seminal to and largely in accord 
with the liberal thinking of modernity, and his frequent antithesis in these por-
trayals, Aristotle, is consigned to a quite alien and justly irrelevant past.4 
2  r.W. carlyle and A.J. carlyle (1903). cicero’s position in this larger work dramatizes the 
carlyles’ view that cicero’s political thought marks an important turn, to be further devel-
oped via mediaeval political theory, toward the egalitarian and popular foundations of modern 
political thinking.
3  carlyle & carlyle (1903, i, 8–9). following in this vein of seeing a fundamental divide 
between Aristotle and cicero are Mcilwain 1932, 1947, sabine 1960, cumming 1969, Mccoy 
1950, 1963. The latter three are not as focused on equality as are the carlyles and Mcilwain 
in seeing this as the single fundamental difference.
4  All of those writers here associated with the carlyles’ “great divide” thesis do acknowl-
edge various continuities between cicero’s and Aristotle’s thought. in the case of the car-
lyles’ own work, even as they focus on cicero as a champion of human equality they notice 
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This embrace of cicero at the expense of Aristotle runs more deeply in mo-
dernity than the formative analysis by the carlyles at the turn into the last cen-
tury. in 1706, at the very beginning of what has been not unfittingly called “a 
ciceronian century” (Wood 1988, 3), Jean Barbeyrac published An Historical 
and Critical Account of the Science of Morality which initially in french and then 
later in english translation (1749) appeared as a preface to Pufendorf’s The Law 
of Nature and Nations. richard Tuck, my source for the account of Barbeyrac’s 
work, reports his view that among ancient philosophers “only the stoics had 
come anywhere near to giving an adequate account of man’s moral life” (1979, 
174–75). “…[W]ithout dispute, the best Treatise of Morality, that all Antiquity 
has produc’d” claimed Barbeyrac, is cicero’s De Officiis. As for Aristotle, Bar-
beyrac saw his influence as a moral teacher ever ascendant after the fall of rome 
and lamented this, for from Aristotle came “scholastic Philosophy; which … 
with its barbarous cant, became even more prejudicial to religion and Moral-
ity, than to the speculative sciences” and produced an ethics which “is a Piece 
of Patchwork; a confus’d collection, without any order, or fix’d Principles … .” 
At the root of what unfolded in Western history was, according to Barbeyrac, 
Aristotle’s failure to grasp “just ideas of the natural equality of Mankind; and, 
by some of his expressions, he gives occasion to believe, that he thought some 
Men to be, by nature, design’d for slaves … . Thus this vast Genius of nature, 
this Philosopher, for whom such numbers have so great a Veneration, proves 
to be grosly (sic) ignorant of, and, without any scruple, treads under foot, one 
of the most evident Principles of the law of nature”. Barbeyrac’s work shows 
then not only a modern ancestry for the carlyle’s thesis of the “great divide” but 
also an emphasis on the way human equality is treated as the significant point 
at issue in the divide. The carlyles’ and Barbeyrac’s understanding of what is at 
issue in the “divide”, with varying emphases in one or another expression of this 
position, sees Aristotle as viewing man as never simply equal and in his place in 
a structured polis which has nourished and educated him; cicero is found em-
phasizing man as an individual, substantially if not simply equal to others, with 
whom he stands in a universal human community under nature and equipped to 
read nature with reason to provide self-direction. The making of such a division 
between Aristotle and cicero obviously involves interpretations of Aristotle as 
passages where they find him “speaking under the influence partly at least of the Aristotelian 
principle of the fundamental distinction in human nature; [they] find him thinking of man-
kind as capable of being divided into those who are able to govern themselves and those who 
are not” (12). Adding that these passages do not change their overall view, they see these 
passages being in contradiction to that view and take refuge in cicero’s alleged weakness as 
a philosopher: “it must be remembered that cicero’s eclecticism is in part the expression of 
a certain incoherence in his philosophical conceptions, and that it is not a matter for any great 
surprise that we should find him holding together opinions hardly capable of reconciliation.”
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well as of cicero’s texts; in what will follow later, we proceed only from the side 
of cicero. 
first, however, there is need to look to the second form of the “modern” tra-
dition of opposition and to bring out the nature of the differences between Aris-
totle and cicero as found in this approach. This form of opposing Aristotle and 
cicero goes more deeply into our past than the strain which we have just found 
as far back as Barbeyrac at the beginning of the eighteenth century. Though 
apparently beginning in the renaissance and humanist enthusiasm for cicero, 
the outcome of this way of opposing “the philosopher” and “the orator” works 
in time to elevate Aristotle in a manner that significantly diminishes the philo-
sophical weight of cicero. This form of the tradition seems then to be rooted 
both in the renaissance enthusiasm for cicero over Aristotle and in the coun-
terattack of Aristotelians that, later joining with the concern for a comprehensive 
and scientific knowledge that emerges in the post-Baconian period, appears to 
have been largely successful.5 
The conflict between Aristotelians and ciceronians as the renaissance 
dawned is signaled by observations like that of Jerrold seigel that in the four-
teenth and fifteenth centuries cicero became among humanists, “the object of 
the kind of enthusiasm” directed earlier at Aristotle (1968, 30). The new enthusi-
asm for cicero should not, however, invite generalizations that oversimplify and 
too sharply differentiate the renaissance as ciceronian and the Medieval period 
as Aristotelian, or that consider cicero as first really embraced and properly un-
derstood in the renaissance. earlier in a similar vein in his Cicero Scepticus, c. P. 
schmitt wrote (1972, 33) that “cicero’s influence during the Middle Ages was 
enormous … . perhaps as great as Aristotle’s”. And on the renaissance side of 
this divide, there is, of course, a vigorous Aristotelianism that manifests itself, in 
one way, in what seem to me sound efforts to emphasize the essential harmony 
between cicero and Aristotle at least in moral philosophy and specifically with 
respect to rhetoric’s moral status.6 Though the concepts of Aristotelianism and 
ciceronianism, just as the much attacked concepts of the renaissance and Mid-
dle Ages, do tend to sharpen artificially and thus falsely actual differences (not to 
speak of how they might contribute to polarizing our conceptions of Aristotle’s 
and cicero’s thought), these concepts and the conflict they are used to describe 
in this case are hardly mere constructs of intellectual historians. My purpose 
5  cicero’s philosophical ability and significance first comes under attack in the course of 
the controversy between ciceronians and Aristotelians in the renaissance. Before that, there 
is pervasive respect, if not acclaim, for him as a philosopher though there is a tradition, to 
which Augustine chiefly gives birth, of differentiating cicero’s thought from the fullness of 
truth and genuine wisdom that is possible in the light of christian revelation.
6  see especially seigel 1968, chap. iV, and 1966, 38–39. see also Tuck 1979, 44–45, 176. 
Tuck emphasizes at several points that the renaissance Aristotle is not invariably the Aristo-
tle of the scholastics.
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here, of course, is not to detail the development of this conflict or describe fully 
its many varieties and complexities. My knowledge of the conflict is dependent 
on the work of other scholars supplemented by my study of a substantial por-
tion of Petrarch’s writings.7 it is Petrarch, that great ciceronian enthusiast of the 
early renaissance, whom i primarily utilize in an effort to state what is at issue 
in this form of the tradition of opposition. 
Petrarch’s writings provide considerable material not only on what he thought 
distinguished cicero’s thought but also on the nature of the Aristotelian attack 
on his ciceronianism and his response to it. Petrarch is direct and unqualified in 
making clear that his initial attraction to cicero was based on his eloquence, that 
this dimension of cicero remains critically important for him, and that the lead-
ing edge of the Aristotelian attack echoes an old charge against cicero, namely 
“much eloquence but little wisdom”. Thus cicero’s rhetorical achievement and 
notable concern with rhetoric seem for the Aristotelians a badge of his philo-
sophical inferiority. The chief issue in the conflict, as it emerges in Petrarch’s 
writings, is then a ciceronian esteem for eloquence and rhetoric versus an Aris-
totelian “despising” of it, or at the least holding it suspect (1948b, 53–54, 61–62, 
85, 87, 91). 
To state the conflict, however, in terms of cicero the orator versus Aristotle 
the philosopher would concede to the Aristotelians the definition of the issue 
and does not represent the view of Petrarch and no doubt other ciceronians. 
rather, eloquence is related to a certain conception of philosophy in which cic-
ero is seen to excel.8 This is philosophy characterized by a moral focus and hav-
ing the actual practice of virtue, the living of the good human life, for its end.9 
for Petrarch, cicero’s eloquence is a part of his wisdom; rhetoric is seen to be, 
and properly so, in the service of wisdom and philosophy.10 Petrarch finds the 
broad and pure learning of the Aristotelians aimless and needlessly contentious 
7  schmitt 1972, for example, describes some of the vigorous conflict in the renaissance 
between those who proclaimed themselves Aristotelians and those who followed cicero; see 
79 ff. and especially his discussion of Pierre Galland (1510–59), 98 ff.
8  A defense of cicero in this respect, inclusive of a finding that he is essentially consistent 
with Aristotle, is found in Garsten 2006. Bird 1976 and Kimball 1986 accentuate the differ-
ence between the rhetorical (oratorical) strain and the philosophical one in the Western tradi-
tion of the humanities.
9  Petrarch 1948b, 61–62, 103, 105. Also, seigel 1968, 34–35 where he cites Petrarch in On 
the Remedies of Both Kinds of Fortune invoking cicero and writing that the way to eloquence is 
found in giving “your attention first of all to virtue and wisdom.”
10  seigel is on the mark when he appreciates Petrarch’s reading of cicero, writing that 
“Petrarch’s intelligence penetrated deeply into the structure of cicero’s mental world” (1968, 
33; also 60, 224, 259). however, seigel’s conclusion on cicero’s understanding of the relation 
of rhetoric and philosophy undermines cicero’s significance as a philosopher: The ciceronian 
combination of rhetoric and philosophy was complex and intricate. As a philosophical posi-
tion it was weak and inconsistent, but it was also humane. it allowed the intellectual to waver 
between a position based on the standards of thought and one based on those of action (1968, 
15, 26, 29).
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(1948b, 56, 77; 1948a, 137). furthermore, he contrasts cicero’s Academic skepti-
cism and its humility with the arrogant assurance and argument from authority 
manifested by some Aristotelians and sees the latter as a threat to a genuine 
philosophical spirit.11 
especially on this last point, Petrarch makes clear, as did other critics of the 
Aristotelians, that his differences are with the latin-using Aristotelians rather 
than with Aristotle.12 he cites (1948b, 53–54, 102) indications in cicero and 
other sources that Aristotle was himself eloquent and more favorable to rhetoric 
than those marching under Aristotle’s banner in Petrarch’s own time. Although 
he does find that Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics lacks the sting to virtuous action 
which he finds in cicero’s writings and in that respect it is inferior, he concedes 
greater “acumen” to the analysis of Aristotle.13 for Petrarch the issue is between 
a cicero whose texts he knows well and the practices of the Aristotelians. one 
might say it is between two differing conceptions of philosophy, but for Petrarch 
such a portrayal would be too gentle and insufficiently precise; for him cicero 
represents genuine philosophy in the socratic-Platonic tradition, the Aristoteli-
ans often manifest a muddled, arrogant and false philosophy that is not a legiti-
mate offspring of Aristotle’s own thought and writings. 
That distinctive conception of philosophy that Petrarch finds in cicero seems 
thereafter to ever lose ground as a way of knowing or science in the Western 
tradition. The ideal of a comprehensive and assured knowledge that appears 
in the Aristotelians merges much more readily with the emerging and subse-
quent enlightenment aspiration to a comprehensive science. The anomaly with 
which we are faced regarding comparisons of cicero and Aristotle comes into 
focus in that ciceronian eighteenth century, for then cicero is heralded (as in 
Barbeyrac and later in the carlyles) as a moral thinker and a “modern” even 
as his stature as a philosopher suffers. one can see in the dual view of cicero 
the Kantian problematic at the heart of that century: new and sure foundations 
neither Petrarch nor cicero would have appreciated a severance of the standards of action 
from those of thought. nor is the positivism – rhetoric and law seen as distinct from reason and 
nature – that Tuck 1979, 33 ff., 44–45 traces in the renaissance Petrarchan or ciceronian.
11  1948b, 124–25; also, 1948c, 34–35. in On Familiar Matters 3. 6 (1975, 128–29), Petrarch 
seems an exemplary ciceronian Academic skeptic as he adopts a stoic position on what con-
stitutes happiness and points to cicero’s De Finibus for a fuller treatment of the matter. not-
ing the teachings of various ancient philosophical schools, Petrarch tells his correspondent 
that “the authority of philosophers does not prevent freedom of judgment” and that he is 
here providing “not the truth of the matter (for that perhaps is hidden) but how it appeared 
to me.”
12  1948b, 74, 107. schmitt (1972, 91) notes a general tendency among humanists in the 
fourteenth through sixteenth centuries to find Aristotle’s actual writings quite acceptable and 
to focus their protests against pollutions of his teachings which were seen in “scholastic ver-
sions and interpretations of Aristotle.” 
13  see his exchange with Jean de hesdin, a french calomniateur of cicero, in de nolhac, 
1907, and also,1948b, 102–03.
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of comprehensive science are to be set down, and at the same time in another 
sphere, where cicero and the stoics are given a strong voice, the moral life is to 
be nourished. The nature of the modern tradition of seeing opposition between 
cicero and Aristotle and what is at stake in it has now been sketched. The re-
examination of this complex tradition properly begins with a return to the texts 
of cicero and Aristotle; in this case, a first step, attended to here, is looking to 
cicero on Aristotle.
sources for cicero’s ArisToTle
one is required to ask, at the very beginning, whether cicero knew the same 
Aristotle whom the renaissance knew and we can know today.14 does he have 
access to essentially the same corpus of Aristotle’s works which later, through 
the first century B. c. edition of Andronicus of rhodes, provided the Aristote-
lian canon for the future? The perhaps surprising answer is that cicero had more 
of Aristotle’s work available to him than we do and than most people have had 
both before and after his lifetime. cicero lived at the very juncture in time and 
even in place when and where the new Aristotelian corpus of Andronicus was 
put together and made available and the hitherto known popular or exoteric 
writings of Aristotle begin their disappearance which has resulted in their all 
but complete loss.15 one would expect, given cicero’s sustained interest in phi-
14  in the larger context in which this paper is set, namely, that just reviewed, that of later 
comparisons of cicero and Aristotle and contentions between ciceronians and Aristotelians, 
it is also appropriate to ask whether we twenty-first century political theorists know the same 
cicero whom the renaissance did. With the exception of cicero’s De Re Publica (Rep.), lost it 
appears sometime shortly after Augustine wrote and recovered with significant lacunae early in 
the nineteenth century, the same texts of cicero are available at both times. chiefly through 
Augustine and Macrobius’s fourth century Commentary on the Dream of Scipio, the Middle Ages 
and renaissance had some knowledge of the nature of Rep. The “great divide” thesis of the 
carlyles does not seem dependent on the Rep. in particular; note above that Barbeyrac’s ver-
sion of the thesis is early eighteenth century. it is not a new and different cicero revealed in 
Rep. Given cicero’s embrace of the mixed regime in Rep. and his related Platonic-inspired 
critique of democracy, one wonders how the alleged egalitarianism of cicero could play such 
a defining role for those who would see him as essentially “modern.”
15  The story of both the puzzle of the disappearance of Aristotle’s popular writings after 
the Andronicus edition of cicero’s lifetime and the development of that edition at rome, 
with the hand of cicero likely involved, is told succinctly in Masters, 1977, 31–33. see also 
M. frede 1999, 773–75, 784 who thinks the Andronican edition may have been completed 
before cicero’s life and that it had considerable impact on other schools of philosophy and the 
Aristotelian revival cicero encountered. see also Gottschalk 1987, 1095 for a summary view 
of the various placements of the Andronican edition. for materials indicating the evidence of 
various lost works of Aristotle in the texts of cicero, see MacKendrick, 1989, 9, n. 38 on 319. 
since Masters’ and other earlier work, there has been a significant but largely reaffirming ef-
fort by david sedley and especially by Jonathan Barnes to examine the presence of Aristotle 
and Aristotelianism in the period of hellenistic philosophy and to speculate further on the 
timing and significance of the edition of Andronicus. sedley (1989, 118) has observed, “it 
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losophy throughout his life, his specific concern to introduce Greek philosophy 
to rome and his evident interaction with other learned romans, that he would 
be aware of, if not in close contact with, the enterprise of assembling the new 
and true Aristotle that has just occurred or was occurring right in rome during 
the very years of his adult life. his writings support this expectation and at the 
least indicate that he consulted the non-popular works (commentarios) of Aristo-
tle then being recovered and assembled.16 in the reference to these works at De 
Finibus v. 12, cicero actually uses the Greek cognate (ἐξωτερικόν) for “exo-
teric” to describe the popular works which are contrasted with those (limatius) 
“more carefully composed” commentarii, usually translated as “notebooks”.17 in 
this passage, cicero reveals that the distinction between the exoteric works and 
has always been a struggle for modern scholars to accept how extraordinarily little notice the 
hellenistic philosophers apparently took of Aristotle, in view of his immense importance to 
the subsequent history of philosophy.” sedley sees Aristotelianism being resurrected in and 
just before cicero’s time by means of taking Aristotle and his school to be part of the Platonic 
revival and the synthesis of Antiochus. lynch (1972, 204) concluded that cicero’s knowledge 
of Aristotle came largely through Antiochus. Barnes (1989, 1997) is in essential agreement and 
believes there was much Aristotle available to cicero even if it is likely that the Andronican 
edition was first put together after cicero’s death.
16  De Finibus (Fin.) iii. 10; v. 12. There is nothing in cicero’s writings to indicate that he 
did not read what he could of the new Aristotle with care. At present i am not convinced that 
cicero has the Aristotle we know wrong in some significant way. As early as 55 B. c. during 
a time when other letters indicate cicero is reading Aristotle, cicero writes Atticus (Epistulae 
ad Atticum [Ep. Att.] iv. 10) that he “is being sustained by the library of faustus” at cumae, a 
library thought to contain the esoteric writings of Aristotle and Theophrastus. see d. frede, 
1989, 95, n. 18. Glucker (1978, 223) saw one impact of the rediscovery of Aristotle’s texts be-
ing was that those turning to the texts were becoming Aristotelians rather than Peripatetics. 
otherwise before and no doubt somewhat into the last generation of the republic, it would 
have been unusual to describe oneself as an Aristotelian rather than a Peripatetic. While con-
ceding that cicero could “have discovered all the Andronican Aristotle”, earl (1972, 850ff., 
853) raises doubts about the presence of the Aristotle manuscripts in the library at cumae and 
cicero’s knowledge of the new Aristotle, A similar conclusion regarding cicero’s knowledge 
of “the mature Aristotle” was reached earlier, though without much argument, in how, (1930, 
27). Powell (1995, 18) emphasizes the different views on the extent of cicero’s knowledge 
of the Andronican Aristotle while claiming that cicero had a good knowledge of Aristotle’s 
published writings including, it seems, the esoteric works brought to rome in 84 by sulla; 
long (1995, 42–43 and n. 11) urges readers to keep an open mind on the question even as he 
inclines against thinking cicero knew much of our Aristotle. 
regarding Aristotle’s “scientific work”, harris (1961, 10) claims their study was abandoned 
by the Peripatetics of cicero’s time who were “imbued with the spirit of stoicism.” it seems, 
however, in the light of cicero’s references to Aristotle’s and the Peripatetic teaching in Fin. 
v and Tusculanae Disputationes (Tusc.) i, that cicero had some contact with the scientific side of 
the Peripatetic tradition. sedley (1980, 5) has taken a different turn on this matter. in writing 
of the comparative weakness of the Peripatetic school in the hellenistic period (noting inter 
alia the loss of Aristotle’s library upon the death of Theophrastus), he remarks “however 
the philosophical writings of Aristotle and Theophrastus were certainly available to any hel-
lenistic philosopher sufficiently interested to seek them out, and their influence should not 
be discounted. it is apparent above all in hellenistic physics and cosmology, and to a lesser 
extent in ethics, though surprisingly little in logic.”
17  cicero also uses the Greek term to describe this set of Aristotle’s writings in Ep. Att. iv. 16.
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the notebooks is one which the Peripatetics themselves make,18 that it is a dis-
tinction which applies to various works of the school, not simply to Aristotle’s 
writings, and that he is sufficiently familiar with both the exoteric writings and 
the notebooks to comment on the appearance of inconsistency between them 
with respect to content.
cicero did not, it seems, know with assurance that our Nicomachean Ethics 
and Politics were works of Aristotle. cicero cites neither of these works directly, 
though he mentions the Nicomachean Ethics and shows himself aware that this 
work is attributed to Aristotle; he himself is inclined to think it was authored 
by Aristotle’s son nicomachus.19 Though the scholarly consensus is that cicero 
did not know our Politics, there is a possibility, as the late elizabeth rawson 
suggests, that he knew the Politics or much of it as the work of Theophrastus, 
Aristotle’s successor as head of the Peripatetic school.20 Whether or not cicero 
did give close attention to the texts of the Nicomachean Ethics and Politics or en-
countered their teachings in other sources, his work shows the impact of such 
teachings and appears largely consistent with them. The teaching of the Ethics 
is quite clearly reflected in De Finibus, especially in Book ii where cicero speaks 
in his own persona, and the De Finibus is a book that cicero regards as his most 
important and that treats the topic which he holds to be foundational to all phi-
losophy.21 Quite directly cicero associates what he does in De Re Publica and De 
Legibus with the tradition of political inquiry in which Aristotle and his school are 
18  The use of the term “exoteric” to describe his other works has been found within our 
Aristotle of Andronicus; see Masters, 1977, 32, 49 & n. 2. earlier these usages had been dis-
cussed by Jaeger 1948, 32ff. who brought a skeptical spirit to all such references. Aulus Gel-
lius (20.5) reported that Aristotle used to give rigorous courses for specialists in the morning 
and more popular ones in the afternoon, Gottschalk 1987, 1172–73.
19  Fin. v. 12. cicero’s suggestion of authorship is firmly rejected by Jaeger, 1948, 230. 
Barnes (1997, 58, 64) thinks it likely that nicomachus was editor of one set of Aristotle’s ethi-
cal writings, and eudemus editor of another set.
20  d. frede (1989, 81) reports this scholarly consensus and makes a set of supportive ar-
guments, which i do not find compelling, based on a comparison of certain teachings of the 
Politics with cicero’s, primarily as found in De re publica. The consensus is reflected in the “in-
troduction” to laks & schofield 1995, 2. ferrary (1995, 54) doubts that cicero had any direct 
acquaintance with the Politics, and while noting his encounter with Aristotelianism through 
what Annas calls, later in the same volume, “hybrid” theories like those of Antiochus and Pa-
naetius, he emphasizes, as does this paper in what follows, the significance of Theophrastus 
as a source for cicero. in the essay that follows, Annas focuses on Antiochus and Arius didy-
mus as evident carriers of Aristotelian thinking. in an interesting, related observation, hardly 
irrelevant to cicero’s thinking, Annas remarks that the modification of Aristotelian ideas to 
meet stoic objections is one of the most important developments in hellenistic philosophical 
debates (74, n. 3). for rawson’s suggestion, see rawson, 1985, 290. The reader of the Politics 
will find some support for her suggestion in the way cicero describes a political writing of 
Theophrastus at Fin. v. 11. note Masters’ hypothesis (1977, 36–41) that Andronicus has com-
bined lectures of Theophrastus and some of Aristotle in our edition of the Politics. see recent 
support for a hypothesis like this and for the likely impact of Theophrastus on the work of 
cicero in d. frede, 1989, 86, 88, 94.
21  Fin. i. 11; De Divinatione (Div.) ii. 2.
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perceived as distinguishing themselves.22 could not the Politics or some version 
of it be what cicero has in mind when he so credits the Peripatetic heritage in 
political philosophy?
There are no doubts, however, about cicero’s considerable knowledge and 
use of Aristotle’s exoteric works as well as the writings of other Peripatetics. 
in fact, those exoteric works, which apparently were chiefly in the form of dia-
logues, are partly known to us through fragments and paraphrases preserved in 
the writings of cicero. Among the exoteric works that seem to be particularly 
influential on cicero is an exhortation to philosophy known as the Protrepti-
cus which seems to have impacted on cicero’s Hortensius, limited though our 
knowledge of that work is.23 The Protrepticus appears to have considered the 
relationship between rhetoric and philosophy. for his understanding of Aristo-
tle, cicero cites and apparently relies heavily on a work titled On Philosophy, also 
among the lost exoteric writings. regarding Aristotle’s political teaching in the 
exoterica, two dialogues – on justice and on the statesman – are thought to have 
been cicero’s primary sources.24 it seems likely that it is these which he has in 
mind when in october 54 he writes his brother about his efforts in composing 
De Re Publica and mentions Aristotle’s writings “concerning the polity and the 
statesman” (de republica et praestante viro).25 later as he reviews his philosophical 
works in his prologue to Book ii of De Divinatione, cicero adds but one comment 
(Div. ii. 3) when mentioning his De Re Publica, namely, that it concerns “an im-
portant topic, appropriate to philosophy, and a topic very fully treated (tractatus 
uberrime) by Plato, Aristotle, Theophrastus, and the entire Peripatetic school”.
These indications that cicero associates his political philosophy with a Peri-
patetic heritage are supported by his fuller comments in his own persona in the 
De Finibus where he reports that “the topic of civic life (which the Greeks call 
political) was treated authoritatively and fully (graviter et copiose)” by the early 
Peripatetics and Academics who had no important disagreement between them-
22  De Legibus (Leg.) iii. 13–14, a passage where cicero indicates that much of his material 
both in Rep. and in Leg. comes from the wing of the Academy developed by Aristotle and 
Theophrastus.
23  Jaeger, 1948, 55, 65 ff. Anton-hermann chroust (1964) is one of the scholars who has 
sought to reconstruct the Protrepticus from fragments and passages found here and there, in-
cluding some from cicero’s texts.
24  how, 1930, 27. ferrary (1995, 62, n. 30), here following Moraux, attributes an aspect of 
cicero’s political theory to the dialogue on justice. Another work of Aristotle’s which there is 
clear evidence cicero had in hand and read is “Aristotle’s books to Alexander”; see Ep. Att. 
xii. 40. This appears to be the work that was alternatively titled On Colonization, and Jaeger 
contends (1948, 24, 259) that if we had the work it would provide considerable insight into 
Aristotle’s later political thought.
25  Epistulae ad Quintum Fratrem (Ep. Q.) iii. 5–6. 1–2. see Powell’s (1994, 23) strong sense 
that cicero is looking to Aristotle regarding the concept of a “first citizen” or statesman.
44 The PoliTics of ArisToTle 
selves.26 When he refers to “the early Peripatetics”, cicero seems to have in 
mind the work of Aristotle, presumably his exoteric dialogues on justice and the 
statesman, and that of Theophrastus. What cicero has in mind, though, might 
well include treatises that later came to be part of Andronicus’s version of the 
Politics. however that may be, in what immediately follows in this passage there 
is an indication that cicero saw the Peripatetic branch of the Academy as the 
major voice in political philosophy and a voice that spoke quite directly to his 
own program of writings. he exclaims, “how much those men have written on 
the polity (de republica), how much on laws (de legibus)! how much about the art 
of rhetoric and how many examples of speaking well have they left for us!”27 
A few lines later (Fin. iv. 6) he enumerates some of the specific topics they have 
treated, listing “on justice, on moderation, on courage, on friendship, on the 
conduct of life, on philosophy and on statesmanship”. later (fin. v. 11), cicero 
has Piso, a Peripatetic of a certain stripe and one with whom he shares much, 
report that both Aristotle and Theophrastus have taught a model statesmanship 
and have written even more extensively on the best regime (qui esset optimus rei 
publicae status).28 
in the 50s when cicero wrote his first philosophical works which consist in 
his De Re Publica, De Legibus, and his major work on rhetoric, De Oratore, Aristotle 
seems much on his mind as already indicated in the october 54 letter. his works 
of this period are all dialogues, and his correspondence shows him consciously 
wrestling with Aristotle’s precedents as a writer of dialogues – following them at 
times and quite aware of what he is doing when he does not do so.29 These pas-
26  Fin. iv. 5. Annas (1995, 81) is so assured that this statement is that of Antiochus that she 
quotes it and attributes it to him without any mention that cicero presents himself as making 
the statement.
27  When cicero comes to listing his rhetorical writings in the catalogue of his philosophical 
writings in Div. (ii. 4), he mentions Aristotle and Theophrastus, and no others, as providing 
precedents for his joining here the precepts of rhetoric with philosophy. schofield (1999, 744) 
has listed the evidence we have of the extensive writing on politics in the Peripatetic school.
28  here cicero through Piso enters into an apparent difference between Aristotle and The-
ophrastus with the latter seen to attend more to the dynamics of change related to regimes 
including the best one; such dynamics appear to be reflected in cicero’s earlier work, De Re 
Publica.
29  Ep. Att. iv. 16 (July, 54); Epistulae ad Familiares (Ep. Fam.) i. 9. 23 (dec., 54) and the later 
letter Ep. Att. xiii. 19 (June, 45). in the July, 54, letter to Atticus, cicero claims, as he works on 
Rep., that he is following Aristotle’s model in his exoteric books (apparently Aristotle’s now 
lost dialogues) by writing a prooemium to each book of the work. The letter to Atticus and the 
variety of dialogue and other forms utilized by cicero all along make unlikely the conjecture 
of rawson (1975, 233) that he lost interest in the dialogue form in his last writings. rather, 
cicero is better seen throughout his writings as a highly conscious adapter of established 
forms (primarily the Platonic and Aristotelian dialogues) to his specific rhetorical objective in 
the work at hand.
Aristotle’s dialogues appear to have been a major influence in cicero’s shaping of his own 
dialogue form. J. s. reid (1885, 25) writes of the “later Greek type” of dialogue which is ap-
parently the Aristotelian dialogue and possibly that of a contemporary of Aristotle, heraclides, 
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sages provide evidence that at least some of Aristotle’s lost dialogues were very 
much before him as he launched his efforts as a philosophical writer and did it 
on the topics of the polity, the laws and the orator. cicero has then turned both 
to the writings of Aristotle, the old and possibly the new, and the writings of 
other Peripatetics, most notably Theophrastus. These are not just some sources 
among many he employs; they are materials of distinctive importance for one 
concerned with the practical topics at the forefront of cicero’s philosophical 
agenda. it is possible, of course, that Aristotle and the Peripatetics helped shape 
that agenda, that practical focus, rather than simply serving as good and ample 
material at hand and to the point.
cicero’s AssessMenT of ArisToTle And his school
not only have the writings of Aristotle and other Peripatetics loomed large and 
significant among cicero’s sources, but they were also, as one might expect, 
very much in harmony with his own thinking. recall our initial epigraph where 
cicero is found writing that his philosophical writings differ “very little from 
Peripatetic teachings”,30 an observation reinforced later in the De Officiis where 
he indicates that his school of philosophy is very close (finitima) to the Peripatet-
ics.31 shortly before this comment cicero has unambiguously identified his own 
philosophical school as that of the new Academy characterized by a commit-
ment to challenging and testing all positions and by a qualified skepticism, and 
thus capable of embracing Peripatetic teachings as well as those of other schools 
on any substantive philosophical questions.32 cicero in other words understands 
himself as a Peripatetic follower to the degree that this school seems to teach the 
truth. As W. W. how (1930, 27) states it, “it remains clear that cicero, though he 
makes good use of the Peripatetics, is no slavish disciple of the school”.
who is mentioned several times in cicero’s correspondence. in an earlier letter (Fam..1.9.23), 
written as he completed De Oratore, (De Or.), cicero says that he has written this work ac-
cording to the way of Aristotle (Aristoteleus mos) – meaning here, i believe, that he uses longer 
speeches, for he himself is not cast as a participant in this dialogue. see Jaeger’s precise and 
discerning statement on the three Aristotelian precedents as to dialogue form that surface 
in cicero’s correspondence; 1948, 29–30, n. 2. how we miss Aristotle’s dialogues! it appears 
that the Aristotle cicero knew was notably more eloquent than the Aristotle we now have. 
see Gorman (2005) to consider more fully how socratic method might be seen to impact on 
cicero’s dialogues and thus merge with Aristotelian influences.
30  De Officiis (Off.). i. 2.
31  Off. ii. 8; he does not actually use the term “Peripatetics” which he often employs but 
here he writes literally of the school of cratippus, his son’s Peripatetic teacher in Athens; the 
philosophy or school of cratippus is called antiquissima nobilissimaque.
32  Tarrant (1985) overall and specifically at 107 highlights the high comfort level of Aca-
demics and cicero himself with a Peripatetic epistemology. long (1981, 98 & passim) has 
brought out how Aristotle grasps the issues that propel Greek skepticism which arises more 
widely and systematically after him.
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That one might even think of cicero as a disciple of Aristotle and a Peripatetic 
is made even more credible by the great esteem in which he holds Aristotle. for 
cicero, Aristotle is at the peak in any ranking of philosophers. his overall view 
of Aristotle is captured in his description of Aristotle as “a man marked by the 
greatest genius, knowledge and fertility of mind and speech” (vir summo ingenio, 
scientia, copia).33 At another point, Fin. i. 7, Plato and Aristotle are described by 
cicero as “those divine geniuses” (divina illa ingenia). Aristotle may be at the 
peak among philosophers, but when it comes to a comparison, cicero’s view is 
clear: Plato is the peak. Thus, for example, only a little later in Tusculanae Dis-
putationes from that point where cicero has spoken of Aristotle as marked with 
summo ingenio, he returns to describe Aristotle as first among thinkers except for 
Plato, in brilliance (ingenio) and thoroughness (diligentia).34 on the one occasion 
when cicero speaks of Aristotle as simply beyond compare, he uses the words 
“fine or sharp” (acutus) and “elegant or polished” (politus) to describe the ways 
in which Aristotle is superior.35 in this instance where the context is a discussion 
of logic, cicero seems to be pointing toward Aristotle’s achievement in the Orga-
non and possibly to his more explicit (compared with Plato) embrace of rhetoric. 
When we find cicero recommending an overall philosophical model (Ac. i. 10), 
a task closely related to if not entailed in his major mission to introduce Greek 
philosophy to rome, it is to Plato and Aristotle as well as Theophrastus to which 
he turns. 
That recommendation says much about cicero’s understanding of his own 
philosophical lineage, specifically with how he locates himself in one line of 
descent from Plato, the prince of all philosophers. expanded versions of this 
philosophical lineage are given at times. The most significant expansions are 
backward from Plato and forward, in a sense, from Theophrastus. Backward it 
is expanded to socrates; recall again our epigraph from the De Officiis where 
cicero was found saying that his agreement with the Peripatetics was substan-
tial because both he and they were seeking to follow “the socratic and Platonic 
tradition”. in a preface to one version of the Academica (Ac. i. 3), cicero describes 
his mission in writing as an effort “to elucidate in latin letters that old phi-
losophy stemming from socrates” (philosophiamque veterem illam a Socrate ortam 
Latinis litteris illustrare). Then in Tusculanae Disputationes (Tusc. iv. 6), also in a 
33  Tusc. i. 7; Orator (Orat.)5, 172; also Div. i. 53 where cicero’s brother Quintus is made to 
speak comparable praise of Aristotle.
34  Tusc. i. 22. At Fin. v. 7, Piso is made to describe Aristotle as the chief (princeps) of the 
Peripatetics and the one who is, except for Plato, princeps philosophorum. for a fuller discus-
sion of cicero’s assessment of Plato and specifically with respect to the work and achieve-
ment of socrates, see nicgorski, 1991b.
35  Academica (Ac.) ii. 143.
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context where he is discussing his mission as writer, cicero speaks of the need 
to give latin expression to “that true and choice philosophy which developed 
from socrates and now has come to abide in the Peripatetic school” (illius ve-
rae elegantisque philosophiae, quae ducta a Socrate in Peripateticis adhuc permansit). 
Though in cicero’s view the socratic torch has passed to the Peripatetics, he 
adds at once a couple of complicating dimensions to that picture, by noting 
that the stoics are saying, in a different manner, essentially the same thing as 
the Peripatetics and that the Academics are on hand to adjudicate the disputes 
of these two schools. While cicero appears in that very sentence to be describ-
ing the then current philosophical situation, the larger context for the passage 
and what cicero has said elsewhere allow us to see this statement as self-
revealing on how he stands with respect to the philosophical schools. Again as 
to substance, cicero appears to understand himself as a Peripatetic who from 
his methodological commitment to the new Academy finds the true legacy 
of socrates here, though he is attracted to at least one stoic formulation and 
the school’s rigorous consistency regarding this matter. More exploration of 
this limited attraction to the stoics and of cicero’s effort to purify the socratic 
legacy through his allegiance to the new Academy will follow shortly when 
this essay turns to consider in what ways cicero differentiates himself from or 
criticizes the Peripatetic school. 
There were developments in the Peripatetic school simultaneous with and 
after the life of Theophrastus that seemed to play a part in cicero’s attraction 
to that school. These are developments reflected in the writings and actions 
of dicaearchus, a contemporary of Theophrastus with whom he disputed on 
some matters, and demetrius of Phalerum, a student of Theophrastus and a 
highly regarded orator who came to political leadership in Athens in the late 
fourth century. dicaearchus and demetrius give a yet more practical turn to the 
Peripatetic tradition. That cicero associates himself with these developments 
is clear in a couple of other statements of his philosophical lineage. in the De 
Legibus (iii. 13–14) as he is about to take up quite specific constitutional provi-
sions for magistrates, cicero observes that, over against the stoic tradition, that 
part of the Platonic tradition which develops through Aristotle and Theophras-
tus engages, like himself, in discussions of the polity (de re publica) intended to 
be useful or applicable. he then adds that it is to this strain in the tradition he 
will turn for much of his material. After naming Theophrastus in this strain he 
adds dicaearchus, “also taught by Aristotle and in no way lacking in this science 
(huic rationi) and inquiry (studio)”. Then he mentions demetrius as a follower of 
Theophrastus and a man distinguished as a philosophical statesman. The words 
cicero uses here have suggested to more than one commentator that demetrius 
is a model for cicero himself. demetrius is described as one who “has done 
the quite extraordinary thing of drawing learning out from its shaded scholarly 
retreat, not only into the sunlight and dust but even into the very frontlines of 
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political contention”.36 Another self-reflection on his philosophical lineage oc-
curs, it appears, when cicero praises Panaetius (Fin. iv. 78–80), a man whose 
writing was especially formative for his approach to ethics in the De Officiis and 
one whose impact on the De Re Publica is strongly suggested in that very text, 
(Rep. i. 34). Panaetius is being praised for criticizing certain harsh stoic teachings 
and their complex, thorny discourse, and cicero approvingly notes that Pana-
etius had always on his tongue those same philosophers whom cicero recom-
mends for careful study, namely, Plato, Aristotle, Xenocrates, Theophrastus and 
dicaearchus.
regarding the impact of dicaearchus and demetrius on him, cicero’s corre-
spondence and other writings provide additional evidence, especially significant 
evidence in the case of dicaearchus. demetrius is praised as a very learned man 
who is also very adept in public affairs and skilled as an orator.37 There is but a 
whiff of criticism of him, that centering on his overly restrained, too academic 
style of oratory.38 regarding dicaearchus, cicero’s correspondence reveals his 
reading works of dicaearchus as well as of Theophrastus before and during his 
writing of his major political and rhetorical writings of the 50s. in december of 
60, cicero writes Atticus about his reading of dicaearchus, calling him a “great” 
and “extraordinary” man; writing from outside rome, cicero claims to have a 
large pile of the writings of dicaearchus with him at the time and makes specific 
mention of possessing, in rome, dicaearchan treatises on the constitutions of 
corinth and Athens.39 There are indications that dicaearchus, in opposition to 
Theophrastus’s more traditional Aristotelian view, developed a position that el-
evated the life of political action and statesmanship to a higher status than that 
of inquiry and contemplation, and it appears that in this respect the thought of 
dicaearchus was especially formative for cicero’s De Re Publica.40 late in cic-
ero’s life in 45, well into that intense florescence of philosophical writing that 
marked the last three years of his life, cicero is very interested in dicaearchus, 
calling for or recalling certain of his works, and reading them as he plans com-
parable writings of his own.41 Yet as always, cicero is no “slavish” follower: he 
36  for another notable similarity to cicero, see Fin. v. 54 where cicero has Piso describe 
how demetrius turned his banishment from politics to writing certain notable works that 
provided cultivation of the soul (animi) and nourishment in humanity (humanitatis).
37  Leg. ii. 66; Pro Rabirio Postumo 23; Off. ii. 60; Rep. ii. 2; Orat. 92; De Oratore (De Or.) ii. 95; 
Ep. Fam. xvi. 22. 2.
38  Brutus 37; Off. i. 3. At Orat. 62 and 127 this criticism is also directed at the style of Aris-
totle and Theophrastus and the entire Peripatetic school. This is done in a context of overall 
praise for their rhetorical and stylistic excellence.
39  Ep. Att. ii. 2. see also the strong praise for dicaearchus in Ep. Att. ii. 12.
40  Ep. Att. ii. 16 is especially significant in revealing cicero’s own struggle with this ques-
tion prior to writing De Re Publica. see also, Ep. Att. vi. 2; vii. 3; Jaeger, 1948, Appendix ii.
41  Ep. Att. xiii. 31, 32 & 33. in these letters as well as the De Off. (ii. 16), cicero mentions 
four different works of dicaearchus including one concerning the mixed constitution. At least 
some of the work of dicaearchus seems to have been in dialogue-form; see Tusc. i. 21.
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is, most notably, not in accord with dicaearchus in his arguments against per-
sonal immortality, but cicero does show himself aware of and draws attention 
to this position of the man he so admires and from whom he seems to be con-
tinually learning, at least over the last twenty years of his life.42 cicero locates 
himself then in the socratic-Platonic tradition as it develops from Aristotle to 
that especially practical thinker, dicaearchus, and to the philosopher-statesman, 
demetrius. he is a Peripatetic, if anything, though a critical one in the socratic 
sense and a practical one in the dicaearchan sense.
There are two aspects of cicero’s self-revealed philosophical lineage that 
merit some additional comment here, for they seem significant to understanding 
cicero’s thought and classical political philosophy before him. These aspects are 
first the essential unity he finds (in fact, stresses) between the Platonic Acad-
emy and Aristotle/Theophrastus, and second, his interest in certain differences 
within the Peripatetic school. regarding the unity between the first Academy 
and the old Peripatetics, cicero indicates at De Legibus i. 38 that the break from 
the Academy by Aristotle and Theophrastus entailed no difference in the con-
tent (re) of their teaching and only a slight difference in their manner of teaching 
(genere docendi paulum differentis). This statement is made in a context of discuss-
ing the positions of schools on the ultimate human end or the nature of happi-
ness. since the question of the ultimate end is the fundamental philosophical 
question for cicero, it would constitute the most important way philosophical 
schools could be compared, and if they do not differ on this, they might be seen 
to hardly differ at all.43 earlier, we had occasion to mention another passage 
where the fundamental agreement of Plato and the early Peripatetics was noted 
in a specific context referring to treatment of the topic of political life.44 it seems 
justifiable to conclude that all of cicero’s references to this essential unity have 
in mind politics in an Aristotelian or classical sense, that is political science as 
a moral science based on a certain understanding of what constitutes the true 
human end.45 
42  Tusc. i. 21, 24, 41, 51–52, 77
43  This statement should also be helpful in understanding what cicero goes on to say here 
as well as elsewhere (for instance, at Tusc. v. 120 where this view is associated with carneades) 
regarding the stoics, namely they only employ new words but make no essential change in 
the teaching of the Academy and the old Peripatetics. in cicero’s view, there was no good 
reason for Zeno, the stoic founder, breaking with the Peripatetic tradition (Fin. iv. 3). The 
stoics, as separated, tended in cicero’s view to be drawn to an unreasonable extremism; thus, 
over against the stoics, cicero praises the moderation of Plato and Aristotle (Ac. ii. 112–13; 
Pro Murena 63), and he welcomes, of course, the work of Panaetius as a deflection of stoicism 
back in the direction of the great tradition represented by Plato and Aristotle.
44  Above, pp. 43–44 and n. 26.
45  other passages bearing on the teaching of an essential unity are Ac. ii. 15; Off. i. 6; iii. 11, 
35; Tusc. v. 87, 120. cicero’s conviction about this essential unity and his understanding of 
its nature can be seen to support an interpretation of his Rep. based on evidence internal to 
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cicero is aware of at least one, and that being often seen by others as the most 
important, of the differences Aristotle seems to have with his teacher Plato. in 
the Academica (i. 33–34) he portrays Varro, whom he very much respects and 
whom he intends to honor by giving him this role in the dialogue, commenting 
upon Aristotle’s “undermining of the forms” which had such an integral part in 
Plato’s teaching. immediately after this comment Varro adds that Theophrastus 
made “in a way a more decisive and penetrating break with the authoritative 
teaching” of the Academy (vehementius etiam fregit quodam modo auctoritatem vet-
eris disciplinae). This more important breach wrought by Theophrastus concerns 
his coming to understand human happiness as requiring something more than 
virtue alone. shortly we will see that this development in the thought of Theo-
phrastus, which cicero does not take to be involved in the initial Peripatetic 
break from Plato by Aristotle, concerns cicero deeply; it is, after all, a matter of 
the ultimate end. The Platonic theory of forms, hardly attended to by cicero 
beyond this passage, does not seem to put so much at stake as does a shift in 
understanding between socrates/Plato and Theophrastus on the ingredients of 
human happiness. 
for cicero, the socratic/Platonic tradition that comes via Aristotle does not 
turn out to be homogeneous on the very questions central to cicero’s practical 
philosophical interests. Two differences within the Peripatetic school are espe-
cially reflected in key thematic issues of cicero’s own philosophical work. These 
have both already been noted, the first being dicaearchus’s elevation of the ac-
tive political life in opposition to Theophrastus’s more traditional Peripatetic 
defense of the superiority of the philosophical life and of the goodness of knowl-
edge in itself. cicero’s letter to Atticus of May 59 (Ep. Att. ii. 16) coupled with 
his handling of this issue in De Re Publica and in De Officiis, his last philosophical 
work, indicate a profound and continuous struggle with this issue.46 Through 
this struggle he comes down on what is, it seems, the side of dicaearchus. 
The second issue among the Peripatetics has surfaced just above in our com-
ing upon the breach of Theophrastus over the ingredients of the ultimate end 
or human happiness. cicero sees this development resulting in a difference be-
tween Theophrastus on the one side and Aristotle as well as much of the Peri-
patetic school on the other. cicero welcomes Aristotle’s ennobling but realistic 
position on the ingredients of happiness as virtue plus well-being throughout a 
that text (see nicgorski, 1991a), that it is from Plato that he draws the basis for his criticism of 
Plato’s The Republic or of a certain reading of it.
46  lévy (2012) has recently examined the texts bearing on cicero’s life-long struggle with 
this choice. Annas (1995) in her chap. 3 and the editors in the introduction to that volume 
highlight the relevant interaction between stoicism and Aristotelianism in the lead-up to 
cicero. one might conclude that if stoicism entailed “a dilution of the strong Aristotelian 
conception of the polis and its treatment of political activity as inherent in the moral idea” 
(2), cicero’s siding with Theophrastus was a kind of Aristotelian response to some of the anti 
or apolitical aspects of stoicism. see also Annas 1996, chap. 20.
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lifetime.47 however, he sees in Theophrastus a slide in the direction of de-em-
phasizing the primacy of virtue in the understanding of the good and happiness, 
a slide toward elevating the importance of ordinary expediencies – the goods of 
body and fortune – in determining the human good.48 This issue also is power-
fully present in cicero’s philosophical writings, being especially prominent in 
the Tusculanae Disputationes and the De Finibus. ciceronian magnanimity is char-
acterized by its being wedded to the very notion that the sole good is the way of 
the right and of virtue, an emphasis not so evident in Aristotle.49
The fact that these two thematic issues, so important to cicero, had been 
or were being argued out within the Peripatetic school may seem to constitute 
even more reason for seeing cicero as within that school and taking upon him-
self a couple of its very important internal divisions. however that latter issue, 
manifested in the breach and apparent slide of Theophrastus, seems to work to 
draw cicero back in the stoic direction and outside the Peripatetic fold. To note 
this is to remind ourselves that however much he respects and associates with 
the Peripatetic tradition and its first citizen Aristotle, he does not call himself a 
Peripatetic and, as our initial epigraph indicates, he implies that his substantive 
philosophical positions, though much the same as those of the Peripatetics, are 
not entirely so. how then does he differentiate himself from Aristotle and/or the 
Peripatetics?
reading across the texts of cicero we are able to find three points of differ-
entiation, and they may help toward understanding the distinctive philosophic 
voice of cicero so close to but not identical with that of the Peripatetic tradition. 
only a brief indication of these points of self-differentiation can be offered here. 
let us take first what has just been before us, the break from the Peripatetic 
tradition by Theophrastus. cicero seems to see this as a symptom of a weak-
ness in the Peripatetic position on the human end being virtue plus some of the 
goods of body and fortune; attracted as he is by the Peripatetic formulation, he 
is concerned about its sliding to a quite ordinary utilitarian calculus. he wonders 
how much does a person need, beyond virtue, of the goods of body and fortune 
for happiness? The ambiguous and different responses to this question within 
the Peripatetic tradition leave him very uneasy, and he regularly shows himself 
attracted by the “splendor” of virtue in the socratic and stoic formulation that 
happiness and the good is found in virtue alone.50 Yet that formulation is not 
47  Fin. ii. 19; Ac. ii. 136, 139; Tusc. v. 30, 39.
48  Fin. v. 12 (Piso speaking), 74 ff.; Tusc. v. 23 ff.; 47–48, 85; Off. ii. 56; also, Annas, 1996, 
385 ff.
49  Off. i. 66–67. for a fuller comparison of Aristotle and cicero on magnanimity see fetter 
and nicgorski, 2008.
50  Off. iii. 20, 106; Tusc. i. 35; v. 1, 32–34; Fin. v. 22. in the light of such passages as some 
of the preceding, we must assume that cicero is not entirely unsympathetic with the stoic 
critique of the Peripatetics on the supreme good which he puts in the voice of Balbus in De 
Natura Deorum i. 16.
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wholly the truth for cicero.51 it is in his De Officiis, above all, that he strives to 
and seems to work out a resolution that preserves that noble and attractive view 
that virtue alone is sufficient for happiness. he does so by working ordinary 
expediences like security and property into the very notion of virtue or right 
(honestatem). here he can be seen working a Peripatetic substance into a stoic 
formulation.
A second matter on which cicero differentiates himself from the Peripatetics 
concerns the nature of their philosophical conclusions and overall goal. They 
like the stoics are seen to suffer, in cicero’s eyes, from an approach to philoso-
phy as a school with a systematic doctrine and from their ambitious explanations 
in natural philosophy.52 in fact, cicero believes that something of the heritage 
of socrates, his inquiring skepticism, was lost already in the passage of his legacy 
to Plato and Aristotle.53 Thus cicero associates most explicitly, as already noted, 
with the new Academy and the effort to reform the philosophical work of the 
schools of his time by a renewal of socratic, skeptical inquiry.54 cicero’s skepti-
cism is not a practically disabling kind but rather that associated with carneades 
which allows and encourages the determination of what appears to be true. it 
is on this Academic basis that cicero accepts the substance of the Peripatetic 
moral and political teaching.
finally cicero shows himself aware that his very model in joining together 
eloquence and wisdom, rhetoric and philosophy, the man who did so much for 
the art of rhetoric, namely Aristotle, had some hesitancy in giving his attention 
to rhetoric.55 cicero does not share this hesitancy, and in fact, took explicit is-
sue with Plato, whom he otherwise regarded so highly, because he found in 
51  Fin. v. 77; Ac. ii. 134.
52  for a discussion of the critical role of prudence in cicero and how it might differ from 
that role in Aristotle, see nicgorski, 1984.
53  Ac. i. 17 ff. (cicero has Varro speaking at this point). see also Tusc. iii. 69 where cicero 
indicates that he finds the understanding of philosophy in Aristotle and Theophrastus to be 
one of expecting philosophy to progress to complete explanation of all things.
54  Above, p. 45; Div. ii. 1. At Tusc. ii. 4–5 it is clear that cicero distinguishes the “selectiv-
ity” of his Academic approach with the drive for substantial consistency and the obstinacy 
of the other philosophical schools. one might say that philosophy in the Academic school of 
cicero, or in the socratic sense of philosophy, is paradoxically seen as distinct from the school-
approach to philosophy. see also Tusc. iv. 7; v. 33–34; Ac. ii. 114–15, 119–20; De Inventione 
(Inv.) ii. 5. see n. 32 above for a key reason why the school of Aristotle may be comparatively 
attractive to the skeptical cicero.
55  on the Aristotelian hesitancy: Off. i. 4 and, in the voice of Antonius, Aristotle is seen to 
have “despised” the technicalities of the art of rhetoric (De Or. ii. 160). on Aristotle as model 
for the unification of rhetoric and philosophy and as contributor to the art of rhetoric, see 
for example Inv. i. 7; De Or. i. 43; iii. 71–72; Tusc. i. 7. Also see above, pp. 43–44, n. 27, n. 28, 
Buckley 1970, 146–47, and Garsten 2006, 115–41. long 1995, 52ff. stresses with respect to 
Aristotle as well as to Plato that cicero seeks to identify with them by accentuating aspects 
of their writings that harmonize with his dominant rhetorical interests and the pro and con 
method of Academic skepticism.
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the Gorgias an unjustifiable depreciation of rhetoric.56 Aristotle in his contention 
with isocrates is seen as having pragmatically (in the struggle for students) and 
somewhat reluctantly turned his attention to the art of the orator,57 yet his school 
then becomes for cicero a receptive home in which to nurture the philosophi-
cal statesman/orator.58 in the texts of cicero the hesitancies of Aristotle must 
be ferreted out of a few places; the support of Aristotle and the Peripatetics for 
rhetoric and their contributions to the development of the art are frequently in 
evidence.59 if there is an underlying difference with Aristotle here and one that 
accounts for different degrees of receptivity to rhetoric’s importance, it is likely 
found in cicero’s embrace of the dicaearchan position of the superiority of the 
active political life; in that horizon, attention to rhetoric is a duty of a high order, 
not simply a necessity for the protection of philosophy.
*
how then does cicero stand on Aristotle and Aristotelians? Perhaps one could 
mount some argument that his few explicit differences with the Peripatetic 
school do provide the bases for the conflicts between his thought and Aristotle’s 
which come to be emphasized in later periods of the West. Most clearly cicero’s 
association with the reform of the schools through a renewal of socratic skepti-
cism could be related to the resistance of later ciceronians like Petrarch to a 
comprehensive and arrogant Aristotelianism. cicero’s greater esteem for and re-
ceptivity to rhetoric might be taken in one direction to see him as less a philoso-
pher and in another direction to view him as embracing more clearly a politics 
of liberty and persuasion. cicero stands, quite explicitly and with respect to his 
substantive positions in moral and political philosophy, chiefly in the Aristo-
telian line of Plato’s Academy. The traditions of opposition between Aristotle 
and cicero that later develop must not be allowed to obscure this self-confessed 
continuity between cicero and that Aristotelian line. Though a facile or false 
harmonization should never be encouraged or tolerated, the study of cicero’s 
writings benefits immensely from taking seriously the tradition of moral and 
56  De Or., in the voice of crassus or, in one case, of another character repeating his position 
back to him: i. 47, 63; iii. 60, 72, 122, 129.
57  De Or. iii. 141 as well as Tusc. i. 7.
58  De Or. iii. 3. 67.
59  There is an irony in the criticism of cicero as merely eloquent by the Aristotelians of the 
Petrarchan period (above) in the light of Aristotle’s considerable impact on cicero as a stu-
dent of rhetoric.  see long’s observations (1995, 52 ff.) with his emphasis on the tie between 
Aristotle’s emphasis on in utramque partem dicere and the carneadean skeptical tradition with 
which cicero chiefly identifies.  see the introduction to May and Wisse’s translation of De Or., 
(2001, 30 ff. and especially 39 and n. 52) for detail on Aristotle’s impact on cicero’s rhetorical 
writings and a perspective on whether cicero knew directly Aristotle’s Rhetoric as we have it 
today.  Wisse, (1989, especially 168, 174, 318), while exploring the similarities and differences 
of Aristotle’s Rhetoric and cicero’s De Or. further develops the case for cicero’s indebtedness 
to Aristotle in rhetorical theory.  see also runia 1989.
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political inquiry in which he professes to stand. in turn, cicero can be usefully 
read as an illuminating commentator on and extender of the practical philosophy 
of Aristotle and his school. in his distinctive way and in the context of the late 
roman republic, cicero has appropriated and represented the Aristotelian tra-
dition of practical philosophy in a number of respects: (1) in his understanding 
of the relation of ethics and politics, (2) in his conception of the nature and end 
of political life, (3) in his thinking about the relationship among rhetoric, politics 
and philosophy, (4) in his treatment of the basic virtues and friendship, of the 
mixed constitution, and of the critical role of leaders or statesmen and, in turn, of 
their education. Where there are differences from or concerns with the Aristote-
lian tradition, they help us critically appropriate that tradition better and thus be 
better prepared for adapting it to circumstances quite different from both those 
of Aristotle and those of cicero.60
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Iwona BarwIcka-Tylek
The Power of Aristotelian Memes – 
the Polish Example
ABSTRACT: The article uses the concept of meme (from Greek word mimesis), 
coined by Richard Dawkins, as a tool to look at the history of political Aristotelianism. 
It argues that recurrent interest in Aristotle’s ideas can be viewed as a manifestation of 
deeper cultural traits that have been running throughout the veins of European societies 
for centuries, framing our minds and influencing our practice. Such Aristotelian memes 
can be observed particularly in Polish political tradition. Thus, this tradition serves here 
as an example of the historical implementation of some Aristole’s memes, among which 
the definition of man as zoon politikon, the concept of politea and the role of virtue are 
of special interest.
KEYWORDS: Aristotelianism, history of ideas, memetics, Polish republicanism, political 
theory.
i shAll sTArT WiTh A QuoTe:
The statue, it is sometimes said, was always there inside the block of marble. All the 
sculptor did was to chip away the surplus marble to reveal the statue within. There is a 
helpful image here for the historian. […] He must begin with some fairly clear percep-
tion of what he wants to end up with, just as the sculptor must have some vision in his 
mind of the statue he wants to create. For it is a process of creation, and the writing 
of good history calls for creative imagination. To deny or to minimize this truth was 
the basic fault of the positivist or ‘scientifi c’ historians. Believing that the statue had 
always, in a material sense, been ‘objectively’ there, they failed to see that it was only 
when the sculptor […] had envisaged it there that it became at all possible for it to be 
revealed. (Thomson 1969. 99)
The above words didn’t grow stale. Quite the contrary, the simple truth they contain 
has been spreading within all branches of history. The history of political thought is 
no exception here. Examining particular political traditions we face a large amount 
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of different data: names, biographies, books, documents, concepts, ideas; institutions 
founded upon these ideas or ideas questioning the institutions being established. 
Some of such data are at hand because they have already been mentioned hundreds 
of times – but is this a sufficient reason to repeat them again or rather to “chip them 
away” as trivial? Others are hardly known because they have usually been omitted 
by many – but is it a sign of their lesser importance or simply more difficult access, 
and then, maybe it would have some value to expose them in our final work? To 
sum up, we do not deal with a block of marble, but with a big quarry. And since it 
is impossible to turn the whole quarry into a sculpture gallery, we are condemned 
to restrict our passion for creation and confine ourselves to selective pieces we find 
particularly attractive, leaving the rest for others. Imagination helps a lot in making 
choices of the historical material that we are to present as our final “statue.”
Though the word “imagination” was not popular in the humanities during the rule 
of the positivist paradigm, lately this attitude has changed. Consequently, we can 
observe more diversification in methodological approaches in the field of history of 
political thought. It is worth underlining that, first of all, imagination is required to 
see past political experiences (both intellectual and practical) from an interesting, ac-
curate, and trustworthy perspective – which is nothing more than a methodology that 
provides us with tools, useful to investigate the past. And reversely, once the meth-
odology is constituted, it directs imagination away from weakening the connection 
between our interpretations and historical facts. In a way, the proportion between 
imagination and methodological rigour assumed or required by particular disciplines 
allows to discriminate between science (where methodology rules almost indivis-
ibly) and art (where imagination takes over). The humanities have always been bal-
ancing between these two extremes. The challenge of positivism had brought it close 
to science, but the failure of positivistic promises made it look more and more firmly 
in the other direction. And so the intellectual pendulum can swing again, reviving 
debates on the right way of talking about the past.
The history of political thought embraces this change of attitude willingly, in its 
“sculpturing” looking for inspirations coming from the outside. Among these inspi-
rations there are achievements of social sciences, such as sociology, psychology, 
economy, and others; but also philosophical standpoints or general, cultural trends. 
All that can be used by imagination to refresh methodology and to find good meth-
ods of presenting old concepts and ideas in the way they could teach us something 
new and useful. The past is left behind, but history, as such, must be up-to-date. And 
it is. Historians drew lessons from Wittgensteinian “linguistic turn,” and then from 
“narrative turn;” like other scholars they thought over problems of objectivity and 
subjectivity; finally they tried to reconsider and specify once again their objects of 
interests. To make this new opening more visible, some new subdisciplines have 
been created, like “history of ideas” (initiated by Arthur O. Lovejoy), “history of 
concepts” (Begriffsgeschichte, initiated by Reinhart Koselleck), or “intellectual his-
tory.” Some insist to discriminate between them, while others prefer to expose simi-
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larities, arguing that the career of all these “histories” reflects a more general change 
in our methodological consciousness.
I do not intend to discuss the variety of possible ways of examining political 
thought. This lengthy introduction is just to show that the door has been opened by 
others, and inviting some dose of inspiration coming from fields strange to historical 
research itself can do it no harm, if applied consciously. Only accepting such a pos-
sibility, one can postpone, for a while, quite natural reservations towards an article 
that refers to Aristotle, Polish political tradition and – the most mysterious of them 
– memetics.
If I was to traditionally discuss Polish contemporary Aristotelianism, then I would 
have to concentrate upon philosophers who openly admitted that the works of Aristo-
tle had been the source of inspiration to them. It could be an interesting task because 
we have such philosophers that have been working on Aristotle’s ideas independently 
of mainstream Western philosophy; and yet in many respects they chose similar direc-
tions in interpreting and imbuing Aristotelian concepts into the more modern context. 
I am talking especially about the so-called Lublin School of Philosophy, that is, a 
group of scholars centred around the Catholic University of Lublin, and their attempts 
to combine Aristotelianism with neo-Thomism, existentialism, phenomenology, and 
Marxism. Their  names include: Józef M. Bocheński, Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, Stefan 
Świeżawski, and definitely the most renowned, Karol Wojtyła. That would summarise 
the influence of Aristotle upon Polish political thinking. However, for Aristotle, the 
politics was mainly practical science with a strong normative bias – it should concen-
trate upon good actions that would lead the given political community towards hap-
piness. So it is dubious whether the Philosopher himself was satisfied with presenting 
Aristotelianism as a particular way of thinking and political reasoning only. Thus, 
with due respect to Aristotle, I want to propose a bit more controversial undertaking, 
trying to reconsider whether in our European or, more precisely Polish history, we 
have not only been thinking as Aristotelians but also acting like them.
Usually a historian of political thought refers to historic events, institutions or 
people’s actions  to understand concepts and ideas he or she discusses more pro-
foundly, and to examine them in a wider context. That means we invite the “ma-
terialised” history to support our intellectual discussions. I intend to do something 
opposite, that is, to suggest that our history incorporates general ideas and concepts 
and then translates them into its particular cultural reality. In the case of Aristoteli-
anism it means that to find its traces in Poland for instance, one does not have to be 
confined to reading several books which deal with it directly, but it is also helpful 
to inquire into Polish culture and its historical development. Only biding these two 
aspects together can we acquire the whole view. To join them, a coherent method-
ology is required; however, specifying it here would change the character of this 
essay, leaving little space for Polish Aristotelianism as such. That is why I decided 
to turn to the concept of “memes.” It is a concept external to the field of history, so 
I am fully aware of the fact that it is not warmly welcomed by historians. Still, I be-
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lieve it suggests ideas (if deprived of a strictly evolutionary background) which can 
gather some of the quite common epistemological and methodological convictions 
on interdependencies between our political theories and the world we live in under 
one label. So let us say that this article just meets memes at the threshold of our dis-
cipline, treating the concept as potentially worth adapting to historical studies, but 
only after serious reconsideration and modification that would make it fit there. Until 
such reconsideration is done, every attempt to apply memetics (not to be confused 
with mimetics) will assume a little bit of imagination. Which means that the term 
“Aristotelian memes” should be treated first of all as a convenient trope here – even 
if I am convinced it can serve far more analytical  purposes without putting a histo-
rian’s methodological conscience at stake.
To begin with some facts: as a term, “meme” was coined by Richard Dawkins in 
his book The Selfish Gene (1976). The general idea of Dawkins revealed the concept 
of self-replicating units that spread in the universe with no respect to goals other 
than reproduction itself. To avoid any simplistic interpretation that would identify 
“replicators” with genes only, and thus would reduce our human development to 
biological evolution, at the end of his book Dawkins introduced the second type of 
similarly “selfish” entities. As he explains:
We need a name for the new replicator, a noun that conveys the idea of a unit of cultural 
transmission, or a unit of imitation. ‘Mimeme’ comes from a suitable Greek root, but 
I want a monosyllable that sounds a bit like ‘gene.’ I hope my classicist friends will 
forgive me if I abbreviate mimeme to meme. (Dawkins 1976/1989. 192)
He adds:
Examples of memes are: tunes, ideas, catch-phrases, clothes fashions, ways of mak-
ing pots or of building arches. Just as genes propagate themselves in the gene pool by 
leaping from body to body via sperms or eggs, so memes propagate themselves in the 
meme pool by leaping form brain to brain via a process, which in the broad sense, can 
be called imitation. If a scientist hears or reads about a good idea, he passes it on to 
his colleagues and students. He mentions it in his articles and his lectures. If the idea 
catches on, it can be said to propagate itself, spreading from brain to brain. (Dawkins 
1976/1989. 192)
A short digression: if we look at contemporary trends in the history of political 
thought (or whatever we decide to name the discipline), it is surprisingly easy to 
argue that “ideas” or “concepts” discussed by followers of Lovejoy or Koselleck are 
not so far away from Dawkins’s memes. In order not to air groundless opinions, it is 
enough to mention that in his monumental The Great Chain of Being Lovejoy uses 
several times the word “unit,” sometimes as a unit-idea. In an interesting passage he 
writes, for example:
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Another characteristic of the study of the history of ideas, as I should wish to define 
it, is that it is especially concerned with the manifestations of specific unit-ideas in the 
collective thought of large groups of persons, not merely in the doctrines or opinions of 
a small number of profound thinkers or eminent writers. (Lovejoy 1936/1964. 19)
It seems that the same methodological presumptions and expectations stand behind 
the attempts like that. Namely, the need to express the development of our intellec-
tual heritage more independently from both the individuals and the natural world. It 
is not to deny the obvious fact that memes or ideas are produced by humans and their 
content is to a large extent determined by the material reality, but only to grant them 
with some kind of autonomy. Thanks to this autonomy, both their history and the 
relations between them can be grasped from a different angle – the angle that ena-
bles the exposure of affinities having been treated as secondary1 so far. Dawkins has 
chosen a very provocative way to express it, but it is worth discriminating between 
the style and the merit.
Originally Dawkins’s memes were presented in a rather nonchalant way without 
any profound examination; however, this primary nonchalance furnishes the given 
concept with a rough simplicity, sufficient to emphasize its most interesting elements 
and thus its theoretical potential. To the contrary, during the later history of the term 
it became a basis for the science of “memetics,” and so its meaning has been frozen 
and it raises reasonable doubts.2
Drawing a veil of ignorance upon memetics, I would like to use the picture of 
spreading memes as a source of analogies with the history of Aristotelianism in Po-
land, and its impact upon the ideological foundations of Polish political theory and 
practice. Several associations seem to be useful here. When expressed in evolution-
ary terms, these features would be: “variation, selection and retention (or heredity)” 
(Blackmore 2000. 14).
1  Because they were usually intermediated. for instance, by putting stress upon individu-
als – historians adore to give answers to the question who was the first to invent a particu-
lar concept, from whom to whom it was being passed. it is an interesting thing to do but 
it strengthens the role played in the history by “great thinkers” at the expense of ideas as 
such.
2  The biggest objection towards memetics is connected with the “universal darwinism” 
of dawkins, and his  assumption of the “selfishness,” which is characteristic for every kind of 
replicators. That means that in their strive for spreading, memes (like genes) do not take into 
account interests or opinions of their “hosts.” To say it simply, we embrace concrete ideas 
(like ideas drawn from the work of Aristotle) not because they seem to solve some of our exis-
tential problems or to improve our human reality. Memes do not serve us but rather we serve 
them, becoming some springboards with which they can jump from brain to brain. drawing 
this conclusion to the extreme would require to deny any thoughtful intellectual activity on 
our part, and to admit that – like parrots – we just repeat beliefs and behaviours we happen 
to hear or see too often. however, nothing in the concept itself calls for such a reductionist 
generalisation, especially if we invite memetics just to support, not to substitute our historical 
research on political thought.
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Variation means that we should not look at memes as some complete “boxes” with 
a fixed content to be passed from one mind to another, for example, as a thought 
transmitted from Aristotle to his pupils and then to their followers up to our times. 
Of course, some Aristotelian ideas (like the concept of politea or the distinction 
between commutative and distributive justice) have been constantly reverting to 
Aristotelianism, but it is worth underlining two faces of this transmission. To dif-
ferentiate between them, the theory of memes discriminates between “copying the 
product” and “copying the instructions” (Blackmore 2000. 14), and it points out that 
we should rather pay attention to the latter. That means that while examining Aristo-
tle’s work (and its later career, that is Aristotelianism) it is not enough to concentrate 
upon deepening our understanding of particular terms, concepts and ideas. It may be 
equally important to see Aristotle’s philosophy as an “instruction” of dealing with 
the world around us and its particular elements. There is, so to speak, the Aristotelian 
“way of thinking” which consists of rules and some general assumptions (axioms) 
that our mind should adhere to if it wants to operate in an Aristotelian manner. Ar-
istotelianism would mean putting this general instruction into action, and we could 
observe its outcomes not only in the philosophical literature, but within the culture 
of a given society subjected to the influence of such Aristotelian memes. Taking into 
account this cultural background, we could become more sensitive about possible 
different “products” of Aristotelian ideas functioning under different historical cir-
cumstances, that is, separate “mutations” of the original concept. Besides everything 
else, they denote the retention and durability of Aristotelian memes.
Memes can also be inherited, and so, it does not suggest that Aristotle was an in-
tellectual or spiritual ancestor of Cicero, Thomas Aquinas, or contemporary philoso-
phers. Instead, it is much more interesting to notice how Aristotelian memes have 
been genetically running throughout history. Sometimes they have been marginal-
ised and hardly visible, yet sometimes they have seemed obvious. My opinion is that 
their influence has been particularly evident and strong within the Polish tradition 
of political thinking and political practice. I would even dare to say that Aristotelian 
memes – quite coincidentally – have embedded in extremely fertile ground in Po-
land.
To sum up what has been said so far: By the reference to the concept of memes, 
I would like to say a few words about the Polish mutation of Aristotelianism. I dis-
criminate between elements (concepts, ideas) that can be viewed as universal Aris-
totelian instructions (prescribing generally the world of political relations), and the 
resultant historical conclusions drawn from these instructions.
Let us for a moment look at Aristotle’s work as  a source of memes to highlight 
a few of them, which, in my opinion, have been replicating continuously within the 
Polish political culture. I will choose to discuss the well-known concepts only (to 
avoid too specific considerations of Aristotle’s ideas as such) and put the stress upon 
connections between these concepts and some features observed in contemporary 
Polish political thinking. My main goal is not to present a detailed lecture on the 
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understanding of Aristotle in the Polish intellectual history; instead, I want to argue 
that quite general assumptions coming from the acceptance of some of his concepts 
are stamped indelibly upon Polish culture, and European culture in general. They 
became a kind of general “schemata” or “scripts” – to borrow terms from cognitive 
psychology – to be used to interpret the world of political relations, to act within it 
and also to look for ways of improving it. It may be interesting to trace such memes 
and to see how they diversified spatially and temporally. Comparing differences and 
similarities in incorporating Aristotelian thinking by different cultures allows to see 
the growing interest in Aristotelian studies in a wider cultural perspective. And that 
can help to understand better what makes Aristotle so attractive to strengthen his 
memes nowadays, since such a tendency is noticeable, at least in modern political 
philosophy.
Beginning with Polish history, Aristotle was known in Poland in the middle of 
the 14th century already, but the explosion of interest in his works took place only 
several decades later, especially among professors of the Kraków Academy (now the 
Jagiellonian University). By the 16th century Polish scholars, just as their European 
colleagues, discussed and commented on all areas of Aristotelian studies. At the 
same time, foundations of the renewed Polish Kingdom were laid, the kingdom that 
(partly by coincidence) had to give up the most obvious legitimation of the king’s 
power – the hereditary right – for another source of legitimisation. The Polish throne 
was elective3; this was not without significance for choosing a theoretical support for 
political theory. Aristotle turned out to be a good choice, and the best Polish thinkers 
of that time referred to him – Andrzej Frycz-Modrzewski, Stanisław Orzechowski, 
Wawrzyniec Goślicki, and others. In their writings, we can find the core of Polish 
Aristotelianism and, at the same time, the Polish version of republicanism which was 
derived from the former.
 It is often underlined that the political system which evolved at the turn of the 15th 
and 16th century in Poland makes up a separate phenomenon in European civiliza-
tion. At first glance, Polish republicanism of that age seems to follow the example of 
the Roman Republic with the concept of a mixed government that consists of three 
elements: monarchy, aristocracy and democracy. However, for many reasons, the 
democratic element has been slowly gaining an advantage over the other two. Thus, 
politically the system was changing into a democracy and the main political prob-
lem was to preserve it from going to the extreme status – that of anarchy. Aristotle 
3  There is a small disagreement among historians about the exact date/event that should 
be considered as the beginning of Polish elective monarchy but most of them agree that 
the first elected king was Władysław ii Jagiełło. up to 1572 this fact did not have any seri-
ous political significance as the crown remained in the hands of the representatives of the 
Jagiellonian dynasty. After the death of the last Jagiellonian – Zygmunt August –, political 
consequences of this (compared to other european countries) quite peculiar Polish elective 
monarchy became visible because it turned into the institution called „free election” (more 
properly: electio viritim).
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tried to solve this problem with his concept of politea, which was meant to give the 
right measure to freedom4 according to the Golden Mean Principle, which combines 
politics with ethics.
It is worth noticing that the erstwhile Polish republicanism needed to deal with 
problems generally quite similar to our modern problems with democracy. Just like 
contemporary philosophers and scholars do now, Polish thinkers had to look for ways 
to put democracy on the right path, that is, to make sure that equality and individual 
liberty do not threaten the minimal level of social cohesion and co-operation the 
commonwealth needs to function as a community which works for the benefit of all 
(the common good, as opposite to the benefit of some group). The interesting fact is 
that many of their prescriptions resemble our contemporary ideas of this issue. These 
prescriptions were used as guidelines for possible reforms of the political system, but 
also as the basis for the education of our citizens. As such, they became the memes 
to be passed on and form the culture of Polish society. Given the fact that they had 
begun to work this way in the 16th century – that is, some three centuries before a 
concept of political democracy came to fruition in the West – by examining them we 
might get a better insight into the benefits and limits of Aristotelian “instructions” of 
where to look, and what concepts to choose upon to improve democracy.
There are at least three important memes of Aristotelian provenience worth recon-
sidering. These are: definition of  man as zōon politikon reinforced with the particu-
lar concept of liberty, the concept of virtue, and the idea of the common good as a 
main criterion of discriminating between good and bad political orders.
If to be a human being means to be a part of a political community, then the natu-
ral desire of every person – to act and to influence the world around – must be di-
rected towards creating interpersonal relations, which builds a commonwealth worth 
supporting. Poles took the idea of fulfilling the definition of zōon politikon very seri-
ously and, in a very Aristotelian manner, identified humanity with the disposition of 
citizens’ rights. Thus, as for ancient Greek philosophers, the crucial thing for them 
was to decide whom to grant full citizenship. The Polish answer was the nobility and 
nobility only. Of course, we may accuse this choice of being non-democratic but it 
would be an ahistorical accusation, especially when we realise that the number of 
Polish nobility (szlachta) was impressive – up to 10% of the population –, and they 
were all enfranchised and took an active part in the legislative process. Thanks to 
privileges, not only political, but social and economic as well, szlachta exercised a 
great part of the political power over the rest of the inhabitants of the country (Ihnato-
wicz et al 1999). Because of that, in Polish history there has never been conditions 
favourable enough to discriminate between the private and the public sphere. Quite 
the contrary, Polish citizens (szlachta) found themselves being representatives of the 
4  in the ancient notion of the term, Beniamin constant was so kind to specify. for Aristo-
tle, as for other Greeks, freedom being realized by political participation, was the essence of 
democracy.
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whole commonwealth and their importance was closely connected with their politi-
cal participation and engagement. So their private interests were in a way expressed, 
and being taken care of, with the help of a particular political language. It is not an 
expression only; such convictions were put in action and backed up by a combina-
tion of individual liberty and equality – both placed within the political sphere.5
The superior concept of Polish Aurea Libertas (Golden Liberty) consisted of 
rights such as election of the king, the right to form an organisation to force through 
a common political aim (konfederacja), religious freedom, and the right of szlachta 
to form a legal rebellion (rokosz) against a king who violated guaranteed freedoms. 
Though generally all these rights can be viewed as creating a “liberal” order, Polish 
liberty had much more to do with so-called “liberty as non-domination,” as it would 
be named by modern civic republicans. It was designed as an active freedom that 
wanted to make a stand within the public sphere, where it could prove (and not only 
assume) to be free from any “arbitrary power.”6 The most visible (and at the same 
time the most infamous) example of such liberty is known as liberum veto – the 
right of each member of the Sejm to oppose a decision made by the majority in a 
parliamentary session. The voicing of such a veto, “I don’t allow,” could negate all 
the legislation that had been passed at that session7.
Liberum veto was acclaimed to be the most important warrant of equality – the 
other crucial value incarnated in the Polish political system. It was understood in 
the Greek way, as a starting point of the right political order. Unlike in Rome, where 
equality was somehow an effect of balancing the quality of each of the citizens (his 
material status, prestige) with the political influence the person was granted with, 
in democratic Athens every citizen enjoyed equality only because the person was a 
citizen. The same way, every Polish noble was treated as equal to all others. There 
were many ways to express this basic democratic equality.For instance, the growing 
superiority of the democratic element (the chamber of envoys) was strengthened by 
the 1505 act Nihil novi. From then on, no king could pass laws without the approval 
of the lower chamber. Beside the legal order, equality was protected in a more subtle 
manner as well. In Poland, there were no special aristocratic titles, and the whole 
5  There is a quite significant, though a bit amusing, detail proving this. Many authors – 
from Maciej sarbiewski in the 16th century to Wincenty lutosławski three hundred years 
later – regarded this Polish inclination to treat every issue as a political matter as being respon-
sible for one of the most visible features of Poles, namely: verbosity.
6  frankly speaking i do not think that the concept of freedom as “non-domination” can be 
separated from the liberal concept of the negative liberty in the way their advocates (Ph. Pettit 
mainly) want to see it. i would rather say that the differences between the two appear because 
of the much more general background that is taken into account whenever these concepts are 
discussed; so they do not rest upon definitions. The same concept can work quite differently, 
if there are other variables to modify its final influence, and this may be the case.
7  The first deputy to disrupt the parliamentary session with “veto” was Władysław siciński 
(1652). it set up a precedent (though it had no serious consequences then) that turned out to 
be dangerous, and many historians accuse it of being the main cause of the decline of The 
Polish–lithuanian commonwealth.
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szlachta regarded their class as “brothers.” Of course, there were serious differences 
between the rich part and the poor part of it (the latter growing), but those differences 
were not taken into account as far as political rights were concerned (which caused 
major political problems in the 18th century).
Liberty combined with equality can be a dangerous admixture. The political his-
tory of the Polish (from 1569 Polish–Lithuanian) Commonwealth is the best exam-
ple that it does matter how general values as these are conceptualised in the given 
society. Its failure followed by partitions of Poland should be, however, viewed in a 
wider context. Polish „noble democracy” was not meant to be a democracy. It was 
designed as an Aristotelian republic/politeia in which excesses of liberty and equal-
ity were to be blocked by the socio-political structure favouring those who were 
able to give priority to common good over their individual interests. The problem 
was that the Polish republicans were not able to direct accepted Aristotelian memes, 
exposing the value of a free citizen, for the common good of the society in a way that 
was superior to democracy. They tried, but to put it succinctly (even if exaggerating 
a bit), they made a small mistake in turning to Aristotle in their search for a useful 
tool.
There is a significant difference when we compare works of Polish republicans 
with works of their colleagues from other Renaissance republics. For example, 
it is enough to look through the books of Thomas Smith, Gasparo Contarini and 
Wawrzyniec Goślicki, as a means of perceiving a puzzling split. All three of them, 
referring to Aristotle, name three things crucial for a good commonwealth to sur-
vive: law, institutions, and virtue of the citizens. Yet Smith and Contarini put the 
onus upon the institutions and legal order, while the work of Goślicki is almost 
solely devoted to virtue.
The attachment to virtue was to preserve the commonwealth by the reduction of 
the potentially unlimited and infinite individual liberty. When invited into the politi-
cal sphere, individual liberty could not be based on the model of self-interest and 
competition.8 It simply had to be supported by a model promoting cooperation, if 
the state was to remain a commonwealth. The concept of the virtuous citizen, rooted 
in the normative concept of a state being the Res publica and thus defining some 
common values one should adhere his actions to, seemed to be a good option. The 
problem with virtue is, nevertheless, that it resides in individuals. Thus, to avoid 
the risk that citizens would become overburdened with their political responsibili-
ties, it required establishing at least some external guidelines and rules to provide 
individuals with proper criteria to make it easier for them to judge right from wrong 
(and so they could attain virtue through habit). For that, the legal and institutional 
order serves best as it frames all relations and actions that are to be called political 
in a commonly understandable way. Both Smith and Contarini seem to agree on this, 
8  Quite natural if we think about freedom as Thomas hobbes and John locke taught us.
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admiring the individual virtue, but allowing it work only within borders delimited by 
the established order. However, for Goślicki things looked different.
The Polish political tradition accepted the simple truth that there would be no 
state without law and institutions. But such impersonal aspects of a commonwealth 
were perceived as secondary. Most of the Polish political thinkers tended to believe 
that we first needed to take care of virtue itself and good institutions, or the good law 
would appear as a natural outcome of virtuous citizens exercising their freedom. It 
was an expectation far too optimistic; I would call it “immoderation in virtue,” to 
suggest that the Aristotelian meme was used in a contrarian way to Aristotelian prin-
ciples in this case. To condemn it, however, would be a premature conclusion.
At the end of the 18th century it turned out that it was not so difficult to erase Po-
land from the map of Europe. Nevertheless, it became totally impossible to eradicate 
its culture. The culture in which memes that had been rightly blamed for the growing 
corruption of the political order had already sufficiently started to work for Poland’s 
preservation. And, this is not a paradox; rather, it is an argument for assessing differ-
ent concepts and theories in their relation to the given empirical political reality.9
The Polish mutation of Aristotelian memes, specifically the assumption that every 
individual should act as zōon politikon – that individual actions matter politically (so 
liberty cannot be simply “negative” in liberal terms) – has led to the belief that virtue 
is indeed a cornerstone of a good commonwealth. This modification gave Polish citi-
zens the responsibility for sustaining the notion of Poland as a political community,10 
even if it had only existed temporarily in their heads and hearts.
External powers could conquer and take over Polish territory, institutions, and 
create their own legal order; however, they could not annihilate the Polish political 
community, primarily because it had been cleverly divided into smaller pieces. In a 
sense, every citizen could simply put one of these political pieces in their pocket and 
save it for the future. This might seem an idealistic standpoint, and it was often per-
ceived that way. However, a political idealism that grounds and provokes concrete 
actions does not differ significantly from so-called political realism.
It is not a coincidence that the long struggle for independence, a drive for “mate-
rialising” the community by regaining the political sphere, was for better or worse 
9  A side remark. i think it may be important here to underline that Polish political think-
ing was at odds with liberalism. The West generally was coming to democracy after having 
discussed and implemented liberal thinking and values such as individualism, for instance. so 
now to discuss propositions that could modify our concepts of politics a bit, as a point of refer-
ence, one simply must take liberalism into account as such (even if it is to be criticised then). 
But we in Poland never did elaborate neither a lesson on absolutism (that would encourage 
liberal demands), nor a lesson on liberalism – so our ideas, and their historical consequences 
could contribute to contemporary debates with some alternative perspective.
10  That is worth underlining – even the Polish ‘nation’ was usually described in political, 
not ethnical terms. That changed to some extent when modern nationalism was born, but 
even then, to be a Pole meant mainly a devotion and engagement in realising Polish political 
interests.
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the superior goal of every political movement that arose in this part of Europe before 
WWI. It tainted both liberalism (never so strong and radical in praising self-interest 
and egoism as in the West) and socialism (rejecting usually the idea of the abolition 
of the state, as being harmful for the ethical core of the society). It was responsible 
for two big Polish national uprisings in the 19th century – at least one of them (No-
vember insurrection of 1830) having managed to organise its own political struc-
tures, exercising real power over Polish society.
Quite similarly, we may look at the Polish Underground State during WWII. It 
could not have functioned on such a large and massive scale if it was not favoured 
by cultural traits that evolved in Polish society. I think it is also the key to profoundly 
comprehend the situation in Poland under the Communist rule, namely, some fea-
tures of the opposition movement, including “Solidarity” (the independent trade un-
ion formed in the 1980’s).
It is usually regarded that “Solidarity” cannot be classified according to typical 
discrimination between the political Left and the political Right. It has expressed 
a clear attachment to religious and national values on the one hand, and the strong 
socialist view of economy on the other hand. To reconcile these two puzzles, we 
could see them as adapting cultural memes to existing possibilities and conditions 
of action. “Solidarity” – as other oppositionists before it (like the Workers’ Defence 
Committee – KOR, or the Polish Independence Movement – NN) concentrated upon 
representing Polish society and its political interests, including social and economic 
goals, against the Communist state. The power and the institutions of the latter were 
perceived as imposed by Moscow so they had to be overtaken or overthrown, if 
Poland was to be Poland in the sense of a bona fide political community. It did 
not mean overthrowing important democratic values that in our tradition were not 
planted upon the soil of liberalism with its individualism, but rather incorporating 
republicanism with its more collectivistic view of the individual. That led to many 
interesting particularities, I think.
Firstly, until the 1970’s almost all opposition hoped for the possibility to reform 
socialism to make it a Polish socialism. They criticised the communist government 
as an institution being a parasite in the Polish body but not necessarily the com-
munist political elite. Rather, they tried to convince the latter (at least a part of it) 
to “convert” to virtue and then stand at the side of Polish society.11 Secondly, iden-
tifying “social” with “political,” it was easier to promote an idea of civil society in 
which our part of Europe gained much attention and thus discouraged the opposition 
in Poland from a revolution on behalf of strengthening the social bonds of every 
kind. The goal was, as it was often summarised, to create a “parallel Poland,” and 
11  The assumption that every person in Poland is a Polish citizen first of all (so every Pole 
can understand and agree on the national interest), and only then one can have other “loyal-
ties” (like being a member of the church or of the Polish united Workers’ Party, for instance) 
made it easier to choose the path of negotiations between the communists and “solidarity” 
(the round Table Talks in 1989).
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thus to make the communist system die naturally as being deprived of any individual 
activity. Thirdly, as all institutions were to be assessed according to their power to 
support political aspirations of the Polish nation, it is easier to understand the special 
role of the Catholic Church which was not restricted to religious matters. As Józef 
Tischner, Catholic priest and philosopher, argued:
The greatest achievement of Polish Christianity cannot be found in theological works, 
but rather in a religious thinking (referring to values) that are deeply rooted in the entire 
Polish ethos. (Tischner 1981. 13–14)
it is in a way remarkable that at the end of the 1970’s even atheists appreciated 
the political activity of the church – some of them denying their earlier views 
on the subject (for example, leszek Kołakowski, or Adam Michnik). And con-
versely, ethical and political issues were incorporated and elaborated by strictly 
catholic thinkers as well. i already mentioned the works of the lublin school 
of Philosophy in which there is a strong connection between  human dignity, 
spiritual values, and their cultural (also political) background. As John Paul ii 
put it during his first visit to Poland:
Polish culture is a good on which the spiritual life of the Poles rests. It distinguishes us 
as a nation. It has been decisive for us throughout the course of history, more decisive 
even than martial power. Indeed, it is more decisive than boundaries. (John Paul II 
1979. 73)
To present both sides, Polish communists knew very well the special tenor of Polish 
political tradition. And, they referred to the same memes to support their power. 
Indeed, the Polish version of the communist ideology quite soon stopped exploit-
ing the orthodox Marxism-Leninism theory of conflict but – with its rhetoric – tried 
to fulfil our needs for solidarity, unity, and so on. It was a difficult task and never 
fully accomplished for there were strong alternative bases for social identity, like 
the Catholic Church, having referred to quite similar memes. So our Polish version 
of communism has been usually compared to a radish – red from outside but com-
pletely white inside.
The last remark: there is a feature of contemporary Polish society that has gained 
a lot of attention from cultural anthropologists lately. After the fall of communism 
many social anthropologists examined post-communist societies with different ver-
sions of individualism-collectivism scales.12 There is an agreement among research-
ers that individualism and collectivism “together form one of the dimensions of na-
tional cultures” (Hofstede 1994. 261). As Geert Hofstede puts it:
12  The concept was introduced to social anthropology by harry Triandis.
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Individualism stands for a society in which the ties between individuals are loose: eve-
ryone is expected to look after himself or herself and his or her immediate family only” 
while collectivism „stands for a society in which people from birth onwards are inte-
grated into strong cohesive ingroups, which throughout people’s lifetime continue to 
protect them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty.13
The concept turns out to be very useful; however, researchers having referred to it 
while examining Polish society came to quite different conclusions. Some of them 
argued that Poles were typical collectivists, while others14 pointed out our strong 
individualistic bent. Only now are these contradictory data being reconciled by new 
observations. Paweł Boski argues, for instance, that this strange combination is ex-
actly the outcome of cultural habits which developed in Polish culture under the 
influence of ideas from 16th century republicanism (Boski 2010. 378). He tries to 
examine and name them but it is not easy without the knowledge about European 
intellectual history as such. Boski, for instance, summarises some of the ideas I 
mentioned as Aristotelian memes under the term “humanism,” which is not the best 
choice. In my opinion, it is worth meeting such attempts half way with a reflection 
coming “from the other side.” Paying attention to cultural differences in putting 
Aristotle’s ideas in action (as adapted political and ethical “instructions”) can also 
have some significance for us historians from different countries, being attracted 
by Aristotle’s heritage. In this way, we get another source of inspiration – besides 
examining Aristotle’s works and works on Aristotle, we can exchange the “practical 
Aristotelian wisdom” our cultures have already gathered. And what can give more 
satisfaction to historians than a visible proof that the past we deal with is perhaps 
dead, but will never be done with – so it is not a waste of time to talk it over again 
and again.
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An Argument within Aristotelianism: 
Maritain and MacIntyre on the Theory 
and Practice of Human Rights
ABSTRACT: Jacques Maritain and Alasdair MacIntyre are two of the leading Thomistic 
Aristotelians of the past century. Their most striking difference is on the subject of human 
rights, and this paper explores their rival approaches. It first attempts to explain Mar-
itain’s move from rejection to promotion of human rights, and to demystify his historical 
role in their political actualization. It then grounds MacIntyre’s own rejection of such 
rights in his concern with social practice, whilst comparing this sustained concern with 
the similar concerns of the young John Rawls and John Searle. It concludes by enquiring 
whether the increasing institutional actualization of human rights weakens this ground 
for their rejection.
KEYWORDS: human rights, Jacques Maritain, Alasdair MacIntyre, social practices.
Alasdair Macintyre’s critique of human rights is informed by a conception of hu-
man agency and ethical practice, and of its social and natural conditions, which 
he identifies as Thomistically Aristotelian. he has always considered human 
rights to be a “moral fiction”, as he famously put it in After Virtue. That he has 
never tired of pressing this critique is due to the incompatibility of human rights 
with his idea of the social conditions of human agency.
Jacques Maritain was the most famous living Thomist when Macintyre first 
encountered the philosophy in the 1940s, and his fame remained when, a de-
cade after Maritain’s death, Macintyre followed him in becoming a philosophi-
cal convert to roman catholicism. That the church which Macintyre joined 
was very different from that joined by Maritain owed something to Maritain’s 
own influence, and owed much to the history that Maritain both exemplified 
and theorized. nothing exemplifies the philosophical difference between them, 
and between their different kinds of Thomistic Aristotelianism, than their rival 
approaches to human rights. This paper contrasts those different approaches.1 
1  i thank Tamás nyirkos for his comments on the original version of this paper.
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1. MAriTAin, And hisTorY
Maritain’s move toward human rights began with his attempt to justify philo-
sophically the Papal condemnation of Action française. Previously, he had been 
one of the intellectual leaders of this movement, which was accused in the first 
academic treatment of the generic history of fascism of having been its ‘first 
face’ (nolte 1965). catholics’ common longing to return to the institutions of 
mediaeval christendom had seemingly been underpinned by Papal endorse-
ment of the mediaeval philosophy of st. Thomas Aquinas. in france, therefore, 
catholics had supported Action française’s reactionary, anti-republican politics 
of monarchism and so-called “integral nationalism”. The Papal condemnation 
therefore came as a shock, not least to Maritain. Although interested primarily in 
metaphysics, he had contested the idea of necessary progress in Theonas, charac-
terized his own position in and as Antimoderne, and attacked the intellectual mod-
ernism of luther, descartes and rousseau in his influential Three Reformers.
Three Reformers argued that “the modern world confounds two things which 
ancient wisdom had distinguished. it confounds individuality and personality” 
(Maritain 1928, 19, Maritain’s emphases.). Whereas individuality is natural, tem-
poral and particular, personality is spiritual, transcendent and universal. This 
analytic, conceptual distinction between the bodily matter and spiritual form 
that together constitute human being remained the first metaphysical principle 
of Maritain’s practical philosophy, even as he came to progressively embrace 
and celebrate modernity. for Maritain, this personalist premiss was theistic and 
Thomist. nonetheless, it came to function in his practical philosophy in a simi-
lar way to that in which the distinction between natural individuality and free 
personality functioned in the philosophy of Kant.
Maritain’s first move upon accepting the condemnation was to elaborate an 
“integral humanism” in opposition to any racist or “naturalist conception of pa-
triotism” (Maritain 1939. 73) and, increasingly, to what in Man and the State he 
eventually called “the plague of nationalism” (Maritain 1998. 5). rather than 
integral nationalism’s prioritization of politics, integral humanism was to give 
primacy to the personal and spiritual over the individual and temporal, includ-
ing the political. As natural individuals, human beings are merely dependent 
“parts” of the analogical body politic. conversely, as spiritual persons they have 
the dignity of being “wholes” in themselves, properly independent of any tem-
poral command. The temporal end and good of human beings may be under-
stood as “a progressive conquest of the self by the self accomplished in time”, 
an integration of the personal and spiritual with the individual and material that 
gives primacy to the spiritual as “a center of liberty” (Maritain 1995. 247, 245).
The common, temporal good is what Maritain calls an “infravalent end”. This 
way of characterizing such a good is absent from Maritain’s The Degrees of Knowl-
edge, which concerned only the metaphysics of being and not of historical time, 
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but is introduced the following year in Freedom in the Modern World. here he 
distinguished the concept of a simple “means” to an end from that of an “in-
fravalent” or “intermediate end (which is a true end though it is subordinated to 
a higher end)”. understood as a mere means to salvation in mediaeval christen-
dom, “the common good of the temporal order” has now become both an “au-
tonomous” and an “intermediate end” (Maritain 1996a. 57). repeated in a more 
theoretical text, Maritain proposed a “conception of the temporal as an order of 
means and ends with its own last end infravalent and subordinated with regard 
to the ultimate supernatural end” (Maritain 1940a. 128). This was to remain an 
important component of his conceptual scheme.
for almost all catholics, the restoration of social order had meant restoring me-
diaeval institutions and, as Maritain now put it, “prop[ping] the altar against a 
worm-eaten throne” (Maritain 1931. 18). What he proposed instead was replacing 
the mediaeval “ideal of the holy roman empire” with “a new ideal” (Maritain 
1931. 27). following renaissance and reformation, revolution and republic, 
changed conditions preclude any universal alliance of temporal and spiritual pow-
ers. The mediaeval ideal “of the emperor on the summit of … the body politic 
of christendom”, “a ‘myth’ strictly appropriate to the cultural conditions of [its] 
time”, presupposed “a vast ignorance of the universe and an imperious optimism” 
that “earthly institutions … are at the service of God” (Maritain 1931. 14–15). for 
Maritain, this ideal belonged irretrievably to the past. Thomists must not make the 
idealist error of assuming a single, unchanging form of the political good. God may 
be unchanging but the world is not. since human beings are necessarily caught in 
the flux of historical change and particularity, the universal can and should be ap-
proximated to in different ways under the differing conditions of time, place, and 
culture. “The defenders of tradition” must not “repeat … the same sort of mis-
takes in … practical and social philosophy” that they had once made in condemn-
ing Galileo (Maritain 1940b. 164). indeed, to avoid such mistakes, he proposed 
“a sort of ‘copernican revolution’ in the[ir] conception of political activity”. he 
advised christians not, as they had, to take their political starting point from any 
prevailing order but, rather, “to begin with oneself” (Maritain 1996b. 311).
What Maritain advocated was a new christendom, different from but analo-
gous to the old. This emergent society would “reproduce in an analogous fash-
ion certain characteristics of medieval civilization” (Maritain 1996a. 32), being 
similarly ordered to the common good, but in an entirely new form. This inno-
vative extension of “the philosophy of analogy” (Maritain 1996b. 240; Maritain 
1995. 442–45.) from being to time enabled him to claim a Thomistic warrant in 
correcting what he considered to be errors within catholic politics. 
in not assuming a single, unchanging form of the political good, Maritain was 
able to pose his new christendom as a “concrete historical ideal” (e.g. Maritain 
1996b, 233–313). from the observed fact that history is the product of persons’ 
free will and agency, he had inferred that there can be no necessity to progress 
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(Maritain 1933. 117–28, 149–50). Although change is inevitable, its direction is not. 
A “historical ideal”, he now added, is something singular and unique that may be 
made, in time, by free human agency. such a metaphysical ideal can inform action, 
in the sense that it can motivate and guide action by providing a target at which to 
aim. he argued that people ought to propound and pursue a “concrete”, materializ-
able ideal, because moral progress really can be actualized through such “a definite 
enterprise in history-making” (Maritain 1940a. 75; 1996a. 78; 1996c. 134).
Politically, Maritain attempted to take sides with good and against evil. even 
if this did not side him unequivocally with republicanism in the spanish civil 
war, it certainly opposed him to nationalist atrocities and, therefore, to the ma-
jority of his fellow catholics. soon after the fall of france and the rise of Vichy, 
he overcame any equivocation and sided straightforwardly with the wartime al-
liance of united nations. it was these allies who represented moral and political 
progress. once again. politics assumed primacy.
on 18th January 1942 Maritain publicly committed himself to the idea of hu-
man rights. seventeen days earlier the Arcadia conference, hosted by franklin 
delano roosevelt and attended by Winston churchill, had issued the declara-
tion by united nations. This committed 18 governments and 8 governments-in-
exile “to preserve human rights and justice in their own … [and] other lands”. 
Although france was not yet a signatory, Maritain had identified the universal 
agency of political progress and history-making with which he must now side. 
his political task was to adopt the political terms and concepts that might be 
used to secure an alliance of Americans and free french, whilst his philosophi-
cal task was now to theorize and elaborate that agency’s telos, its concrete, “noble 
and difficult historical ideal, capable of raising up and drawing forth … good-
ness and progress [as well as] …. men to work, fight, and die” (Maritain 1942. 
123–24). from here onward, human rights were to be focal to the infravalent end 
that was his concrete historical ideal.
Maritain’s declared his commitment to human rights fifteen years to the 
month after quitting Action française. until quitting, he had mocked the “reli-
gious pomp [with which] the modern world has proclaimed the sacred rights of 
the individual”, opposing the particular “rights” of the church and the family 
against the equal rights of human individuals (Maritain 1928. 19). in a remark-
able reversal, he now announced that the sacredness of the rights of the person 
is really proclaimed by the classical tradition of natural law:
The human person possesses rights because of the very fact that he is a person, 
a whole master of himself and of his acts, and who consequently is not merely a 
means to [an] end, but [is] an end, an end which must be treated as such. The ex-
pression, the dignity of the human person, means … that by virtue of natural law 
the human person has the right to be respected, is a retainer of rights, possesses 
rights. (Maritain 1942. 118.)
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in The Rights of Man and Natural Law he identified human rights with
the ‘myth’ which temporal history needs. if we understand it as applying to states 
where human existence is progressively established by the structures of common 
life and civilization, it concerns history itself and represents a ‘concrete historical 
ideal’, imperfectly but positively realizable. (Maritain 1944. 29.) 
he repeated a formulation from Three Reformers, that the common good of per-
sons in society is common “to the whole and to the parts” (1944. 9, Maritain’s em-
phasis; 1928. 23, Maritain’s emphasis). it is, that is to say, an attribute of both the 
community as a whole and of those persons who participate in the community, 
who are themselves wholes of another kind. his position is therefore “communal 
and personalist”, as he put it elsewhere (1996a. 27, 31, 32, 32n., Maritain’s em-
phases). for Maritain, whereas human beings are creatures of God, the political 
community is a human and historical construct. What had changed was not so 
much his conception of our nature, or even of the nature of the common good, 
but his appraisal of intellectual, political and moral enlightenment, and, more 
especially of the idea, politics and ethics of rights. 
having once opposed france’s republic, he now worked to recruit one repub-
lic to fight for the restoration of another. catholics should not resist the rights of 
man and the citizen. rather, they should embrace civil rights as granting them 
independence from “the things that are ceasar’s”, and should embrace human 
rights as an aspect of the universality and, indeed, the naturalness of natural law, 
and should identify the enlightened progress of moral conscience as an increas-
ing recognition of that natural law. “A right”, he later reflected, is “a requirement 
which emanates from a self with regard to something as its due, and which other 
moral agents are bound in conscience not to frustrate” (Maritain 1990. 187).
The familiar claim that Maritain was an author of the universal declaration 
of human rights (udhr) is entirely false. What he did contribute to was a 
virtual united nations educational, scientific and cultural organization “sym-
posium”, at the invitation of his old rival, the independently minded scientific 
humanist Julian huxley. far from contributing to the udhr, this symposium 
was politically marginalized and its publication prohibited until after the decla-
ration. in his introduction to the eventual book, Maritain noted the diversity of 
approaches to rights and
the paradox … that … rational justifications are at once indispensable …. because 
each one of us believes instinctively in the truth, and will only assent to what he 
himself has recognised as true and based on reason …. [and yet] are powerless 
to bring about a harmony of minds because [the justifications] are fundamentally 
different, even antagonistic …. and the philosophic traditions to which they are 
related have long been divergent. (Maritain 1949a. 9.)
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he referred back to his opening speech to the second annual conference of 
unesco, in which he opposed huxley’s intellectual ambitions by proposing 
that international intellectual collaboration aim not at philosophical agreement 
but, rather, at what we might call an overlapping consensus. huxley was heir to 
British idealism. in contrast, Maritain sounded almost Wittgensteinian:
however deep we may dig, there is no longer any common foundation for specula-
tive thought. There is no common language for it …. Agreement … can be sponta-
neously achieved, not on common speculative notions, but on … the affirmation of 
the same set of convictions concerning action …. [which] constitute … a sort of un-
written common law …. it is sufficient to distinguish properly between the rational 
justifications … and the practical conclusions which, separately justified for each, 
are, for all, analogically common principles of action. (Maritain 1952. 179–80.) 
Although he did advertise the point in his more exoteric and consensual ad-
dresses and publications, this position was, of course, informed by his theoretical 
belief in the intuitive “connaturality” of the natural law, as an unwritten com-
mon law. Given this belief, he saw no reason why ideological or religious disa-
greement on the nature of rights should obstruct moral conscience’s progressive 
recognition of their practicality. indeed, a warrant existed for this in The Degrees 
of Knowledge. To the degree of knowledge that Maritain called “speculatively 
practical science”, his metaethics and conception of politics’ first principle and 
final end changed little through the 1940s. What developed was his conception 
of political means, which he had already differentiated in the early 1930s as the 
cognitive realm of prudence and of “practically-practical moral science” (Marit-
ain 1940a. 138n.; 1995, 333). 
Maritain’s position on human rights reflected his broader historical ideal. he 
now advocated supranational, global government. Although not comprehen-
sively christian, such a pacific and tolerant union should be the aim, also, of any 
new christendom, in which church should be independent of state. This is the 
end to which politics should order the means, and human rights constitute the 
kind of morally “pure means” for which Maritain had always sought since break-
ing from the instrumentalism of Action française. These means may be accepted 
alike by “advocates of a liberal-individualistic, a communistic, or [like himself] 
a personalist-communal type of society” (Maritain 1949b. 22). still believing in 
progress, he left it to the future to determine which of these rival conceptual 
schemes best suits human beings.
After fully elaborating his account of human rights, Maritain systematized 
his metaphysics of history. here, he identified what he calls history’s “natural 
ends”: of “mastery over nature; conquest of autonomy; and the manifestation 
of all the potentialities of human nature” (Maritain 1959. 96, 108). These are all 
“intermediate or infravalent ends”’ (Maritain 1959. 102). each “is a relatively ul-
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timate end, an ultimate end in the order of nature” (Maritain 1959. 103). in this 
way, he sought to overcome Kant’s dichotomy of nature and freedom without, 
like hegel, resorting to their identification (see 1996 a, 6). into this historical 
teleology he fitted his account of “history-making”. This is the expression of in-
creased human mastery over their own and other natures, of what Maritain con-
sistently called humans’ conquest of their own freedom and autonomy, and of 
the actualization of the potentialities inherent in created human nature, which 
is related to divine creation as “the pursuit and conflict of uncreated and created 
liberty …. — one in time, the other outside of time” (Maritain 1959. 96). Marit-
ain was thereby able to accommodate a constructivist account of human history 
alongside a theodicy and within a theological account of being.
2. PrAcTices, And MAcinTYre
for Maritain, as for Kant, moral practice is a matter of individual action informed 
by individual reason and, for both, such personal and fully human moral reason-
ing and action must be differentiated from merely animal and instinctive behav-
iour. Twentieth-century philosophy generated far more sociological accounts of 
practice. in After Virtue, Macintyre proposed that “a moral philosophy … charac-
teristically presupposes a sociology” (Macintyre 2007. 23) before going on to re-
place Aristotle’s “metaphysical biology” with teleological accounts of tradition, 
of narratively understood lives and, most basically, of shared social practices. 
ludwig Wittgenstein’s famous reflections on rule-following were developed 
by John rawls. Before arguing for the superiority of contractarianism over utili-
tarianism (because “utilitarianism does not take seriously the distinction between 
persons”; Macintyre 1999. 24) rawls advanced the case for rule-utilitarianism, 
as distinct from act-utilitarianism. This case was based in his “practice concep-
tion of rules”. on this conception, “rules are pictured as defining a practice”, so 
“that being taught how to engage in [the practice] involves being instructed in 
the rules which define it, and that appeal is made to those rules to correct the 
behavior of those engaged in it” (rawls 1955. 24). The paradigmatic instances 
of practices are, of course, such games as Wittgenstein’s “chess, or baseball” 
(rawls 1955. 16). Without the constitutive rules of the game, there could be no 
game. rawls extends the concept’s scope by drawing analogies between games 
and such ethically crucial activities as punishing and promising. What is here 
important for rawls is “distinguishing between the justification of a rule or prac-
tice and the justification of a particular action falling under it” (rawls 1955. 4). 
The obligatoriness of keeping a promise, he argues, is justifiable by reference 
not to the likely effects of any particular act but only to those general rules by 
which the act is defined. his subsequent account of justice as fairness is prem-
ised upon analogical extension from games to political laws and institutions, and 
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to what he generalized as “the system of practices” (rawls 1958. 169) and later 
renamed society’s “basic structure”. from the start, he explicitly limited the 
scope of his theory of justice to “social institutions, or what i shall call practices”. 
having precluded “justice as a virtue of particular actions”, he added omission 
of justice as a virtue of “persons”, insisting that “justice as applied to practices” 
is justice in the “basic” sense (rawls 1958. 164–65). A practice as such is to be 
defined as 
any form of activity specified by a system of rules which defines offices, roles, 
moves, penalties, defenses, and so on, and which gives the activity its structure. As 
examples one may think of games and rituals, trials and parliaments, markets and 
systems of property.
his theory of justice as fairness was to formulate “restrictions as to how practices 
may define positions and offices, and assign thereto powers and liabilities, rights 
and duties” (rawls 1958. 164). This is all carried over into A Theory of Justice, 
where he adds that “an institution” “may be thought of in two ways: first as 
an abstract object, that is, as a possible form of conduct expressed by a system 
of rules; and second, as the realization in the thought and conduct of certain 
persons at a certain time and place of the actions specified by these rules”, and 
that he intends the latter (rawls 1999. 48). These refinements were influenced 
by the way in which John searle had, in the meantime, redescribed rawls’ two 
concepts of rules as “regulative and constitutive rules” and renamed practices 
“institutions” searle 1964. 55). in adopting the language of “institutions” and 
their “constitutive rules”, rawls (rawls 1999. 49, 303) followed searle. 
searle has built a social ontology upon an account of the linguistic generation 
of desire-independent reasons for actions, which began with his identification 
of constitutive rules as the way to derive “ought” from “is”. in playing such a 
game as searle’s beloved baseball, one assumes both the institutionally factual 
obligations and rights of a player.
 similarly, rawls wrote of “the assignment of rights and duties in … common 
practices”, of rights’ relation to “the justice of practices”, and of “the distribu-
tion of rights and duties established by a practice” (rawls 1958. 174, 175, 186), 
in a line of throught which focussed in A Theory of Justice upon “the basic struc-
ture of society, or more exactly, the way in which the major social institutions 
distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advan-
tages from social cooperation” (searle 1999. 6). for both searle and rawls, then, 
rules constitute institutions (or practices) and institutions constitute rights and 
duties, as rules, and these rights and duties ought therefore to be acknowledged 
and enacted by participants in the institution and can be justifiably enforced. in 
this way, the bedrock in which rawls’ political “contractarianism” is rooted can 
be identified as Wittgensteinian. 
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others have pursued such a line of thought about normativity so far as to de-
scribe rights themselves as “a practice”. for rawls and searle, to say this would 
be to confuse the rules that constitute a practice with those that regulate action 
within it, once constituted. nonetheless, richard flathman took himself to be 
following both searle (flathman 1973a; 1973b) and rawls when, in The Practice 
of Rights, he accounted for such a practice, and identified its roots in a non-meta-
physical, political “tradition that goes back to at least Aristotle” (flathman 1976. 
18). even so, “the concept of a right as we know it seems not to have become an 
identifiable part of Western social and political thought and practice until well 
into the seventeenth century”, and even this modern “concept of rights is be-
ing misused” in the udhr (flathman 1976. 76). More recently, charles Beitz 
has radicalized rawls’ The Law of Peoples to reconceptualize human rights as a 
practice with roots that go back only so far as the udhr (Beitz 2009). duncan 
ivison warrants his claim “that rights are best understood as a social practice” by 
reference not to rawls or searle but to Macintyre’s famous account of practice, 
as “any coherent (and complex) form of socially established cooperative human 
activity” (ivison 2008. 18; cf. Macintyre 2007. 187). 
long before writing After Virtue, Macintyre appreciated the move made by 
rawls and searle in distinguishing two concepts of rules.2 he, too, followed 
Wittgenstein in exploring the sociological and ethical import of rules, most nota-
bly in A Short History of Ethics. for Macintyre, what is most important in shared 
practices the way in which socialization into practices educates our individual de-
sires, so that our internal, subjective reasoning is rendered susceptible to exter-
nal, objective, shared reasons. After Virtue repeats the earlier book’s point about 
the essential attributiveness of “good” as the opening move in a distinctively 
Aristotelian case for moving from “is” to “ought”, and for the social constitution 
of an ethical reality. “We define … ‘farmer’ in terms of the purpose or function 
which … a farmer [is] characteristically expected to serve”, so that if someone is 
a farmer he ought to do whatever a farmer ought to do. Macintyre therefore con-
curs with searle that it is “a grammatical truth” that “an ‘is’ premise” can entail 
“an ‘ought’ conclusion”, and that social practices give real ethical content to this 
truth (Macintyre 2007. 57–58). Macintyre broke from searle in drawing the Ar-
istotelian inference (see Nicomachean Ethics 1097b22–1098a20) that a functional 
conception of “good” can be attributed to certain human beings as such, and not 
just as enactors of particular social roles. Whereas Maritain drew an analogy be-
2  in Knight 2013 i compare searle’s account of practices with that of Macintyre, and i 
give fuller accounts of Macintyre’s account of practices in Knight 2007 and 2008. Macintyre 
does not acknowledge rawls by name but, given that it is elaborated at length as “an attempt 
to shore up utilitarianism”, his account of “rational, because rule-governed”, practices with 
shared “criteria of success or failure” clearly refers to rawls’ “Two concepts of rules” (Mac-
intyre 1967. 243, 241).
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tween the function of a human being and a piano in making his Aristotelian case 
for human rights (Maritain 1998. 86), Macintyre’s analogy is with a watch. 
it is the first principle of Aristotelian practical philosophy that actions are un-
dertaken for the sake of goods (ne 1094a), and Macintyre’s account of practices 
is Aristotelian and teleological. Practices are constituted in part by collectively 
intended rules but also, on his account, by commonly intended goals and goods, 
and it is these goods that give point and purpose to the shared rules. common 
goods also justify particular duties and rights, insofar as those rules and rights 
contribute to the achievement of the goods. even though moral responsiveness 
to the ethical demands and needs of others is seldom “rule-governed” (a point 
which would hardly surprise those who, unlike searle or rawls, share Wittgen-
stein’s apparent scepticism), trustworthiness in the “rule-following” of “truth-
telling and promise-keeping” is a necessary virtue within every role and practice 
(Blackledge 2010. 9–12), so that practices function as the schools of the virtues. 
What most crucially distinguishes Macintyre’s concept of practices from all 
earlier and all rival accounts is the distinction between what he denotes by the 
Greek-derived “practices” and the latinate “institutions”. 
chess, physics and medicine are practices; chess clubs, laboratories, universities 
and hospitals are institutions. institutions are …. involved in acquiring money and 
other material goods; they are structured in terms of power and status, and they 
distribute money, power and status as rewards. nor could they do otherwise if 
they are to sustain not only themselves, but also the practices of which they are the 
bearers…. indeed so intimate is the relationship of practices to institutions — and 
consequently of the goods external to the goods internal to the practices in ques-
tion — that … the ideals and the creativity of the practice are always vulnerable 
to the acquisitiveness of the institution, in which the cooperative care for common 
goods of the practice is always vulnerable to the competitiveness of the institu-
tion…. Without … justice, courage and truthfulness, practices could not resist the 
corrupting power of institutions. (Macintyre 2007. 194).
As Macintyre “warn[s]” in chapter 14 of After Virtue, he uses “the word ‘prac-
tice’ in a specially defined way which does not completely agree with current 
ordinary usage, including my own previous use of that word” (Macintyre 2007. 
187), and, as ivison evinces, disregard of his distinction allows his account of 
practices to be misconstrued as a premise for describing rights as a practice. of 
course, After Virtue’s famous critique of human rights, even though it precedes 
the book’s stipulative definition of “practice”, should be sufficient to preclude 
such misconstrual. Though famous, the critique is too often misunderstood. its 
premiss is that “the possession of rights … presuppose[s] …. the existence of 
particular types of social institution or practice” (Macintyre 2007. 67), and this 
premiss allows Macintyre to date the concept’s appearance earlier than flath-
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man — to “near the close of the middle ages” (Macintyre 2007. 69) — and 
even to warrant description of “human transactions” in terms of rights “in times 
and places” that lack any such express concept. his crucial point is about the 
particularity not of language but of rights. it is that any such description must 
identify “some particular set of institutional arrangements”, in which the rights 
are “institutionally conferred, institutionally recognized and institutionally en-
forced” (Macintyre 1983. 12). in the absence of any appropriate “set of rules”, 
“the making of a claim to a right would be like presenting a check for payment 
in a social order that lacked the institution of money”. first one needs the insti-
tution to be constituted, and then one can engage in the new kind of reasoning 
about action that it makes possible. The sets of rules that confer rights “are in 
no way universal features of the human condition” and, Macintyre continues, 
“always have a highly specific and socially local character” (Macintyre 2007. 67). 
This is what underlies his critique of claims for the universality of human rights, 
and his provocative observation that in the udhr “what has since become the 
normal un practice of not giving good reasons for any assertions whatsoever is 
followed with great rigor” (Macintyre 2007. 69). What we may now add is that 
rights are amongst those powers “distribute[d]” to individuals by organizational 
“institutions”, in the sense stipulated by Macintyre later in the book. in Macin-
tyre’s terms, successful claims to the possession of rights therefore presuppose 
the existence of particular types of institution.
organizational institutions formalize and enforce rules and distribute money, 
power and status. The question we should ask about the reality of human rights 
is that of the extent to which modern, western-style, bureaucratic nation states 
— and the “international” system that they comprise, now globally extended 
and formally unified by the un and its “international law” — successfully in-
stitute and enforce individual, universally. insofar as they do, we might regrad 
them as constituting a historically (but no longer locally) particular set of insti-
tutional arrangements capable of institutionally conferring, institutionally recog-
nizing and institutionally enforcing human rights as a set of positive rules. 
3. conclusion
As Macintyre said in After Virtue, Maritain is one of a couple philosophers “for 
whom [he has] the greatest respect and from whom [he] learned most” (Macin-
tyre 2007. 260). some of what he learned is already apparent in his own first pub-
lication, “Analogy in Metaphysics” (Macintyre 1950). As he made clear in Three 
Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, the Thomism to which he turned following After 
Virtue was close to that of Maritain, notwithstanding the “uncharacteristic lapse” 
of Maritain’s “quixotic attempt to present Thomism as offering a rival and su-
perior account of” human rights (Macintyre 1990. 76). he has since admitted 
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both that he “sometimes followed Maritain too closely” (Macintyre 2008. 262) 
and that his stance on human rights had been “too negative”, and that there is a 
“need for an Aristotelian grounding for a proper understanding of rights”. such 
a grounding must be located not, as for Kant or Maritain, in the reason or dignity 
of persons or “individuals as such” but in “the common good” as something 
social, and in “justice as a virtue, both of individuals and” of insitutions, that is 
directed to the common good. he credited “the institutionalization of” rights by 
“American and french revolutionaries” with some such good and justice (2008. 
272) but also with what he elsewhere calls “a mistake of theory…. embodied in 
institutionalized social life” (Macintyre 1998. 229). 
Macintyre’s conception of human nature is that of dependent rational ani-
mals (Macintyre 1999), who need virtuous others if they are to attain those qual-
ities that Kant and Maritain separate from material individuality as personality. 
Personality is therefore for Macintyre a social achievement, a consequence of 
successful participation in social practices. intellectual and moral virtues exist 
initially in individuals as no more than potentialities, which require others for 
their actualization. We attain personality though participation in social practices, 
which are the schools of the virtues. Therefore it is a mistake of theory to ascribe 
rights to human beings apart from and prior to their relations with others, and apart 
from the historically particular practices and institutions into which they are social-
ized. The problem that Macintyre persists in attributing to individualist (but not 
necessarily to social and economic) rights is that they threaten “the bonds” and 
“authority” of practices and “institutions intermediate between the individual 
on the one hand and the [state] on the other” (Macintyre 2008. 272). 
Macintyre’s critique of human rights may have lost some of its force since the 
time of After Virtue. As samuel Moyn argues, this was the time that the language of 
human rights was, for the first time, attaining salience in international politics, but 
when the concept still lacked much purchase on reality. Then, like huxley before 
him, Macintyre identified the concept with the earlier idea of natural rights. now, 
he is prepared to follow Moyn in acknowledging that our conception of human 
rights is a more recent idea. They are the stuff of Maritain’s concrete historical 
ideal, or, as Moyn puts it, of “the last utopia” (2010) which first presaged and now 
follows the death of state socialism. Maritain had already told us why, during the 
cold War, no theoretical justification could be agreed universally for the udhr. 
now, human rights is a crucial aspect of that international law to the implementa-
tion of which all states are committed, formally and institutionally, as a condition 
both of their legitimacy and of their participation in global capitalism. Macintyre is 
more resolute in his resistance to global capitalism than was Maritain, and, where-
as Maritain saw global governance as the best guarantor of perpetual peace, Mac-
intyre is no less resolute in his defence of the goods of practices and the politics of 
locality. Perhaps, though, Macintyre’s argument will have to be made in the face 
of the progressive actualization of Maritain’s institutional hopes. 
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BalÁzs M. MezeI
Yves Simon’s Understanding of Aristotle
some comments
ABSTRACT: Yves Simon was among the prominent Catholic political philosophers 
who worked for many years at the University of Notre Dame in Indiana. In many of his 
writings, the most important references point to the teaching of Jacques Maritain; however, 
Aristotle’s political philosophy plays a significant role in Simon’s view of democracy as 
well. In my paper I offer an overview of the Aristotelian elements in Simon’s works and 
attempt to identify the kind of scholarly reading of Aristotle Simon consistently applied.
KEYWORDS: Yves Simon, Jacques Maritain, Aristotle, democracy, Catholic politi-
cal philosophy, Natural Law
1. siMon And MAriTAin on ArisToTle
Yves simon belongs to those important scholars who contributed to the emer-
gence of the university of notre dame as a leading catholic university in the 
us. Although simon’s activity as a professor of notre dame ended in 1948 
when he moved to the university of chicago, his connections to notre dame 
remained alive. he lived in south Bend during the subsequent years and, as 
Anthony o. simon told me in one of our personal conversations some years ago, 
he travelled by train to chicago once a week for two or three days. simon con-
tinued to co-operate with notre dame professors and, among other activities, 
contributed to The Review of Politics until his passing away in 1961.
As James A. McAdams summarily writes of simon’s oeuvre,
Although he was reluctant to allow his personal faith to intermingle with his po-
litical writings, simon became recognized internationally for his adaptation of the 
teachings of leading catholic thinkers, such as Aquinas, to contemporary concerns 
such as opposing fascism and promoting democracy. he was a strong believer that 
democratic citizenship requires education in basic values. While an interest in 
practical issues ran through all of his scholarship, he also displayed an ability to 
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comment on a dazzling array of philosophical issues, including the nature of free 
choice, the limits of reason, the pursuit of happiness, and mind-body problems. 
(McAdams 2007. 394)
one of the “leading catholic thinkers” referred to in the above quotation was 
simon’s mentor Jacques Maritain, his professor at the institut catholique in 
Paris during the 1920’s. Maritain’s dynamic Thomism determined that of si-
mon’s in many ways although not in every aspect, for example, their approaches 
to Aristotle differ. it is a notable lacuna of Maritain’s works that he rarely deals 
with Aristotle in his own right; rather, he offers Thomistic interpretations of 
Aristotle from time to time. To have a balanced view of Maritain’s reading of 
Aristotle, we need to analyse carefully his works, such as the Introduction to Phi-
losophy, in which Aristotle is often mentioned and an entire chapter is dedicated 
to his thought.
in a general sense, we may say that Maritain lets the reader see Aristotle in 
a double frame of reference: on the one hand, Aristotle is the most outstanding 
ancient philosopher by virtue of his genius and works; after Plato’s contribu-
tions, he is the real founder of genuine philosophy. on the other hand, Aris-
totle’s thought was thoroughly transformed by an even more eminent genius, 
Thomas Aquinas, into the most perfect philosophy ever to be attained by the 
human mind. due to this outlook, Maritain does not attempt to give a detailed 
account of Aristotelian thought in the context of the stagirite’s age and culture, 
but considers him in the perspective of Thomas Aquinas, and especially in the 
perspective of the Thomistic revival of his age.1
in a general sense, Yves simon also follows the scholastic, and especially the 
neo-Thomistic interpretation of Aristotle along the lines he found in the works 
of Maritain. nevertheless, simon is not just a faithful follower of Maritain. he 
exemplifies a different type of thinker, a careful, perhaps less systematic, yet a 
very accurate kind of researcher who is never satisfied with an abstract view of 
a philosopher or a period. it is a consequence of simon’s different character as 
a philosopher that he shows more caution in interpreting Aristotle in conform-
ity with neo-Thomism. simon attempts to look behind the interpretations, so 
he explores Aristotle’s original texts and the scholarly work on the thought of 
Aristotle. Thus he does not only use the original Greek texts in understanding 
Aristotle’s points, but criticises such scholars as for instance W. d. ross.
it is therefore an interesting task to see simon’s relationship to Aristotle’s 
thought. Just as other Thomists, simon ubiquitously uses Aristotelian notions 
in his works. But there are some important junctures where simon carefully 
1  As Maritain writes in the introduction, “My chief aim in composing an Elements of Philoso-
phy series, to which this book may serve as an introduction, is to give a faithful presentation of the 
system of Aristotle and St. Thomas…” (Maritain 1947. 8).
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reflects on Aristotle’s thought on the basis of the original works and develops an 
interpretation instrumental to his own understanding of philosophical matters. 
in what follows, i shall investigate three such fields in simon’s work natural law, 
government, and moral philosophy.
2. ArisToTle in siMon’s TheorY of nATurAl lAW
simon’s understanding of natural law reveals the approach of a scholar at home 
in more than one philosophical culture. in a long passage of The Tradition of 
Natural Law, his masterpiece on the subject (simon 1992), simon demonstrates 
a historical and linguistic sensitivity so important in mapping out philosophi-
cal issues. simon specifies two important points: on the one hand, he refers 
to the epoch-making change in the meaning of the expression “right” during 
the 17–18th centuries, when the meaning of right in the objective sense (right 
is what satisfies a prescription or a rule) assumed the meaning of right as that 
which gives sufficient ground to claim something, for instance some material or 
intellectual good (simon 1992. 120). on the other hand, simon realises that what 
we call “law” in english, such as in “natural law,” is expressed by a different 
word in other languages, such as Recht, droit, or diritto. in latin, we distinguish 
between ius and lex, in Greek between dikaion and nomos. in english ius is uni-
formly translated as “law.” As he observes, “This famous particularity of the 
english legal language has probably exercised considerable influence on the 
Anglo-saxon way of thinking about juridical (or legal) matters.” (simon 1992. 
119). simon does not explore the full scale of the difficulties inherent in this 
particularity, but he certainly demonstrates a unique sensitivity to how deeply 
philosophical issues are entangled with linguistic-conceptual developments.2
Thus it comes as no surprise that simon shows a strong interest in the origi-
nal meaning of some important Greek terms within the tradition of natural law. 
one characteristic paragraph dealing with the problem of natural law is pro-
posed by Aristotle. simon quotes the famous passage from the Rhetoric where 
Aristotle refers to “natural justice and injustice,” a law “binding on all men,” by 
citing Antigone’ words: “not of to-day or yesterday it is, But lives eternal: none 
can date its birth.” (Quoted by simon 1992. 131). simon gives particular atten-
tion to a clause in Aristotle which appears in the sentence mentioned above: 
“for there is, as every one to some extent divines, a natural justice and injustice 
that is binding on all men […]” (ibid, 131). simon goes back to the Greek text 
2  As a non-native American, here Simon was able to recognise an important feature of the 
Anglo-American mind, the readiness to view the world as a compound of particulars which can be 
known by observing and disentangling all the individual issues and their compositions. The nega-
tive side of this attitude is a general skepticism about wholes and syntheses.
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and points out that Aristotle uses the expression ὃ μαντεύονται πάντες in 
the above quotation where the verb μαντεύονται is translated as “divines.” 
suggesting that the verb has a more concrete sense than “to perceive through 
sympathy or intuition” (ibid, 132), simon makes the meaning more precise, and 
concludes that “no doubt, Aristotle in this passage maintains that natural law 
is known by inclination.” (ibid, 132) Whether we agree with simon’s interpre-
tation of μαντεύονται or not, so much is evident that simon strives to reach 
an understanding of Aristotle based on a careful reading of the original text. 
Μαντεύονται may not factually mean “intuition by inclination,” but may refer 
to a phenomenon we call conscience today. for simon, however, the use of the 
term and the strength of the point raised by Aristotle serve as a springboard to 
argue for the naturalness of natural law in human beings.
We find a similar procedure with respect to such important terms as God, 
nature, or free choice. it is especially notable that simon insists on the teach-
ing of the plurality of natures by Aristotle; in interpreting Aristotle’s notion of 
nature, he does not only investigate some original loci, but gives a short histori-
cal overview of the notion of nature from antiquity to modernity (simon 1992. 
45–46). he points out the tremendous importance of the Aristotelian concept of 
the plurality of natures since, without viewing things in this way, it would not be 
possible to speak of natural law as a hierarchy or dynamism with beginnings and 
ends, with intentions and with distinctions in value (ibid, 51–52). natural law in 
simon’s understanding is dynamic, that is to say, progressive, and allows us to 
build up an ever more appropriate understanding of its functioning by means 
of the development of science, technology, morality, and philosophy. This is 
an Aristotelian conclusion, according to simon, which is made possible by the 
inherent teleology of things, a natural advancement.
3. ArisToTle in siMon’s PhilosoPhY of deMocrAcY
The second example of simon’s keen understanding and use of Aristotle is given 
in his works on political philosophy. interestingly, his main work on the subject, 
Philosophy of Democratic Government (simon 1993) contains only a few, even though 
substantial, references to Aristotle. his other works, such as A General Theory of 
Authority (simon 1980), mention Aristotle’s thought more frequently. simon’s po-
litical philosophy attempts to reach a synthesis between authority and democracy, 
between a traditional conception of politics based on the notion of order and the 
modern understanding of politics based on the notion of individual freedom.
here we face a common feature of simon’s terminology: he uses important 
terms, which go back to Aristotle, in the sense given to these terms throughout the 
history of ideas. such a term is for instance “prudence” or practical wisdom which 
simon analyses insightfully. in the Philosophy of Democratic Government as well as 
90 The PoliTics of ArisToTle 
in A General Theory of Authority, simon distinguishes individual prudence from pru-
dence in leadership of a community and he points out the latter’s connection to 
the problem of the unity of political action (simon 1980. 37 sq; simon 1993. 28 
sq.). on the theoretical level, however, simon offers a perceptive analysis of the 
peculiar nature of practical knowledge as described by Aristotle. As he opines,
The problem with which we are now concerned is whether what holds for scientific 
propositions holds also for those practical propositions which rule the action of a 
multitude […] if the certainty of science demands that the scientific object should 
possess the kind and degree of necessity that is found in universal essences alone, 
it seems that practical knowledge admits of no certainty, for human practice takes 
place in the universe of the things that can be otherwise than they are. (simon 
1993. 21)
here simon refers to the classical passages in chapter 6 of the Nicomachean Eth-
ics which defines practical truth as truth in agreement with right desire. how-
ever, this does not give the key to the “mystery of prudence,” as simon calls it, 
for in the case of an individual the practical decision is dependent on various 
factors which are difficult to identify. in the case of a community, however, it is 
“the common good” which should govern political action.
The notion of “the common good” is again of Aristotelian origin (as so of-
ten, with Plato in the background). in A General Theory of Authority – a book we 
published in hungarian a few years ago (simon 2004) – simon refers to the Ni-
comachean Ethics and quotes the famous sentence: “The common good is greater 
and more divine than the private good.” (simon 1980. 28–29, Nicomachean Ethics, 
1094b; “ἀγαπητὸν μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἑνὶ μόνῳ, κάλλιον δὲ καὶ θειότερον ἔθνει 
καὶ πόλεσιν”).3 simon goes on to comment on the meaning of θειότερον and 
suggests that it refers to the participation in the privilege of imperishability; 
human communities are the highest attainments of nature and are virtually im-
mortal (simon 1980. 29).
simon uses an important passage from the Politics, too, where Aristotle repeats 
his thesis to the effect that human beings are political animals and they form a 
body politic with respect to their share of the common good they can thereby 
achieve (simon 1993. 74; Politics 1278b: μέρος ἑκάστῳ τοῦ ζῆν καλῶς). This 
common good is the “good life” which belongs to the essence of the body poli-
tic. now simon analyses the notion of the common good in a rather formal fash-
ion, that is to say, he does not describe the content of the common good but 
emphasises some of its structural features, such as, most importantly, its shared 
character:
3  Simon uses the translation by W. D. Ross; in other translations, however, the text is more 
complicated.
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in order that a good be common, it does not suffice that it should concern […] several 
persons; it is necessary that it be of such nature as to cause, among those who pursue 
it and insofar as they pursue it, a common life of desire and action. (simon 1993. 49)
The other feature simon picks out is that the pursuing of the common good 
renders authority necessary. simon’s all examples, such as a football game, a 
team of workers, and the operations of an army, possess characteristic goods 
in common, even one common good which defines their common action. Yet 
in all cases the presence of a certain authority is required, just as in the case of 
contracts the validity of which calls for a higher authority than the contracting 
partners. That is to say, as simon suggests in a Kantian fashion, certain states 
of affairs in human situations logically and practically presuppose the existence 
of authority as the key function of these states of affairs. even two-party or 
multi-party liberal democracies require the existence of authority in a number 
of forms, such as laws, constitution, political bodies checking and balancing the 
power of the representatives of the political majority in decision making. it is 
not my aim here to develop simon’s notion of authority in more detail and argue 
for a notion of authority higher than its function in a community; suffice it to say 
that simon’s notion of authority points to an Aristotelian origin again.
in order that a society realises the common good, political unity is required. 
unity is needed in action towards the common good (in the order of means), and 
it is also needed as the most important element of the common good itself (in 
the order of ends). The unity of the common good, according to Aristotle, cannot 
be realised by many governing principles; Aristotle quotes the famous line from 
homer, and simon gives a special emphasis to this quotation: “The world, howev-
er, refuses to be governed badly. »The rule of the many is not good; one ruler let 
there be.«” (simon 1993. 35; Metaphysics, 1076 a: “οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίη: 
εἷς κοίρανος ἔστω”).4 however, this is not the Aristotelian view which simon 
wants to put forward in a book on the philosophy of democracy; rather, simon 
offers us Aristotle’s anti-Platonic view of the best government which should be a 
combination of several political forms, such as monarchy, aristocracy, and democ-
racy. still, authority is an important functional element of all forms of government. 
in various aspects of contemporary democratic societies, we need political forms 
recalling the content of these ancient expressions; and thus simon agrees with 
Aristotle’s lines in the Politics: “some indeed say that the best constitution is a 
combination of all existing forms […]” (simon 1993. 107; Politics 1265b).
The last example of simon’s use of Aristotle leads us to political ethics. Ac-
cording to simon, Aristotle’s ethics is political and his politics is ethical; and this 
4  This sentence served as one of the most important references in pre-Christian and Christian 
arguments for the importance of a political and ecclesiastical monarchy, as Erik Peterson pointed 
out in his essay about monotheism as a political problem (Peterson 1935).
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proposition enjoys simon’s full consent (simon 1980. 139–140). he even adds 
that “The best way to perceive the ethical character of politics is to realize fully 
the political character of ethics.” (simon 1980. 141). Most importantly, he un-
derstands authority as the guarantee and, at the same time, the accomplishment 
of the unity of ethics and politics.
4. ArisToTle in siMon’s MorAl ThouGhT
Thus if we want to say some words on simon’s understanding of Aristotle in 
matters of morality, the unity of ethics and politics is an excellent beginning. As 
i mentioned, simon’s dealing with Aristotle is far from being uncritical; when 
he wants to understand Aristotle’s meaning, he usually goes back to the original 
Greek texts and offers not only a genuine reading but also a criticism of some 
translations, such as the received editions of W. d. ross.
A good example is simon’s correction of ross’s translation of hexis, ἕξις as a 
“state of character.” in the Philosophy of Democratic Government, simon points out 
that the Greek word ἕξις was unintelligibly translated by W. d. ross as “state of 
character.” simon proposes “habitus” as the right translation and even the latin 
habitus should be rendered as habitus, and not as “habit” as A. c. Pegis has it in 
his influential translations of Thomas Aquinas’s works (Pegis 1996). it may be 
worth mentioning here that the debate between Pagis and simon, as the latter 
remarks, became less and less polite on this issue, until both sides decided to 
keep their own version.
on the other hand, simon accepts W. d. ross’s translation of Aristotle’s 
φρόνησις as “practical wisdom” in The Definition of Moral Virtue (simon 1986. 96). 
Practical wisdom is an intellectual virtue in Aristotle’s understanding since its duty 
is to utter judgment. on the other hand, φρόνησις is also a moral virtue since it 
directs human action. simon’s interpretation of φρόνησις is indeed insightful. As 
he explains, φρόνησις is an “absolute virtue,” for it is a virtue of non-virtue: it is 
a virtue that contains no general pattern of insight and action, for it is character-
ised by uniqueness and contingency. Φρόνησις is the capacity to act in a unique 
situation in accordance with our best insights with the intention to reach a certain 
good in a way which is not predetermined or prescribed in any sense. no book, 
no information, no advice or example can help us to make the right decision in a 
situation when we need to act according to φρόνησις, “prudence.”
here simon criticises ross’s translation of some sentences of Book Vi of the 
Nicomachean Ethics. ross, after determining prudence as “a reasoned and true 
state of capacity to act with regard to human goods,” goes on to translate Aristo-
tle as follows: “But further, while there is such a thing as excellence in art, there 
is no such thing as excellence in wisdom.” (simon 1986. 98). simon is right in 
pointing out that the clause “there is no such thing as excellence in wisdom” is 
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embarrassing. simon censures the translation of ἀρετή as “excellence;” his rea-
son is not that ἀρετή does not have the wider meaning of excellence but a more 
cogent one which underlines the translation’s incapacity to render the original 
meaning of Aristotle. According to simon,
Aristotle’s meaning is this: When you have art, you still need virtue to make a good 
human use of it; but if you need prudence, you do not need an extra virtue to make 
good use of it, because prudence, being a moral as well as an intellectual virtue, 
supplies this good use of itself. (simon 1986. 98)
Moral virtue is not “a state of character,” as ross suggests, “concerned with 
choice, lying in a mean, i. e. the mean relative to us…” rather, according to 
f. h. Peters’s translation, which simon prefers, “Virtue is a trained faculty of 
choice, the characteristic of which lies in moderation or observance of the mean 
relative to the persons concerned […]” (simon 1986. 118).
These passages clearly show how original simon’s approach to Aristotle was. 
indeed, he did not only follow Maritain in important overall questions, he did 
not only apply Thomas Aquinas’s teachings on a variety of contemporary prob-
lems but was able to go back to the original texts and develop his own under-
standing of the original authors. This latter point is clearly shown by his The 
Definition of Moral Virtue, a book published 25 years after his passing away by Vu-
kan Kuic. This work demonstrates that simon was not only an excellent thinker 
upon the problems of democracy and authority, tradition and modernity; he was 
an eminent moral thinker as well who, by his original explorations of Aristotle, 
contributed to the renaissance of virtue ethics in the halls of the university of 
notre dame.
simon’s understanding of the main virtues – prudence, justice, fortitude, and 
temperance –influenced the revival of virtue ethics in Anglo-American philoso-
phy. it is especially remarkable that simon was able to synthesise the position 
of an accurate classical scholar with his attachment to Thomism. for instance, 
as opposed to the later position taken by Alasdair Macintyre, simon not only 
emphasises the unity of virtues in Aristotle – focused on the virtue of prudence 
– but asserts the plurality and interdependence of virtues at the same time. 
criticising etienne Gilson’s view, simon see some positions of Aristotle as de-
termining historical Aristotelianism throughout the centuries, beginning with 
the ancient authors through Aquinas and later scholasticism to franz Brentano, 
whom simon considers an influential representative of important Aristotelian 
notions. no doubt, simon saw himself as an Aristotelian too, for he criticises the 
stoic conception of an absolute unity of virtues and proposes the Aristotelian 
notion of plurality and interdependence. Moreover, simon was aware of the fact 
that it is not a turning back to the ancient idea of virtues that may help contem-
porary human beings to live a better life but rather the realisation of progress 
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in moral philosophy: a progress without which we are unable to find the right 
interpretation of moral life, natural law, or democratic government.
As James V. schall formulated it some years ago,
simon remains an education in himself as well as someone who critically transmits 
us Aristotle and st. Thomas in the light of the various ways that they have been 
received, understood, or too often misunderstood during the past hundred years. 
(schall 1998. 1)
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caTHerIne zuckerT
Do “Virtue Ethics” Require 
“Virtue Politics”?
ABSTRACT: If, as Aristotle argues, human beings cannot acquire the habits needed to 
make them virtuous if they do not receive a correct upbringing, and this upbringing needs 
to be supported and preserved by law, one has to ask how citizens of modern liberal 
democracies can become virtuous, since their laws do not explicitly identify, reward, and 
honor virtuous behavior. This article examines the three different answers to this question 
proposed by the liberal M. Nussbaum, the communitarian A. MacIntyre, and the libertar-
ians D. den Uyl and D. Rasmussen, and finds none entirely satisfying.  Ironically, none 
of these commentators takes account of the educational activity in which they like Aristotle 
are engaged.
KEYWORDS: virtue ethics, liberal democracy, Nussbaum, MacIntyre, Rassmussen, den 
Uyl, practical reason, human flourishing, neo-Aristotelian
Virtue ethics now constitutes one of three major approaches to the study of eth-
ics by Anglophone philosophers (hursthouse 2012). its proponents almost all 
recognize the source of their approach in Aristotle, but relatively few of them 
confront the problem that source poses for contemporary ethicists. According 
to Aristotle, ethikē belongs and is subordinate to politikē (Aristotle 2011. 13; ne 
1.2.1094b4–11). But in the liberal democracies within which most, if not all An-
glophone ethicists write, political authorities are not supposed to dictate or leg-
islate the good of individuals; they are supposed merely to establish the condi-
tions necessary for individuals to choose their own “life paths.” if, as Aristotle 
argues, the good life for a human being is a virtuous life, and if human beings 
cannot acquire the habits needed to make them virtuous if they do not receive 
a correct upbringing, and this upbringing needs to be supported and preserved 
by correct legislation, one has to ask how citizens of liberal democracies can be-
come virtuous, if the laws of their regime do not explicitly identify, reward, and 
honor virtuous behavior and punish vice.
contemporary ethicists who have addressed this question have proposed 
three very different answers to the question of how “virtue ethics” ought to 
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be related to politics in modern nation-states. Martha nussbaum advocates an 
“Aristotelian social democracy” which seeks to provide all human beings with 
the capacities – intellectual and moral as well as material – they need to choose 
the best way of life – whereas Alasdair Macintyre looks to smaller, tradition-
based communities within larger nation states to provide moral education. Be-
cause political action is coercive and truly ethical or virtuous action is voluntary, 
douglas den uyl and douglas rasmussen argue that ethics and politics should 
be strictly separated. in this paper i propose to examine each of these attempts 
to revive an Aristotelian understanding of ethics, bringing out the advantages 
and problems involved in each as well as the ways in which the three different 
proposals intersect.
All three of these contemporary attempts to appropriate an Aristotelian under-
standing of ethics in a liberal democratic political context begin by jettisoning 
some distinctions that he claims are natural. for example, they deny that there 
is “natural” slavery and that women should generally be subordinate to men. 
But, since they all disown Aristotle’s natural hierarchy, we have to ask what they 
think the basis of the “Aristotelian” understanding of human “perfection” or 
“flourishing” they adopt is. 
nussBAuM’s “ArisToTeliAn sociAl deMocrAcY”
early in her career nussbaum argued for an understanding of the human good 
based on human nature. But she distinguished the understanding of human na-
ture upon which she relied very sharply from “objective” scientific notions of 
nature based on external observations. like Aristotle, she contended, many 
human beings have articulated an “internal” understanding of what it is to be 
human as neither an immortal god nor a beast (nussbaum 1986, chapters 8–9). 
More recently, however, she has argued that the understanding of what it is 
to be human she is proposing represents an “overlapping consensus” of the 
beliefs and practices of many cultures that is not grounded “in a specifically 
Aristotelian conception of human nature” (nussbaum 2002. 91). This overlap-
ping consensus points to a series of common spheres of experience; and from 
these “spheres of experience” she derives a corresponding set of “non-relative 
virtues” (nussbaum 1988b. 35–36.). But having explicitly jettisoned the Aris-
totelian notion of a single human good, nussbaum moves relatively quickly 
from her list of “non-relative virtues” to a list of the “capabilities” necessary 
for a human being to function well. As a result, the central focus of her work 
shifts from the “ethical” question concerning the definition and requirements 
of a good human life to the “political” question concerning the just distribution 
of goods necessary to give all human beings the capacity to choose to live as they 
think best.
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Although nussbaum explicitly jettisons Aristotle’s notion of human nature 
and endorses a more open, free, egalitarian, and pluralistic understanding of the 
human good, she recurs nevertheless to his famous claim that human beings 
are by nature political for two reasons. The first is that the claim applies to the 
whole species; it is not limited to the citizens of any particular regime or state. 
nussbaum found such a universal standard useful in formulating her list of the 
capabilities a human being needs in order to choose a good life with an eye 
particularly to the “quality of life” for developing countries (nussbaum 2002. 
51–52). The second reason she stresses Aristotle’s emphasis on the political char-
acter of a distinctively human life is that it highlights the importance of develop-
ing one’s practical reason and affiliation or association with others. in general, 
nussbaun argues that the “thin vague conception of the good” articulated by 
liberal theorists such as John rawls and ronald dworkin is inadequate, because 
it requires only a minimal distribution to all citizens of the “bare essentials” that 
are “prerequisites for carrying out their plans of life.” These “primary goods” 
are conceived in terms merely of “wealth, income, and possessions” (nussbaum 
2002. 54–55). But, she objects, human beings need more than money to be able 
to make informed choices. They need education, nurturing or supportive as-
sociations, and protection from demeaning labor. Their specific needs will also 
vary, moreover, according to their particular circumstances. The “Aristotelian 
approach” she champions “takes cognizance of every important human func-
tion, with respect to each and every citizen. But [. . . ] [it] does not aim directly 
at producing people who function in certain ways. it aims, instead, at producing 
people who” have both the training and the resources to so function as they 
choose. The task of government is to enable citizens to choose; “the choice is 
left to them.” like a liberal, she argues that an Aristotelian holds “that political 
rule is a rule of free and equal citizens.” But she insists that citizens are treated 
as free and equal only if they live in conditions necessary for the exercise of 
choice and practical reason (among which are education, political participation, 
and the absence of degrading forms of labor). (nussbaum 2002. 62)
in light of the importance nussbaum attributes to the development of practi-
cal reason it may seem surprising that she does not emphasize the importance of 
political participation more. she insists merely that all citizens (or adults) should 
be able to hold office, not that they actually do so. in contrast to Aristotle (Pol. 
3.2.1277b25–27), she does not think that ruling is a necessary part of a citizen’s 
education, particularly in developing phronêsis, the one virtue he says is peculiar 
to ruling (nussbaum 1986. 349). 
her emphasis on enabling citizens to choose and not mandating any choice 
points, moreover, to two very large sets of problems. 
The first concerns the division of labor within any political community (or 
the world as a whole). it is curious that an ethicist who has co-authored with a 
nobel prize-winning economist says so little about how the resources to supply 
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each and every human being with the capabilities she lists are to be found or 
produced.  What happens if a sufficient number of individuals do not choose 
to perform the functions needed for the survival or flourishing of the commu-
nity? clearly some tasks are more attractive than others, and human beings are 
not so uni-dimensional that we are “programmed” to perform one and only one 
task by nature (as socrates imagines in the Republic). Marx thought that modern 
technology would overcome the need for a division of labor, but things have not 
gone as he predicted.  And where the government does not mandate a certain di-
vision of labor, the lives individuals choose are shaped not only by their families, 
cultures, and governments, but also by market forces that give some individuals 
an incentive to produce more than they need and others an incentive to perform 
jobs that are not rewarding in themselves.
 nussbaum would respond by observing that Aristotle was no friend of un-
regulated production and free market exchange; he argues that human beings 
should not seek to acquire any more property than needed to support a good life. 
he suggests that governments should make sure that their citizens have good 
air, water, and other necessities like food, and proposes common use of private 
as well as of publicly owned property (nussbaum 2002. 47–49, 54–57, 77–78, 
86). But, unfortunately for nussbaum, Aristotle also recognizes that economic 
restrictions make it impossible for most of the inhabitants of a city to develop 
all of their distinctively human capacities by engaging in politics or philosophy. 
Modern industry and technology have made it possible for us to educate many 
more citizens and to involve them in making political decisions that shape their 
lives, but many of the restrictions imposed by the need to earn a living and fill 
essentially unrewarding jobs remain. 
nussbaum acknowledges that there will be problems implementing her “ca-
pabilities” approach and that the acquisition of some goods may interfere with 
the provision of others, but she does not address the root of the problems associ-
ated with the supply and demand for goods directly. As an ethicist, she might 
say that she is simply outlining what ought to be done. insofar as she claims to 
be following Aristotle, however, she admits that her political proposals need to 
be practical.
The question concerning the incentive or incentives to produce points, 
moreover, to a larger set of questions about human motivation. What leads indi-
viduals or groups not merely to produce more than they need but to share their 
surplus with others? nussbaum often quotes Aristotle’s statement that when 
he equates happiness with self-sufficiency, he does “not mean by self-sufficient 
what suffices for someone by himself, living a solitary life, but what is sufficient 
also with respect to parents, offspring, a wife, and, in general, one’s friends and 
fellow citizens, since by nature a human being is political” (ne 1.7.1097b7–11). 
Because Aristotle also insists that no one would want to live without friends (ne 
9.9.1169b10), she interprets his discussion of the “political” character of human 
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life more in terms of the satisfactions human beings derive from intimate as-
sociations like friends or family than from civic participation (nussbaum 1986. 
349–62; nussbaum 2002. 79; nussbaum 1988a. 161–62). she rightly associates 
his praise of friendship in the Nicomachean Ethics with his critique of Plato’s pro-
posals to eliminate both private families and private property on the grounds 
that human beings care and take more responsibility for persons and things they 
consider to be their own than those that are held in common. (nussbaum 2002. 
77–78.) But she does not address the problems the need for close and exclusive 
relations among the members of a polity raises for the “cosmopolitan” approach 
to human “capabilities” she advocates. What leads or will lead citizens of one 
nation to share their goods with the inhabitants of poorer countries? A feeling 
of moral obligation? sympathy? As nussbaum recognizes, both tend to become 
weaker as they become or are applied more generally.
AlAsdAir MAcinTYre: froM TrAdiTion-BAsed coMMuniTies  
To rATionAl dePendenT AniMAls
like nussbaum, Macintyre seeks to persuade his readers to understand both 
ethics and politics in terms of the good rather than rights. further like nuss-
baum, Macintyre finds the source of the approach he advocates in Aristotle, but 
again like nussbaum he finds it necessary to modify his Aristotelian source in 
fundamental—though different—respects. Whereas nussbaum wants to enrich 
and extend the “thin vague conception of the good” underlying contemporary 
liberal political theory, Macintyre seeks to replace that thin liberal conception 
of the good with an ancient-medieval understanding. having jettisoned the an-
cient-medieval conception of a common human telos or goal, he argues, modern 
moral philosophy became incoherent; with no end in sight; modern ethicists ei-
ther subordinated reason entirely to the passions (hume) or sought, ineffectual-
ly, to control human passions with abstract reason (Kant). But instead of trying to 
articulate a common “internal” understanding of the human good, by nature, as 
nussbaum initially did, or, as she did later, in a cross-cultural “overlapping con-
sensus” of opinions and practices, Macintyre finds the core or basis of a common 
understanding in a “tradition” that develops over time and contains essentially 
different, even contradictory notions of the good. in After Virtue he emphatically 
rejects Aristotle’s “metaphysical biology,” grounded as it is in a teleological view 
of nature, because it has become incredible as a result of modern natural science. 
(Macintyre 1984) like nussbaum, he thus jettisons the invidious distinctions 
Aristotle draws between natural slaves and masters, males and females, Greeks 
and barbarians. even in Rational Dependent Animals when he acknowledges 
“natural law” as the foundation of the communities necessary to sustain human 
life, he emphasizes the dependency everyone has on others and the need to 
100 The PoliTics of ArisToTle 
discover ways of enabling those with disabilities, especially those whose mental 
disabilities prevent them from voicing their own views, to take part in common 
deliberations-- at least by proxy. Because he retains a fundamentally histori-
cal understanding of the “traditions” that unite the communities that form the 
lives and self-understanding of their members, Macintyre can and does, like 
nussbaum, maintain that the definition of the common good is open-ended. 
he also emphasizes the different components and hence potentially conflicting 
understandings of the good within any given tradition that make it possible for 
both individuals and sub-groups, as well as the tradition as a whole, to develop a 
variety of changing conceptions over time. 
The vitality of a tradition, Macintyre argues, is demonstrated by the ability of 
people living within it to devise new understandings or solutions to the conflicts 
that inevitably arise among its disparate parts, especially when it encounters 
other traditions. Those of us living in the West have inherited very different, 
indeed essentially incompatible “tables” or understandings of human virtue 
presented in the homeric epics, ancient philosophy, medieval theology, and 
modern novels like those of Jane Austen. in After Virtue Macintyre suggested 
that these different notions provide the material from which each individual 
can construct his or her personal identity in the form of a narrative of his or her 
own development—in conjunction with supervening community deliberations 
about the content, character and requirements of the common good. But, as 
nussbaum noticed in her review of Whose Justice? Which Rationality? for The New 
York Review of Books, Macintyre later dropped that novel-like option for indi-
viduals giving coherence and meaning to their own lives, independent of the 
community (nussbaum 1989).
Macintyre would no doubt see nussbaum’s critique of the reliance on re-
ligious authority in the two efforts to integrate classical and scriptural under-
standings of virtue he praises, first by the medieval catholic theologian Aquinas 
and later by the calvinist philosophers of the scottish enlightenment, as merely 
another example of the modern liberal rebellion against any form of author-
ity. And, he would remind nussbaum that, as Aristotle argues, not merely the 
authority, but the force of law is needed to educate human beings in virtue. 
Although he too endorses an open-ended and pluralist definition of the human 
good, her “capabilities” approach is far too individualistic and decisionist for 
him to accept. 
Both of these neo-Aristotelians emphasize the importance not merely of edu-
cation in general, but more specifically of enabling each and every human being 
to develop his or her practical reason; and both understand education to involve 
much more than mental training. But Macintyre stresses the ways in which 
family, community, and tradition shape the character and lives of individuals, 
whereas nussbaum seeks to specify the conditions that make it possible for an 
individual truly to choose his or her own “life path.” no one chooses the fam-
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ily, country, or time in which he or she is born, Macintyre points out, yet the 
place, time, and people among whom we are born shape our lives in irrevocable 
ways. Both nussbaum’s early embrace of an “internal” as opposed to externally 
observable definition of the human good and her later insistence on providing 
each and every individual with the capabilities necessary to choose his or her 
own good are far too “subjective.” These “choices” are, in the final analysis, 
too close to the “preferences” individuals express in voting or buying goods. 
As nussbaum herself emphasizes, such preferences can be shaped by educa-
tion, experience, and external circumstances, but they are not necessarily the 
products of rational deliberations about what is in the common good. Macintyre 
agrees with nussbaum that choices of ways of life, as well as membership and 
specialized roles in particular communities are evaluative. But, he argues, such 
evaluations are not mere expressions of “values” based ultimately on subjective 
feelings rather than reason or knowledge. Just as the judgment that a clock that 
does not keep time is a bad clock is evaluative, but factual, so is the judgment 
that a cobbler who cannot make shoes that fit is a bad cobbler and a man who 
does not contribute to the common good is a bad man. human “practices”—
both activities and products—are judged in terms of their particular ends; and 
these particular ends are, in turn, evaluated in terms of their contribution to the 
common good.
Arguing that all particular goods—activities and individual lives—are and 
should be evaluated by what they contribute to the common good, Macintyre 
follows Aristotle more closely than nussbaum in emphasizing the importance 
of individuals actually and actively participating in the political decisions that 
shape their lives. Both nussbaum and Macintyre explicitly follow Aristotle in 
recognizing that human communities are formed and sustained by the intimate 
relations we associate with friendship, and that these intimate relations cannot 
be extended over great distances or among many people without becoming di-
luted, if not entirely destroyed. But Macintyre concludes that the spatio-tem-
poral limitations on any real community are a reason not to formulate universal, 
“cosmopolitan” definitions of the human good. 
following Aristotle, Macintyre observes that the authoritative decisions that 
shape the lives of all the members of a given community take the form of laws, 
and that these laws educate or form the character of all the members of a given 
community in two different ways. The first is by praising or honoring certain 
kinds of people or deeds; the second is by not merely blaming, but punishing 
persons who either neglect to perform their duties or who positively harm rather 
than help other members of the community. Precisely because some actions 
and characteristics are deemed better than others, Macintyre points out, “virtue 
ethics” are essentially hierarchical; and like Aristotle, he suggests that there is a 
kind of natural basis for the hierarchy. Whereas nussbaum cites only the under-
standing of justice Aristotle attributes to democrats—that equals should receive 
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equal portions—Macintyre endorses Aristotle’s full, proportional definition of 
justice as giving equal things to equal persons, and unequal things to unequals.
Both nussbaum and Macintyre emphasize Aristotle’s argument (Pol. 1256a1–
1258a18) that the unlimited accumulation of wealth characteristic of capitalism 
is bad, because it leads people to confuse the means of living well with the good 
life itself. Both explicitly agree with Aristotle that people should seek to acquire 
only what they need to live well—and no more. But, in contrast to nussbaum, 
Macintyre explicitly recognizes the limits such a needs-based restriction on ac-
quisition involves. not only must a community that seeks to involve everyone in 
their own government be small. it must also seek to be self-sufficient, so that its 
members will not become subject to the abuses that flow from the economic in-
equality inevitably associated with a “free-market” economy (Macintyre 2001). 
The members of such a community will be expected to contribute according to 
their abilities and receive according to their needs—to the extent that is pos-
sible.
Macintyre insists that large modern nation-states cannot provide their citi-
zens with the sort of practical education that enables them to become inde-
pendent practical reasoners conscious of their dependency upon others. But he 
acknowledges that it is difficult to imagine their withering away in the foresee-
able future. indeed, he recognizes that these large states perform a necessary 
function insofar as they protect public security—from external aggression and 
internal crime. he contends, however, that these large nation-states need to be 
supplemented, even in the provision of security, by smaller, more participatory 
associations--both because the nation-states do not provide soldiers or police 
with a sufficient incentive to perform their duty by assuring them that, if they 
die or are wounded, they and their dependents will be provided for, and because 
the state itself can constitute one of the primary threats to public security, es-
pecially internally. he looks to forms of association, intermediate between the 
modern state and the contemporary family, to provide people with the necessary 
education in practical reason through common deliberations.
critics have raised three major objections to Macintyre’s tradition-based un-
derstanding of “virtue ethics.” The first objection, raised by other “neo-Aris-
totelians” like den uyl and rasmussen is that by subordinating the individual 
entirely to the practices and decisions of the community, Macintyre’s approach 
destroys the individual freedom and responsibility that are essential to virtue, 
as Aristotle described it (see below). The second objection is that Macintyre’s 
“redescription” of Aristotle’s understanding of virtue or, even more, Thomas 
Aquinas’s argument concerning the natural law as a “tradition” is neither philo-
sophically nor historically accurate (coleman 1994). even when he shifts the 
basis of his understanding of community and the character of virtue ethics from 
“tradition” simply to “natural law,” Macintyre treats natural law more as estab-
lishing the basis of community in mutual dependency and shared vulnerability 
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than as pointing to distinctive ends or goals of human action, on the basis of 
which individual human beings and communities can be judged better or worse. 
feminist critics have praised Macintyre for his emphasis not merely on the mu-
tual “care” our shared vulnerabilities make necessary, but on the need to find a 
way of including the voices of those least able to speak for themselves. But, stat-
ing the third major objection to his position, they criticize Macintyre for allow-
ing only internally based criticisms of traditions that arise out of conflicts within 
them. he does not provide a universally applicable standard of the human good 
on the basis of which women, for example, could protest the secondary status 
and social roles to which most tradition-based communities have confined them 
(frazer – lace 1994).
rAsMussen And den uYl’s PerfecTionisT ArGuMenT 
for non-PerfecTionisT PoliTics (rAsMussen – den uYl 2005)
following Aristotle, both nussbaum and Macintyre argue that efforts to pro-
vide human beings with the habits, dispositions, and rational ability to live good 
and virtuous lives require political support. explicitly labeling their own posi-
tion as “neo-Aristotelian,” because in this respect they clearly break with Aristo-
tle, rasmussen and den uyl maintain that ethics and politics are and should be 
strictly separated. Their central contention can be simply stated: political action 
is coercive; truly ethical or virtuous action is voluntary. A person is not truly mod-
erate, generous, or witty, if forced to act moderately or generously and to speak 
with humor. insofar as virtue consists in certain kinds of activities, moreover, it ex-
ists in individual, embodied actors, not in communities. Virtue ethics is and ought 
to be concerned, therefore, with the happiness or flourishing of individuals, not 
with common goods (as in Macintyre) or with the distribution of goods produced 
by some to others (as in nussbaum). And political authority or the state ought 
to be restricted to protecting the liberty of individuals that makes it possible for 
them to seek to flourish in the way they desire and think best.
rasmussen and den uyl contend that both their lockean political philoso-
phy, that would restrict the state to protecting the rights of life, liberty and the 
pursuit of happiness, and their Aristotelian understanding of ethics are founded 
on nature. The understanding of nature in their political and ethical theories 
might seem to be different. With regard to politics they follow locke in main-
taining that no one rules anyone else by nature; governments are instituted by 
human beings (as Aristotle also recognizes); and like locke they reason that if 
no one rules anyone else by nature, by nature all human beings are free. They 
recognize that the teleological view of human nature upon which they base their 
ethics is more controversial. echoing some of the worries that Macintyre voiced 
in After Virtue, they deny that they are relying on a “metaphysical biology.” like 
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nussbaum and Macintyre, they follow Aristotle in beginning “with the estab-
lished opinions, or endoxa, of our society and culture.” They observe that “the 
point of entry for such reflection most often occurs when we examine our lives 
as a whole and wonder what they are for.”  And they conclude that “our general 
aim is to make our lives as good as possible and to find unity for them” (116). 
like Macintyre, they admit that teleology has often been associated with 
“dubious metaphysical views—for example, that the cosmos has some end, that 
species are fixed and do not evolve” (118). But they do not think that an account 
of human life in terms of ends requires them “to hold that the cosmos, history, 
society, or the human race is directed toward some grand telos.” They maintain 
only that individuals have ends, and that there are individual potentialities that 
are actualized. 
in human beings, they argue, “it is the ability to have a correct conception of 
what is good for oneself (that children and nonhuman animals do not possess) 
that creates the causal power necessary for the purposeful production of good 
outcomes. [. . .] As Aristotle states, ‘reason is for distinguishing the beneficial 
and the harmful, and so too the just and the unjust. for this distinguishes a hu-
man being from the other animals—that he alone has perception of the good 
and bad and just and unjust and the rest’(Pol. 1253a14–18)” (124). As nussbaum 
and Macintyre also emphasize, developing one’s practical reason thus becomes 
crucial to determining what one ought to do.
on the basis of this understanding of the end of human life, rasmussen and 
den uyl maintain that the human good is objective, because it is a way of living; 
it is not a mere feeling or subjective experience. And as a way of living it consists 
in a kind of activity, not merely in the possession of needed goods or virtues. it 
includes basic goods, “such as knowledge, health, friendship, creative achieve-
ment, beauty, and pleasure; and such virtues as integrity, temperance, courage, 
and justice. These are valuable,” however, “not as mere means to human flour-
ishing, but as expressions of it, and thus as partial realizations of it as well” (133). 
But, they emphasize, “this view of human flourishing is open to the possibility 
that there may not be a preset weighting. [. . .] for the basic or generic goods and 
virtues that constitute it.” And “this possibility creates a basis for a conception of 
human flourishing that is different in many respects from that usually associated 
with traditional perfectionist theories” (133). it is individualized and diverse.
rasmussen and den uyl distinguish their position most from the other neo-
Aristotelians by insisting that human flourishing or virtue must be “self-direct-
ed.” Aristotle observes that the difference between sensation and knowledge 
is that the first is caused by things external to us whereas we can exercise our 
knowledge when we choose (De Anima 417b18–26).  That means, however, that 
both the acquisition of the requisite knowledge of what is good and acting on 
the basis of that knowledge require effort on the part of the individual. “only 
by initiating and maintaining the effort to gain the knowledge, to cultivate the 
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proper habits of character, to exercise correct choices, and to perform the right 
actions can someone achieve moral excellence” (139). nussbaum and Macintyre 
agree that “the functioning of one’s reason or intelligence, regardless of one’s 
level of learning or degree of ability, does not occur automatically.”  But, where 
they both emphasize the kind of support individuals require from others in or-
der to learn how to reason, rasmussen and den uyl insist that “the use of one’s 
practical reason is something each person must do for him or herself” (140).
in maintaining that an ethical or good life occurs only in individuals through 
their own efforts, rasmussen and den uyl do not deny that human beings “are 
naturally social animals” or that their associations with others have profound 
effects upon their development as individuals. on the contrary, they maintain, 
“we do not flourish independent and apart from [. . .] others. [. . .] As Aristotle 
makes clear, philia (friendship) is one of the constituents of human flourishing. 
like Macintyre, they observe that “we are born into a society or community, 
and . . . our upbringings and environments are crucial to the formation of our 
self-concepts and fundamental values” (141–2). But in opposition to Macintyre, 
they point out that “though one must flourish in some community or other, [. . 
.] one is not morally required simply to accept—indeed, one might be required 
to reject the status quo. [. . .] one might need to refashion a community’s values 
or find a new community.”
like Macintyre in Rational Dependent Animals, rasmussen and den uyl argue 
that the development of an individual’s practical reason requires him or her to 
take a perspective other than his or her own. But, they observe, the ability to 
take another’s perspective also gives a person critical distance from his or her 
current situation “to consider abstractly the best that is possible for human be-
ings” (158). so, where nussbaum and Macintyre both consider Aristotle’s state-
ments about the supremacy of intellectual to moral virtue to be inconsistent and 
brush them aside along with his teleological view of nature, rasmussen and den 
uyl suggest that it is possible, indeed, necessary to obtain a general theoretical 
knowledge of human nature and its end or virtue. That knowledge can and 
should be used not merely to criticize, but also to create new and different com-
munities, persons, or policies. But, they emphasize, “we need to know when 
our concern is with knowing what is true and good and when it is with achieving 
what is good. We should not confuse speculative with practical reason” (159).
106 The PoliTics of ArisToTle 
conclusion: hoW VirTue eThics cAn And cAnnoT  
Be fosTered BY Modern sTATes
den uyl and rasmussen provide important correctives both to nussbaum’s 
tendency to make ethical or virtuous action a social and political rather than an 
individual responsibility and to Macintyre’s tendency to subordinate the good 
of the individual to the good of the community as traditionally defined. But in 
maintaining that the coercive power of the state should be confined to protect-
ing the lives, liberties, and property of citizens, rasmussen and den uyl do not 
take sufficient account of the social prerequisites of the individual inventive-
ness and expression they argue are protected in property rights. They argue 
that the goods people produce are extensions and expressions of the individuals 
who created and produced them. so “a person’s choices and judgments cannot 
be said to have been respected if the material expression of those judgments is 
divested from the individual” (98). in order to invent or produce things, how-
ever, human beings have to acquire language in order to become able to think 
and communicate, and languages are social products. so, in a sense, are human 
beings, insofar as we are procreated. Granted that it is both just and socially use-
ful to let individuals who invent new modes of production to keep a good part of 
the profits in order to create an incentive for others to do so, those who helped 
educate these individuals and the government whose laws make trade possible 
have a claim to some of the profits as well. 
rasmussen and den uyl would no doubt protest that they have not denied 
that human beings are social by nature and that they flourish only in association 
with others. They simply maintain that government cannot provide individuals 
with the education in practical reasoning they need to make good choices about 
the direction of their own lives. nor can—or should--government decide which 
goods ought to be produced or how. (rasmussen – den uyl 2009) Both educa-
tion and production are better left to the “intermediate” associations of civil 
society upon which Macintyre also relies. But they thus ignore, if they do not 
deny, the authoritative character of the law, which Macintyre stresses, both in 
making certain kinds of lives and actions exemplary and in punishing those who 
either neglect their duties or refuse to obey.
Aristotle would observe that in regimes like the modern nation-state where 
“the people” have the final say in public decisions, the opinions of the majority 
will prevail. People did not agree about the definition of the best life for human 
beings in his time any more than they do in ours; and, he observed, most tried 
to amass as many of the means of living, i.e., to acquire as much wealth, as they 
could. That tendency has been furthered by modern political doctrines like the 
lockean political philosophy to which den uyl and rasmussen adhere. But 
that tendency did not prevent Aristotle from trying to persuade his auditors or 
readers that it was a mistake. his example shows that it is possible to argue per-
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suasively (at least to some) that the widespread tendency to accumulate wealth 
without limit is mistaken. Admitting the necessity of owning a certain amount 
of “equipment” in order to live a good life, it is still possible to show (as a great 
many novelists and playwrights do) that wealth does not necessarily bring hap-
piness. other goods and virtues are more important.
Aristotle was a resident alien who did not have the right to take part in politi-
cal deliberations in Athens, nussbaum reminds her readers. But the restrictions 
on his political activity did not prevent him from founding a school and lecturing 
or writing on politics and ethics in an attempt to educate citizens and legislators, 
from Athens and elsewhere. All three of the neo-Aristotelians with whom we 
have been concerned strangely fail to take account of the character and potential 
effects of their own work.
What increasing interest in “virtue ethics” reveals, i conclude, is a growing 
perception that defining morality simply in terms of an opposition between 
self-interest and the common interest is not sufficient. These conceptions are 
all too abstract. it does not take an extraordinary education to have a sense of 
what it means to be a good person or character; and that sense can be expanded 
and deepened by examples drawn from history, literature, and film. rigorous 
investigations of what exactly constitutes a good character or “human flourish-
ing” may be rare, but so, Aristotle would remind us, are prudence and the other 
virtues. What we need are more educators who seek not to teach their students 
skills that will enable them to succeed, but who remind them of the importance 
of practical wisdom and developing a good character. such educators may not 
have the authority of the law, but, as Aristotle teaches, virtue is virtue only when 
it is chosen for its own sake.
BiBlioGrAPhY
Aristotle 2011. Nicomachean Ethics. Trans. robert c. Bartlett – susan d. collins. chicago/il: 
university of chicago Press. 
coleman, Janet 1994. Macintyre and Aquinas. in After MacIntyre: Critical Perspectives on the 
Work of Alasdair MacIntyre, ed. John horton – susan Mendus, oxford, Polity Press, 1994, 
65–90.
frazer, elizabeth – lace, nicola 1994. Macintyre, feminism and the concept of Practice. in 
After MacIntyre, 265–82. in After MacIntyre: Critical Perspectives on the Work of Alasdair Mac-
Intyre, ed. John horton – susan Mendus. oxford: Polity Press 265–282.
hursthouse, rosalind 2012. “Virtue ethics”. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. ed. 
edward n. Zalta, url = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2012/entries/ethics-vir-
tue/>. 
Macintyre, Alasdair 1984. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. notre dame, university of 
notre dame Press. 
Macintyre, Alasdair 2001. Rational Dependent Animals. chicago, open court Publishing. 143–46.
108 The PoliTics of ArisToTle 
nussbaum, Martha c. 1988a. nature, function, and capability: Aristotle on Political distri-
bution. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy. 1988/1. 145–84.
nussbaum, Martha c.1988b. non-relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach. Midwest Studies 
in Philosophy 13 (1988). 32–53.
nussbaum, Martha c. 2002. “Postscript, 2001” to “Aristotelian social democracy” in Aristo-
tle and Modern Politics: The Persistence of Political Philosophy. ed. Aristide Tessitore. notre 
dame, university of notre dame Press, 2002. 47–104.
nussbaum, Martha c. 1989. recoiling from reason. The New York Review of Books 36. 19 (de-
cember 7, 1989). 36–41. (http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1989/dec/07/recoiling-
from-reason/ )
nussbaum, Martha c.1986. The fragility of goodness: Luck and ethics in Greek tragedy and philoso-
phy. cambridge, cambridge university Press. 
rasmussen douglas B.– den uyl douglas J. 2009. liberalism in retreat. The Review of Meta-
physics, 62. 875–908.
rasmussen, douglas B. – den uyl, douglas J. 2005. Norms of Liberty: A Perfectionist Basis for 
Non-Perfectionist Politics. university Park, PA. The Pennsylvania state university Press. 
Ferenc HörcHer
Is a Contemporary Conservative 
Political Philosophy Based on the Aristotelian 
Concept of Phronesis Possible?
ABSTRACT: This essay – although aware of the contradiction in terms of the concept 
of conservative theory – tries to pick out some key notions within the conservative political 
mindset, and offers an analysis of them by relating them to one another. Beside Aristote-
lian phronesis or practical wisdom, it focuses on kairos, or the right moment for action. 
It points out that due to the time constraint inherent in the realm of political action, agents 
need to acquire a kind of tacit, practical knowledge of how to deal with pressing issues, 
and phronesis is a term which covers this sort of practical ability. The paper then tries 
to show that individual action is closely connected to communal interests, differentiates 
between formal and informal forms of communal knowledge and ends up by referring to 
Oakeshott’s, MacIntyre’s and Tocqueville’s ideas of communal wisdom and practice.
KEY WORDS: phronesis, kairos, virtue, moeurs,  practice, institutions, Aristotle, 
oakeshott, Macintyre and Tocqueville
1. ProloGue: PHRONESIS As The TheorY of non-TheorY
Politicians with a conservative inclination are well known for their non-theoreti-
cal stance: that is, they dislike political ideologies or theories in general. Perhaps 
the best example of this kind is Winston churchill who did not mind leaving 
the conservative party when other considerations made that decision reason-
able – theoretical considerations could not restrain him from this move. even if 
self-contradictory, this anti-theoretical attitude is regarded as a first preliminary 
consideration and, as such, plays a permanent part in conservative theory as well. 
Aristotle famously claimed in his Ethics that political expertise is “concerned 
with action and deliberation,” and therefore it “is not systematic knowledge, 
since it has for its object what comes last in the process of deliberation” (ne 
1141b28, 1142a24). edmund Burke, too, points out in his Reflections that one 
of the key problems of the french revolutionaries was that they were men of 
theory and not of experience:
110 The PoliTics of ArisToTle 
After i had read over the list of the persons and descriptions elected into the Tiers 
Etat, nothing which they afterwards did could appear astonishing. Among them, 
indeed, i saw some of known rank, some of shining talents; but of any practical 
experience in the state, not one man was to be found. The best were only men of 
theory.1
And speaking about “old establishments,” for Burke again, it is just their inde-
pendence from theory that makes them the more reliable: “they are the results 
of various necessities and expediencies. They are not often constructed after 
any theory; theories are rather drawn from them.” for indeed experience super-
sedes theory in politics: „The means taught by experience may be better suited 
to political ends than those contrived in the original project.”2
if nothing else, these facts about conservative practice and theory should 
make the present author cautious in trying to “reconstruct” conservative po-
litical philosophy along a theoretical proposition, namely, that the concept of 
phronesis should be regarded as central to it. however, this is a tricky problem, 
logically. for, indeed, here the theoretical concept is exactly to support an anti-
theoretical stance. on the other hand, its use would still be theoretical – after 
all, conservative politicians are not ready to consider theoretical constructs, like 
the concept of phronesis, at all. Therefore i have to admit that to think over the 
possibilities of a conservative political philosophy with phronesis in its centre is 
still a contradiction in terms. But perhaps if i fail, the very fact of the theoreti-
cal failure would save my project in the end. At least this is the hope which i 
cherish. if the argument of the present paper can bring home my message, i.e., 
if it works theoretically, then i did my job as a philosopher. if it does not, then 
it can serve as one more example that theory really cannot help conservative 
politics. But one can express this logical connection a bit more pessimistically 
as well: if i succeed to convince the audience that this is a viable theory of con-
servatism, then it certainly will not be a conservative theory, after all, that is a 
contradiction in terms. And if i do not succeed, i prove to be a loser, anyway. 
not too promising prospects.
2. The TeMPorAl diMension of conserVATisM
let me have this starting point: as we saw, both Aristotle and Burke had a basic 
distrust in the reasonability of organising human and, more particularly, political 
affairs on theoretical principles. Both held this view with good reason, presum-
1  i use the following internet link: http://www.constitution.org/eb/rev_fran.htm. edmund 
Burke: Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790)
2  from the same internet source.
ferenc hörcher: is A conTeMPorArY conserVATiVe PoliTicAl PhilosoPhY BAsed  111
ably having drawn the conclusions from first hand experience of the political 
matters of their political community. Therefore their mistrust of (political) the-
ory was not a simple theoretical construct, but was the summary of experiences 
collected in their own life as well as by other authors whom they might have 
consulted. They were experienced men, with the necessary amount of scepti-
cism about political construction.
if we want to characterise the position of authors like Aristotle and Burke, the 
concept of phronesis seems to be useful as a point of departure. We can rely on it 
to be particularly suitable when dealing with political matters. Phronesis, or prac-
tical wisdom is opposed to other manifestations of rationality in Aristotle. it is to 
be distinguished from the primary vehicle of thinking about politics in the mod-
ern Western philosophical tradition: instrumental, or even moral reason. Perhaps 
the main target of Aristotle’s criticism is Platonic political constructionism, while 
for Burke indirectly the Kantian tradition. in 20th century terms, conservatism 
is opposed to the form of neo-Kantianism as it was reinvigorated by John rawls 
in his Theory of Justice. Kant tried to reinforce the efficacy of reason in practical 
matters, reacting to hume’s devastating criticism of rationality claiming that it 
is, and ought only to be “the slave of the passions” (hume 1992. 415). however, 
in his effort to prove its capacity to directly influence human action, and for that 
special purpose contrasting it with pure reason, Kant exaggerates his case, and 
this way – so the conservatives can argue – distorts human nature as it appears in 
the context of political action. on the other hand, while his enthusiasm for the 
self-capacitating intellectual powers of the individual is overstated in the neo-
Kantian tradition, there can be no doubt that the philosopher from Königsberg 
was a firm believer in public reason, i.e., in the human ability to discuss (and 
solve) political matters in a free and open way as part of a deliberative process. 
rawls – and habermas, for that matter – takes over this firm belief in the ef-
fectiveness of public debate leading to a more democratic political culture than 
it would be possible without this sort of open-ended, and theoretically informed 
cooperation between the citizens.
conservatism in the Aristotelian tradition is not much less intellectual than 
the Kantian tradition, even if it is much more sceptical about the potential of 
human reason in solving human problems on a grand scale. Although the scale of 
reasonable scepticism in political affairs is debated within the conservative tradi-
tion itself, Aristotelian political thought never denied the intellectual capacities 
of humans, even in their every day affairs. Phronesis is both an intellectual and a 
practical virtue.
But then in what sense is it less optimistic intellectually? it seems to me that 
in this respect Aristotle is a critic of his master, Plato who was a keen constructor 
of political ideology in his Republic. Aristotle’s notion of phronesis is there to show 
that politics should not be taken as a playground for the philosopher king: hu-
man affairs do not allow so much licence for rational deliberation as is ordinarily 
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accepted in the empire of thought. The main reason for this is not simply the na-
ture of political authority, i.e., not the fact that the use of free thought can be po-
litically risky for those in power. neither is it simply the political responsibility 
of the political agent that should hinder him from the exercise of free enquiry. it 
has more to do with another trait of politics: that power has to be operated under 
very severe time constraint.
Time is necessarily a scarcity in the human realm, not only in politics and not 
only because of the shortness of human lifespan. it has to do with the dynamism 
of human affairs: there is a constant flow of ever newly born and reborn situa-
tions, and a never relaxing pressure on agents to decide and act. The life story 
of a human being or community is so much in a constant and dynamic flux that 
one can only afterwards, looking back on the whole story from some distance, 
cut it up into distinct entities which could be regarded as episodes or political 
situations. When experiencing one’s life, moments are not really separated from 
one another but grow organically into one another, making it almost indiscern-
ible when one moment closes and another one opens up. Therefore we carry 
along huge baskets of unresolved conflicts, tensions, dilemmas, and each and 
every decision or non-decision of ours will have a direct or indirect, foreseeable 
or unforeseeable effect or counter-effect on this package.
But there are special moments when decisions have to be made, here and 
now. These moments of crisis call for immediate judgement. These moments 
have their own Greek god after whom they are named: they are regarded as 
being under the rule of Kairos. Kairos is a rhetorical term, meaning that the mo-
ment calls for the decision of the actor, it is the connection between the moment 
and the agent who is confronting it. each right action has its naturally assigned 
time of execution, the actor needs to make good use of those moments in order 
to be able to act properly.
if we want to make sense of Aristotle’s views on phronesis for our present 
concern, what we need to understand is the way kairos objectifies time in this 
ancient concept. let me refer to Aristotle’s earlier idea in moral philosophy, to 
the so called golden mean, so as to shed light on the meaning of this concept 
of kairos. The golden mean is a teaching about how we should not miss the 
target in moral decisions: either by over- or undercharging the case, by excess 
or deficiency in our chosen type of behaviour. Aristotle’s point is that the moral 
target cannot be hit by simply complying with the rules – what is needed is a 
kind of sense which helps you to find the right proportions, balance, and scaling, 
in other words to find what is “intermediate” between excess and deficiency 
(ne 1104a26). But this is not an objective category because it is relative to the 
particular object and to us as subjects confronting the object. What needs to be 
found is therefore “the intermediate, that is, not in the object, but relative to 
us” (ne 1106b5).
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Kairos calls our attention to the fact that a right decision is always to be re-
alised in time by a particular agent. it is neither to be done by him too quickly 
nor too slowly. The first would amount to hasty-mindedness while deliberation 
should be done slowly, the second might miss the target by arriving at the spot 
too late. Think about Aristotle’s reference to the archer as a metaphor for the 
agent who deliberates in urgent situations. This time the task of the archer is the 
more difficult as the target is moving, and as there is a very short time span when 
he can actually act. Kairos is the temporal intermediate found. for deliberation 
might last too long, or can be finished too quickly, but “deliberative excellence 
is correctness as to what one should achieve, and the way in which, and when 
[…].” (ne 1142b29). it is achieved not by trying to force the stream of time to 
stop but rather by tuning oneself to the right rhythm of the flow. This is the 
more important because the target is on the move – it can only be hit if subject 
and object are moving in the same rhythm in this dynamic.
finally, there is yet another dimension to the importance of the temporal 
element in human decision-making to be taken into account. it is not simply 
the objective flow of time that invites subjective response in particular cases or 
emergency situations. individuals also need a sense of timing in another way: to 
accumulate enough experience for a good improvisation by the time the deci-
sion is required. This temporal condition of the right amount of accumulated 
experience lets Aristotle say that “sense and comprehension and intelligence 
[…] depend on age”, adding that “experienced and older people, or wise ones 
[…] have an eye, formed from experience, they see correctly” (ne 1143b8, 
1143b13–14).
now my claim is that these two axes of what counts as ideal timing in Aristo-
tle, i.e., to find the intermediate between the too early and the too late, and be 
fortunate and careful enough to accumulate experience in life, will be central 
to our understanding of the conservative agenda. for it shows that liberals and 
conservatives definitely have a different perspective on the relevance of time for 
human decision-making. That conservatism is not simply a superficial admira-
tion of the past in direct contrast to the future-oriented positivism of the left-
ist ideologies is already made obvious by Titian’s famous painting of Prudence 
which presents the face of a young, of a middle-aged, and of an old man, rep-
resenting the past, the present, and the future. These faces show the different 
attitudes of the different generations, one caring about the past, the other facing 
the present, and the third one trying to make sense of the future. none of them 
is neglected by the artist, none of them is controlling the others. The three of 
them together build up prudence (phronesis), a virtue playing a pivotal role in 
conservative political theory as it is related to right timing, kairos.
in what follows we would first concentrate on Aristotle’s idea that, in order 
to achieve maximum safety in the temporal dimension, we have to obtain the 
virtue(s) which will help us to save energy and time in daily life. Then we point 
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out that the individual agent’s virtues themselves are insufficient to lead us with 
some guarantees in the labyrinth of political life. That is why we need to con-
sider the importance of communal practices for the conservative agenda. The 
role played by virtue(s) in our individual lives is complemented by the commu-
nal practices of our political communities. finally, we shall have a look at how 
communal practices are divided then into informal techniques of harmonising 
individual behaviour (moeurs) and formalised techniques of encouraging social 
cooperation on societal level (institutions).
3. VirTue As The AccuMulATed PrAcTicAl deliBerATions  
sTored in The indiViduAl’s ATTiTudes
Virtue, or aretê plays a key role in Aristotle’s moral theory. it is usually translated 
into english as excellence, and Aristotelian virtues – which were largely based 
on Plato’s example and socrates’s views on it – are identified in the literature 
as “complex rational, emotional and social skills” (Kraut 2012). however, even if 
they are social skills, they belong to the individual’s personal sphere: virtues (or 
the lack of them) build up – in the ancients most of the time – his moral behaviour. 
This is not the place to give a full account of Aristotle’s concept of virtue – the 
division of contemporary moral theory called virtue ethics has already done a lot 
to update our knowledge of it in accordance with recent philosophical develop-
ments. it is more interesting to ask if it can have any relevance in political theory 
– and especially in a conservative moral theory – today. To answer this question 
we are in need of a working definition of virtue in the Aristotelian sense in order to 
be able to show how it can turn out to be useful in a conservative theory.
now for Aristotle virtues are dispositions (hexis). And more exactly: “the 
excellence of a human being too will be the disposition whereby he becomes 
a good human being and from which he will perform his own function well” 
(ne 1106a24). And in a statement which refers back to our earlier discussion 
he adds:
excellence has to do with affections and actions, things in which excess, and defi-
ciency, go astray, while what is intermediate is praised and gets it right […] excel-
lence, then, is a kind of intermediacy, in so far as it is effective at hitting upon what 
is intermediate. (ne 1106b27–8)
 
in other words, virtue is a complex human skill that leads one to the right sort 
of action. And even among the virtues phronesis becomes a very special one: it 
is regarded by Aristotle as both an intellectual and a practical-moral excellence, 
and, as such, the virtue of virtues, a kind of meta-virtue. in other words, what 
Aristotle suggests is that practical wisdom will help us in risky situations to find 
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the right decision in time. it can help us to do this because virtues are disposi-
tions, or even more radically translated, habits, which means that they do not 
need the sort of rational deliberation each and every time an action has to be 
performed. Aristotle’s account of virtue in general, and phronesis in particular, 
does not aim at providing a description of the whole decision making procedure. 
This is because he does not believe that such a procedure can possibly be im-
parted. And yet he insists on the rationality of our moral choices. his point is 
that by conditioning ourselves to patterns of behaviour, or acquiring socially ac-
ceptable dispositions called virtues, we can ensure that in an unknown situation 
we shall be able to mobilise these rational potentials without losing time which 
is the most precious valuable in those very moments. Also, phronesis is so handy 
for him because it can stock all the knowledge one can acquire in one’s life in 
a condensed but easily unwrapped form and activate it in unfamiliar situations 
at the right time, too. The mechanism of how phronesis leads to action is not 
clearly described by Aristotle but that it is not a simple syllogism or mechanical 
rule-following is clear from his account, and nothing else is really relevant in this 
respect.
But what is the real political advantage in all these points? Well, it is, i hope, 
obvious by now. Aristotle’s concept of moral virtue in general, and of phronesis 
in particular can be used to override the sceptical premise of the political epis-
temology of conservatism. After all, what Aristotle argues for is a kind of rational 
knowledge in the political sphere which, however, has nothing of the a priori 
in its nature. in this respect Gadamer’s account of the Aristotelian analysis of 
phronesis sounds quite convincing for he succeeds to show that although this 
form of knowledge has no universal validity, it does not sink into mere sub-
jectivism or emotivism, either. on the contrary. it helps the political agent to 
behave in a rational way in politics without disregarding the requirements of this 
particular form of craft. it presents the activity of the statesman as based on prin-
ciples, without becoming clumsy or inadequate. The prudent politician handles 
each case by mobilising the means of the adequate solution to it from the situa-
tion itself and from his own conditioned reservoir of earlier experiences.
4. The coMMunAl diMension of VirTue PoliTics: PrAcTices
The Aristotelian doctrine of virtues enables the individual to mobilise his ac-
cumulated experience in an emergency situation. it can also be read, however, 
as a summary of social norms: a manual of what is required from the agent by 
the Athenian political community. But it can only make sense if we suppose the 
existence of particular forms of social coordination mechanisms called practices. 
This concept has been worked out in 20th century philosophy – among others – 
by Michael oakeshott and Alasdair Macintyre.
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Practice, or activity, for oakeshott is a kind of social game played by a limited 
number of people to achieve certain ends. he takes, for example, the activities 
of the historian, the cook, the scientist, or the politician (oakeshott 1962/1991. 
117). All of them, he claims, are engaged in a certain way of behaviour defined 
by the particular questions this activity tries to answer. Those people belong 
to a given group – who think they know where and how to look for the answer 
to these particular questions. however, oakeshott also keeps emphasising that 
their knowledge is not given “to be such in advance of the activity of trying to 
answer them.” his knowledge is about the practice of that activity in general but 
the activity itself generates particular questions as well as the modes how they can 
be answered, and none of them can be foreseen before they are actually born. But 
the activity itself already exists before any one practitioner of it will actually take 
part in it, just as language exists before any particular speaker starts to use it. it is 
in this sense that political action is not individual: it always happens in the context 
of what we could call political practice. There are other participants, other ques-
tions, other efforts to try to answer those questions. And each and every activity 
needs to have an idiom (as opposed to well-defined rules): a certain “knowledge 
of how to behave appropriately in the circumstances” (oakeshott 1962/1991. 121). 
This knowledge cannot be abstracted from the very practice itself: “it is only in 
the practice of an activity that we can acquire the knowledge of how to practise 
it”. it is in the very activity where the knowledge is stocked: “principles, rules 
and purposes are mere abridgments of the coherence of the activity” (oakeshott 
1962/1991. 122). But there are certain “elements” which can be identified “with 
a relatively firm outline” within the pattern inherent in a certain activity: “we call 
these elements, customs, traditions, institutions, laws, etc.” oakeshott identifies 
these relatively firm and solid parts of a given pattern of activity as “the substance 
of our knowledge of how to behave” within that particular form of activity. The 
pronoun ‘our’ shows that this is not the knowledge of a single person but shared 
by all those who participate in the activity in an adequate way. We shall turn to-
wards these crystallised forms of social knowledge in the last part of our paper very 
soon. Before that, however, let us look at an alternative description of practice – 
this time by Professor Macintyre.
Macintyre calls practice in his book After virtue
any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity 
through which goods internal to that form of activity are realised in the course 
of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and 
partially definitive of that form of activity, with the result that human powers to 
achieve excellence, and human conceptions to the ends and goods involved, are 
systematically extended. (Macintyre 1985. 187)
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he calls leisure activities, and sports like football and chess, useful arts like 
architecture, and fine arts like painting, farming as well as the work of the his-
torian, and music, too, practice. And he also regards politics as practice in the 
Aristotelian sense.
What is the novelty of this understanding of the activity of politics? one of 
the important points of this analysis is to show that the fruits of a practice are 
not only to be looked for outside of the very practice but also inside. certain 
patterned activities are good in themselves – because they help us to fulfil the 
potentials inherent in human nature. in this sense the activity of doing politics 
is not simply useful if it leads to political success – as a certain form of activity it 
might be valuable in itself, independently of the external consequences resulting 
from it. But what does the internal value of politics consist in? The activity of poli-
tics gives us occasion to relate ourselves to our fellows in the polis in a way that is 
characteristic of the potential of being human: by it we can prove that we are just, 
courageous and temperate. it is a way to become better as human individuals by 
becoming better participants of the given practice. in this sense the polis edu-
cates its members in a way that the modern state can hardly do by now.
Yet what is specifically conservative in these two descriptions of political prac-
tice? There is no doubt that both oakeshott and Macintyre relied on Aristotle 
heavily. But the question still remains whether this analysis belongs to what 
is legitimately called conservatism today, or not. i would like to argue that the 
answer to this question is yes. These descriptions of practice are to be seen as 
answers to the specific problem of the time constraint which we characterised as 
the sceptical starting point of conservative politics. According to this insight, a 
primary problem for a political agent is the lack of adequate time span to process 
rational deliberation to choose the right type of action in a tight political situa-
tion. i showed how virtue, or conditioned hexis is an answer to this sort of time 
constraint: a virtuous agent does not need to think each time before he would 
choose the right action in a given situation because his disposition contains all 
the knowledge, in condensed form, he might need even in a brand new situ-
ation. if we accept the conclusion that the concept of virtue is a conservative 
answer to the characteristic preliminary conservative problem of time constraint, 
we only need to see that the analysis of practice is also directly linked to this set 
of problems. i propose to understand the concept of practice as the communal 
side of individual virtue. Virtue as the habituated knowledge of the individual 
of how to behave in situations for which there are no exact rules of behaviour 
only makes sense if we realise that individual action in politics is governed by a 
socially constituted framework called practice which orders the relationships of 
individual behaviours in a given situation. if virtue is an accumulated and con-
densed form of that knowledge which the individual requires to be able to make 
the right decision in a given situation, practice is the reservoir of communal 
knowledge responsible for the right coordination of individual actions in pos-
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sible situations. Practice is also a form of phronetic knowledge in the sense that it 
is not a set of abstract norms, rules, or etiquettes, but a practical way to handle 
complex social relationships in a way that fits the situation, and the participants 
who take part in them at the same time.
5. forMAlised And inforMAl PrAcTices:  
insTiTuTions, MOEURS, PoliTicAl culTure
As we have seen, one can separate certain items within the general phenomenon 
of what is called practice, in our case within political practice. A conventional way 
to distinguish between different types of this crystallisations is to identify formal 
and informal ones among them. formalised solid structures within a given activity 
are called institutions, while the not less important informal ones, which are, how-
ever, much more difficult to explain, are labelled as moeurs or conventions. formal 
institutions and informal moeurs build up what we call political culture.
in his detailed and sensitive description of the unprecedented workings of 
American democracy, Tocqueville focused on institutions and moeurs as part 
of his effort to describe the characteristics of the political culture of the new 
World. in this effort of his, he could rely on forerunners like Montesquieu or 
rousseau who tried to define the differentia specifica of modern republics be-
fore him. certainly the identification of the different forms of government went 
back even in the 19th century to ancient sources, among whom Aristotle played a 
pivotal role. But the novelty of Tocqueville’s effort was that he was not satisfied 
with simply identifying the form of rule, or political regime. rather, he tried to 
show that democracy is more than a power structure, it is better to be regarded 
as a certain form of life. he succeeded to show that it was due to certain histori-
cal peculiarities of the birth of the united states that some unintended conse-
quences engendered a certain way of practicing politics. And this held true not 
only of the governing elite, but in an undifferentiated way of all those partaking 
in political life – and certainly one of the key points was that a lot more people 
engaged in politics on a regular, but most of the time non-professional basis.
institutions are legally confirmed forms of social cooperation, fixed practices 
that help to make the flow of political life smoother. They guarantee proce-
dures, intersubjective relationships, and room for manoeuvring for individual or 
group participants taking part in it. institutionalisation is a formalisation of hu-
man cooperation that is highly recommended by conservatives because institu-
tions serve to make manifest and available the experience of earlier generations 
for any member of the present generation of the political community. This way 
it makes political life less rough and more foreseeable.
But institutions are highly recommended by other ideologies of Western 
democratic politics as well, even if they do not rely on it, most of the time, as a 
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solution to the problem of time constraint. Therefore, the informal constructs of 
political activity, the soft forms of social expectations encoded under the name 
moeurs are perhaps more characteristically conservative means of providing social 
peace. here there are no formal agreements, contracts, legal sanctions or any 
form of government pressure behind the self-controlling mechanisms of society. 
rather, requirements are “expressed” in the forms of habits or customs, i.e., in 
patterns of behaviour that are repeated in wide enough circles within a certain 
community to be regarded as social expectations. it is based on the Aristotelian 
insight that the human learning process is based on imitation, and on the mass 
psychological observation that individuals are keen to adapt the norms of a given 
society in order to get in on it.
comparative studies of political culture reveal the fact that the frequency 
and the elaborateness of the network of institutions and informal behavioural 
patterns can indicate the level of development of the political culture of a given 
political community. According to the conservative agenda, these crystallised 
parts of political activities should be encouraged because they can safeguard 
public peace and prosperity by transferring the experience of earlier generations 
to the next one. They all contribute to handle the temporal deficit of political 
agents in actual political situations – this way they answer the first problem of 
the conservative politician and the conservative thinker.
6. suMMArY: PHRONESIS, KAIROS, VirTue, inforMAl  
And forMAl PrAcTice
in this paper i tried to show that if one wants to understand the perspective of 
conservatism on time, it should not be interpreted as a simple nostalgia for the 
past. on the contrary, conservatives care about the present moment: they call at-
tention to the fact that political agents can rarely have enough time to process a 
whole programme of rational deliberation before they decide in a tight situation. it 
is in order to handle this time constraint that they rely on the Aristotelian notion of 
practical wisdom, or phronesis: this is a kind of meta-virtue, intellectual and moral 
excellence at the same time which enables the agent to make the right decision 
and act on it without the sort of rational enquiry into the nature of the cause that 
would be required in a theoretically defensible process like in a scientific investi-
gation. Phronesis is a kind of conditioned, habituated form of technical knowledge 
which, however, does not allow any subjective preference to take the lead as a 
motivational force in one’s decision making. Phronesis in the Aristotelian discourse 
is closely connected with the concept of kairos which denotes the ideal moment 
for an action to be executed. Practical wisdom leads us to find the kairotic moment 
which is neither too fast nor too slow, and which ensures that the agent be tuned 
to the rhythm of the dynamic of the object he targets.
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finally, i tried to show that while phronesis is an individual virtue, it has a 
communal counterpart, called practice by oakeshott and Macintyre. Practice 
expresses the accumulated practical wisdom of the community by channelling 
individual behaviour in a given community’s political life, relying on the experi-
ence of earlier generations, expressing it in practical knowledge instead of fixed 
rules. There are two types of practice: while institutions are pretty stable forms 
of social cooperation, based on formalised human activity, moeurs are habits, cus-
toms and conventions, unwritten rules, that govern members of a group without 
reflecting on the very rules individuals are following.3
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